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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

AL-AHRAM Article Cites Ukrainian Missiles to Iran *[Moscow International]* 1
Scandinavian Ministers Discuss Baltic Request for Weapons *[PRAVDA 7 May]* 1
USSR, Japan Allegedly Dumped Mustard Gas at Sea *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 2

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

Council of CIS Defense Ministers Meets in Moscow *[ITAR-TASS]* 3
Ukrainian Delegation Absent *[ITAR-TASS]* 3
Shaposhnikov Comments *[ITAR-TASS]* 3
Shaposhnikov on Meeting Agenda *[Russian TV]* 3
Moldova Absent From Yerevan Interior Ministers Meeting *[Moscow Radio]* 4
Russia's Yerin Comments *[Moscow TV]* 4
CIS Heads of State To Discuss Collective Security *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 May]* 4
Interstate Space Council Discusses Cooperation in Kiev *[UKRINFORM]* 5

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Talbott Unveils U.S. Nuclear Arms Mediation Offer *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 12 May]* 6
Kozyrev Protests Estonia's Admission to European Council *[Moscow TV]* 6
Further on Protest *[BNS]* 6
Protests Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 7
Embassy in Zagreb Releases Statement on Churkin Talks *[ITAR-TASS]* 7
Yastrzhembskiy Comments *[Moscow Radio]* 7
Yastrzhembskiy on Results of Russian, Abkhaz Talks *[Moscow Radio]* 7
Yeltsin Message to Shevardnadze *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 8
Situation Reviewed *[Moscow TV]* 8
Kozyrev Cited on Veto on UN Cyprus Vote *[Moscow TV]* 9
Results of Mulroney Visit to Russia Assessed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 9
Admiral Kasatonov on Black Sea Fleet *[ROSSIYA 12-18 May]* 10
Government To Help Train Kazakh Nuclear Specialists *[Radio Rossii]* 11
Baltic States' Council of Europe Membership Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 11
Commentary on Cooperation With Western Nations *[Moscow International]* 12
Border Revision Suggested To Resolve Karabakh Conflict *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 12
Yeltsin Signs Decree Establishing Ties With Eritrea *[Radio Rossii]* 13
Nationalists Visit Europe, Claim Western Support *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 11 May]* 13

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Constitution Issues

Yeltsin Addresses Working Group on Constitution *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 12 May]* 15
Reactions to Yeltsin's Draft Constitution Viewed *[Radio Rossii]* 15
Yeltsin Seen 'Pushing Ahead' on Constitution *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 16
Yeltsin's Draft Speeds Up Work on New Constitution *[ITAR-TASS]* 17
Draft Constitution Commission Members Listed *[ITAR-TASS]* 17
Further on Khasbulatov Meeting on Constitution 18
Election of Local Leaders Urged *[ITAR-TASS]* 18
'Excerpts' of Khasbulatov Address *[Russian TV]* 18
Regions May Combine Drafts *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 19
Khasbulatov Article on Ending Constitutional Crisis *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 20

Political Issues

Chernomyrdin Chairs Council Presidium Session *[ITAR-TASS]* 25
Council Calls For Draft Programs *[Russian TV]* 25
Rutskoy Relieved of Duty of Receiving Ambassadors *[ITAR-TASS]* 25
Yeltsin Assassination Attempt Reports Called 'Provocative' *[Moscow TV]* 25
Kozyrev Comments on Recent 'Cadre Purge' *[SEGODNYA 12 May]* 26

Yeltsin Aide on Reshuffle, Rumored Replacement *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 26
Further on Shakhray Comments at Roundtable *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 27
Referendum Results Show 26 Territories Opposed Yeltsin *[Radio Rossii]* 27
Presidential Aide Volkov Interviewed *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 12 May]* 27
Social Democrats Elect New Leaders; Party Splits *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 12 May]* 29
Gaydar Interviewed on Possible Return to Government
[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 12 May] 30

Economic Issues

Soskovets Gives News Conference on Industrial Policy *[Moscow TV]* 31
Comments on Economic Reform *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 32
Chernomyrdin Urges 'Cooperation' Among Various Forces *[ITAR-TASS]* 32
Describes Government's Economic Policy *[ITAR-TASS]* 32
Calls For Accord in Curbing Inflation *[ITAR-TASS]* 33
Yeltsin Issues Decree on Privatization Guarantees *[Radio Rossii]* 33

Supreme Soviet

Yeltsin's Actions on New Constitution Challenged *[ITAR-TASS]* 33
Constitutional Commission Timetable Reported *[Radio Rossii]* 34
Exclusion of Officials From Rostrum Protested *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 34
Soviet of Nationalities Adopts Bill on Auditing *[Moscow Radio]* 34

Regional Affairs

Chechen Parliament Removes Dudayev From Government *[Radio Rossii]* 34
More on Chernomyrdin Visit to North Caucasus *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 34
Trip Results Evaluated *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 13 May]* 35
Shakhray in Murmansk To Explain Yeltsin Constitution *[Moscow TV]* 36
Aushev Welcomes Plan for More Troops in Ingushetia *[Radio Rossii]* 36
Yeltsin, Chita Administration Head Discuss Referendum *[Radio Rossii]* 36
Dudayev Views Relations With Russia, Ukraine *[ZA VILNU UKRAYINU 6 May]* 36

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Strobe Talbott, Delegation in Kiev for Visit *[Kiev International]* 39
Trip Shows Change in U.S. 'Tactic' *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 39
Results Seen as 'Nil' *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 12 May]* 40
Environmental Protection Minister Views START I *[KHRESHCHATYK 28 Apr]* 40
Defense Minister on Black Sea Fleet Ownership *[UKRINFORM]* 41
Russian Envoy Blames Ukraine for Stalemate *[Kiev International]* 41
Plyushch Meets With Iran's Hashemi-Rafsanjani *[Kiev International]* 41
Morozov Holds Meeting With Polish Army Chief *[Kiev International]* 41
Agreements Reached With Turkmenistan in Transport *[UKRINFORM]* 42

National Affairs

Parties Hold Talks on Possible New Constitution *[Kiev International]* 42
Democratic Party Urges Extraordinary Measures *[UKRINFORM]* 42
Greens Party Opposes Retention of Nuclear Arms *[KHRESHCHATYK 28 Apr]* 42
Deputy Supreme Soviet Chairman's Remarks Criticized *[SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA 30 Apr]* 43
Parliament Decrees No Price Raise Until After 18 May *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 11 May]* 43
Economic Statistics Released for First Quarter *[ECONOMIC NEWS AGENCY]* 43
Cabinet, Trade Union Groups Sign Agreement *[Kiev International]* 43

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Defense Pact on Bilateral Contacts With Poland Signed *[VO SLAVU RODINY 4 May]* 45
Kebich's Visit to United Arab Emirates Achieved Goals *[Minsk Radio]* 46
Delegation Attending CIS Summit 'With Guarded Optimism' *[Moscow Mayak]* 46
Import of Russian Newspapers, Except IZVESTIYA, Banned *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 46
Army Shortfall Attributed to 'Draft-Dodgers' *[RID]* 46
Servicemen Banned From 'Sociopolitical' Activity *[Minsk Radio]* 46

Moldova

Parliament Discusses Draft Law on Status of Gagauz *[Bucharest ROMPRES]* 47
Snegur Urges Accord With Gagauzia *[BASAPRESS]* 47
Ethnic Gagauz Reserve Right to Self-Determination *[BASAPRESS]* 47
Gagauz Leader Analyzes Prospects for Settlement *[ROSSIYA 12-18 May]* 48
Government Achieves Understanding With Dniester *[ITAR-TASS]* 48
Dniester Leader Caraman Cited on Talks With Snegur *[BASAPRESS]* 48
Memorandum Signed With CSCE Mission on Dniester *[Moscow Radio]* 49
Dniester Republic Bank Financed From Moscow *[BASAPRESS]* 49
Sangheli Receives UNDP Officials, Discusses Assistance *[Bucharest ROMPRES]* 49
Snegur Meets With UN Official *[Bucharest Radio]* 49

CAUCASUS

Armenia

Spokesman Discusses Developments on Tripartite Plan *[Yerevan International]* 50
Karabakh Official Comments *[SNARK]* 50
Azerbaijan Said Provoking Karabakh To Start Offensive *[SNARK]* 50
More on 'Provocative Activities' *[Yerevan Radio]* 51
Defense Department Reports 3 Soldiers Wounded *[SNARK]* 51

Azerbaijan

Foreign Ministry on 'New Armenian Aggression' *[TURAN]* 51
Calls For UN Action *[ITAR-TASS]* 51
Defense Ministry Reports Continuing Armenian Fire on NAR *[TURAN]* 52
More on Fighting *[ITAR-TASS]* 52
Troops 'Forced' To Retaliate Against Armenian Shelling *[TURAN]* 52
Mitterrand Letter Notes Concern Over Conflict *[TURAN]* 53
National Assembly Confirms 10 Cabinet Ministers *[Baku TV]* 53
Mullazade To Head Foreign Relations Department *[Baku Radio]* 53

Georgia

Hostages Freed From Russian 'Army Township' *[ITAR-TASS]* 53
Shevardnadze Interviewed on Kutaisi Investigation *[Tbilisi TV]* 53
Russian Troops Press Cited *[ITAR-TASS]* 54
Rocket Attack Against Sukhumi City Center Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 54
Recent Resignations of Kitovani, Ioseliani Analyzed *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 16 May]* 54

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Talks With Russia on Military Withdrawal Resume *[Tallinn Radio]* 56
Defense Minister Rebas Interviewed *[Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 24 Apr]* 56

Latvia

Ministry Protests to Russia Over Baltic Maneuvers *[Riga Radio]* 58
More on Protest *[Riga Radio]* 58
Russian Stance on Estonia Council Membership Criticized *[LETA]* 58
Iraqis Said Receiving Russian Training at Naval Base *[Riga Radio]* 58
Premier, Delegation Return From Visit to France *[Riga Radio]* 59

Lithuania

Foreign Minister Meets EC Commissioner *[Vilnius International]* 59
Presidential Aide Discusses Foreign Policy *[VALSTIECIU LAIKRASTIS 20 Apr]* 59
Economic Committee Head Criticizes Agrarian Reform *[VALSTIECIU LAIKRASTIS 17 Apr]* 60

AL-AHRAM Article Cites Ukrainian Missiles to Iran

NC1305072993 Moscow Radio Moscow in Persian 1330 GMT 12 May 93

[Commentary by Sergey Viktorov]

[Text] Ukraine has delivered eight cruise missiles to Iran that can be targeted at any ship in the Strait of Hormuz from the Iranian coast. This was reported yesterday by Egypt's AL-AHRAM newspaper citing British and U.S. intelligence organizations. It is also pointed out that the maximum flight capability of these missiles is 17 seconds.

According to allegations from these sources, the sale of these arms forms part of the Iranian-Ukrainian agreement on modernizing the Iranian Army in which a number of fighter planes, namely MIG- 29's, more than (?200) T-72 tanks, and air defense equipment are to be sold to Iran. Radio Moscow commentator Sergey Viktorov writes in relation to this:

As we can see, the Egyptian newspaper has touched on an extremely subtle part of the Iranian-Ukrainian agreements, that is, the agreement on military-technical cooperation. The figures that have been published are spectacular even for a big country (?like Iran) [words indistinct]. However, the important point that is the sale of cruise missiles to Iran and details on these missiles' range of operation in the Strait of Hormuz. After all, as we know almost one-fifth of the oil used by the world passes through the Strait.

We will not speak about the reliability of this information, especially since there is no love lost between the Egyptian newspaper and its sources—the special services of the United States and Britain—and Iran. It is even unnecessary to speak in length about the coincidence of the report published in the Egyptian newspaper with the official visit to Tehran by Ukrainian Speaker Ivan Plyushch during which the two sides are constantly emphasizing the need for the comprehensive expansion of relations, even though I think that this strong interest by Ukrainian statesmen in Iran is not accidental. It should also be noted that Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Yuliy Ioffe also visited Tehran recently.

But let us try to study the essence of the issue. What is the outlook of military-technical cooperation between Kiev and Tehran? We should assume that the outlook of cooperation is studied within the framework of the domestic considerations of both countries as well as the international situation. Ukraine's interest in cooperation with Iran is understandable and the issue of oil and of oil products (?is important). This was explicitly stated by Ivan Plyushch, the high-ranking Ukrainian guest, at Mehrabad Airport. Because of fuel shortages due to reduced deliveries from Russia, the Ukrainian economy is being stifled in its true sense. And the reduction in Russian oil products is due to genuine reasons.

Under such conditions, can Kiev refuse to cooperate with Iran even if there are some in the West who do not like it? It cannot and does not have the right to do so. But the fact that it is easier for Ukraine to offer arms for oil is another matter since arms are among the few competitive items that Ukraine can offer. Meanwhile, Iran needs arms because—as correctly pointed out by AL-AHRAM—Iran is thinking of modernizing its army. In exchange for its [word indistinct], Tehran wants to receive modern arms from Kiev and namely MIG-29's and T-72 tanks. There is nothing special about such transactions, especially when Iran is purchasing arms from other countries, namely from Russia, and when the United States is overtly selling billions of dollars of arms to the region.

But in relation to this, only one question arises as far as the cruise missiles are concerned. The expansion of missile capabilities is an international issue since the international community and its representative, the United Nations, oppose this. It is sufficient to recall the commotion in the United States last year on the sale to India of Russian (?cryogenic) motors for missiles. Even though this transaction did take place, I nevertheless think that both Kiev and Tehran should think about the aftermath of this, at least about giving some explanation to the world's social circles.

Scandinavian Ministers Discuss Baltic Request for Weapons

PM1005120393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 93 p 3

[Aleksey Boldinyuk report: "Baltic Region Requests Arms"]

[Text] Helsinki, 6 May—A meeting of defense ministers of the Scandinavian countries has taken place in the Swedish city of Karlskrona. It discussed a request from the Baltic states to supply them with weapons "for self defens- " The ministers' common view was expressed by E. Rehn, representing Finland. In her words, northern countries will neither give nor sell weapons to the Baltic region—indeed, now it is far more important to help the young states "in the civilian sphere." For instance, in the sphere of education.

Swedish Defense Minister A. Bjork, who is scheduled to make his first official visit to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, told his colleagues that the Baltic states will nevertheless receive sundry gifts—old equipment for radio stations, and pistols, which are not classed as "combat arms." The defense minister added that Sweden will never supply the Baltic region with anything more sophisticated [seryoznyy], as this would contradict the laws of the country.

In the final communique, the ministers again voiced a demand for the swift withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries' territory. Talk about the direct

threat to the security and independence of these countries stemming from Russia's troops has increased markedly here in recent times. Estonian Foreign Minister T. Velliste mentioned it in an interview for the Helsinki newspaper HUFVUDSTADSBLADET. Political relations between Estonia and Russia have not been regulated, the minister declared, the issue of the border is very far indeed from a solution, and troop withdrawals have virtually ceased. "In theory, there is a risk of attack on the Baltic countries (from Russia)," the Estonian minister said. "In practice the development of events is slow, but it is moving in a direction favorable from the Baltic countries' viewpoint."

Obviously the decision by the Scandinavian countries' defense ministers that it would be better to develop international cooperation in securing a stabilization of the Baltic Region's economy rather than to send weapons there was also made on the basis of this consideration.

USSR, Japan Allegedly Dumped Mustard Gas at Sea

PM1305085393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 7

[Unattributed report under "Rumors" rubric: "USSR Might Have Sunk Mustard Gas in Sea of Japan"]

[Text] The Japanese Government would like to receive an explanation from Russia with regard to data to the effect that during the forties the USSR sank approximately 30,000 tonnes of mustard gas in various containers in the Sea of Japan. This was stated at a news conference in Tokyo yesterday by Yoshiro Mori, the country's minister of international trade and industry, ITAR-TASS reports.

He pointed out that the data on the sinking of mustard gas have not yet been confirmed. But if they tally with reality, Mori said, this undoubtedly "poses a serious problem"—just like the question of the Soviet Union's dumping of radioactive waste and spent nuclear reactors in the Sea of Japan. The minister reported that his government is formulating its position with due regard for the information which it hopes to receive in this regard from Russia.

Citing Russian official sources, the Tokyo press has published a report that in the forties, after the end of World War II, the USSR dumped in the Sea of Japan a considerable number of bombs, shells, and containers containing, in toto, approximately 30,000 tonnes of liquid mustard gas at the end of its useful life. Data on the sites of these burials have not yet been cited. According to specialists' forecasts, the casings of these munitions could be destroyed by corrosion in just a few years' time.

Experts of the Japanese National Defense Agency have reported, the newspaper ASAHI writes, that mustard gas easily solidifies at a temperature below 15 degrees, is heavier than water, and on contact with water gradually turns into a substance with low toxicity. Therefore experts believe that the zone of contamination with this toxin, even if the casings of the munitions and the containers are destroyed, will be quite local. Account here is also taken of the fact that the current international ban on sea burials of toxins does not extend to toxins dumped in the water before 1985.

According to information available, the Japanese armed forces have also sunk mustard gas containers in Tokyo Bay, Beppu Bay, and other regions in various years, but the details of these operations are still not known.

Council of CIS Defense Ministers Meets in Moscow

LD1305074193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0642 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—The Council of the Ministers of Defence of the Commonwealth member countries opened at Moscow headquarters of the chief commandment [as received] of the allied armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States today. The defence ministers are discussing draft agreements which will be submitted to the Council of the Heads of State on Friday, according to Lieutenant-General Leonid Ivashov.

The Council of the Heads of State will consider the draft resolution on the main directions of raising the defence capability of the Commonwealth member countries and deepening military cooperation. Other draft agreements considered today concern the allied armed forces and the main principles and conditions of military service in these forces by servicemen who are citizens of other Commonwealth member countries. This last point may be postponed until the next meeting of the heads of state, Ivashov said.

Representatives of the defence ministries will also examine a number of questions of technical nature, including draft resolutions on the organisation of coded and confidential communication between the chief commandment [as received] and the commanding bodies in the armed forces of the Commonwealth member countries, the accreditation of representatives of foreign states and military- political alliances.

Ukrainian Delegation Absent

LD1305082993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0730 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 13 May—In the Moscow headquarters of the Chief Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS today, a session of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the countries of the Commonwealth has begun. Taking part in it are the heads of military departments of the nine countries of the Commonwealth. Moldova has sent an observer to Moscow. The places allocated at the talks table for the Ukrainian delegation were empty even after the start of the session.

Belarus and Tajikistan are represented at the Council by heads of military departments. Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are represented at the level of deputy ministers of defense and chiefs of main staffs.

As commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, who is chairman at the Council of Defense Ministers, noted that there are three questions on the agenda that will be introduced tomorrow at the commonwealth summit. These are the protocol decision on the main directions of raising the defense potential of the member states of the commonwealth and of deepening military cooperation, on the agreements on the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, and on the basic principles of service by servicemen of other nationalities in the member states of the Commonwealth.

Shaposhnikov Comments

LD1305091193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0819 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—"Today we shall discuss concrete measures to promote military cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States," Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov told journalists before opening the CIS Council of Defence Ministers here. "The documents, drawn up by the Supreme Command, stipulate the coordination of military, military-political and military-technical efforts at various levels: both within the framework of the Tashkent collective security treaty, and on the basis of bilateral agreements," the commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces stated.

"I believe a military union among some CIS states is possible," Shaposhnikov said, replying to an ITAR-TASS question. "Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan could provide the core for genuine economic and military-political integration, a real defensive union," he said.

Turning to the safety of nuclear weapons, deployed in Ukraine, Marshal Shaposhnikov noted: "I have never heard the Ukrainian leadership say that it assumes the functions of controlling nuclear weapons. My last talk with Ukrainian Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov, which took place a week ago, confirmed that the leadership of that state does not insist on a nuclear power status for Ukraine, as the other CIS nations, Ukraine possesses documents, regulating mutual commitments in the field of nuclear safety. They include agreements, signed by the CIS heads of state, and also the Lisbon protocol, which Ukraine has to ratify," the commander-in-chief stressed.

Marshal Shaposhnikov is against the use of strength to resolve the Yugoslavian problem. "I think political methods have still not been fully used to resolve the Yugoslavian issue," he stressed.

Shaposhnikov on Meeting Agenda

LD1305105993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 93

[By unidentified correspondent on CIS defense ministers' meeting, including recorded remarks by Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A meeting of the CIS defense ministers took place today in the headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces' Main Command, on the eve of tomorrow's conference of Commonwealth heads of state.

[Unidentified correspondent] There were three main issues on the agenda for today's meeting: enhancing the defense capability of the Commonwealth states; agreements on the CIS Joint Armed Forces; and the main principles and conditions for carrying out military service for servicemen of a different nationality in CIS states.

In an interview before the meeting, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said that he believes in the possibility of having a military alliance among certain of the Commonwealth states, and that Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan could be the core of real economic and political integration. In response to the question of why the Ukrainian Parliament has for so long failed to ratify the Lisbon Agreement and the SALT I and SALT II [as heard] treaties, the Joint Armed Forces commander in chief replied thus:

[Shaposhnikov] There are two things here, one good and one bad. It is bad in that ratification should have been faster, and good in that the members of parliament are looking into what the nuclear weapons are and what it would cost Ukraine to store, keep, and maintain these nuclear weapons. This amounts to billions and billions of rubles, all the more so since in 2000—or, say, at the start of the next century—all the missile launchers in Ukraine will become obsolete. [Video shows defense ministers session in progress; Shaposhnikov in foyer interview.]

Moldova Absent From Yerevan Interior Ministers Meeting

LD1205113093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] A meeting of ministers of interior of CIS states opened in Yerevan today, participated in by heads of Ministries of Interior of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Estonia.

The place reserved for Moldova at this roundtable is empty; the leaders of the Interior Ministry of this republic are absent for a valid reason.

The meeting will go on for two days, discussing interaction and cooperation in fighting organized crime and other no less dangerous crimes on the territory of the Commonwealth.

Russia's Yerin Comments

LD1305085093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 12 May 93

[By Vladimir Nazaryan on meeting of CIS interior ministers in Yerevan, including recorded remarks by Russian Internal Affairs Minister V. Yerin; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A meeting of the CIS interior ministers and several other former Union republics started today in Yerevan.

[Nazaryan] The main item on the agenda is the formulation of an agreement on cooperation over matters of anti-criminal backup equipment for operational and service activities. A program of joint measures to fight organized crime and other kinds of dangerous crimes, drawn up in January this year, is also to be ratified.

Within the framework of the meeting today, the signing took place of a bilateral agreement on cooperation between the interior ministers of Armenia and the Russian Federation.

[Yerin] The conclusion of a bilateral agreement, which is a certain fulfilment of our multilateral accords, also makes it possible to carry out in a more specific way practical measures to unmask certain criminal groups that are active both on the territory of Armenia and on the territory of Russia, and to exchange experience of our work and, most importantly, specific information.

CIS Heads of State To Discuss Collective Security

PM1305101993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 93 p 3

[Aleksandr Pelts article: "Three Tasks in Common"]

[Text] Three common tasks have been laid out in draft documents to be submitted to the CIS heads of state.

As you know, there is to be a routine meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state in the immediate future. The agenda, understandably, has not yet been defined, but it is quite likely that the leaders of the CIS countries will also discuss problems of collective security.

The meeting of government heads in Minsk 28 April, too, examined issues of military cooperation, and the prime ministers initialed a number of drafts. So, the presidents now have the final say. The most important thing may be the agreement on the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces of 22 January this year, formulated on the instructions of the Council of the CIS Heads of State. According to the draft the parties to the Collective Security Treaty believe that a proportion of their national armed forces should be allocated to defend the interests of the Commonwealth countries. The draft also highlights three tasks confronting the Joint Armed Forces: localizing conflicts on external borders, averting a military threat, and repulsing possible military aggression.

In peacetime the allocated forces come under the jurisdiction of the national defense ministries. The High Command (whose composition and numerical strength still have to be clarified) will only exercise coordinating command and control. Every independent state decides for itself what proportion of its armed forces to allocate for the formation of the Commonwealth Joint Armed

Forces. To date it is only clear that they will consist of groupings used for antiaircraft defense and protecting state borders.

Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the Council of Commonwealth Defense Ministers, stressed during a conversation with your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that other important documents have also been drafted and made ready for the routine summit meeting. In particular, they comprise documents pertaining to the mechanism for implementing the Collective Security Treaty (the appointment of the general secretary of the Collective Security Council and its working organs) and also to the terms and mechanism for other states to accede to this treaty (this draft document was, incidentally, introduced at Russia's suggestion). The statute regarding the Council of Commonwealth Border Troop Commanders, on the basic principles for military cooperation, and the interstate commission on military-technical cooperation is undoubtedly also important and topical.

Lt. Gen. Leonid Ivashov stressed that this all this will make it possible to considerably improve the set of measures designed to ensure collective security, and although there is still plenty of work to do, the main thing has been accomplished. The Commonwealth defense ministers will coordinate their positions once and for all at their Council 13 May and will be able to submit a sizeable package of military questions to the latest meeting of the heads of state.

Interstate Space Council Discusses Cooperation in Kiev

LD1305083893 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1525 GMT 12 May 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Oleksiy Petrunya]

[Text] [No dateline as received]—Issues of cooperation in mastering the expanse of space are being discussed by participants in a session of the Interstate Space Council [Mizhderzhavna Rada po Kosmosu], which opened in Kiev on 12 May. The center of attention is the validation of an interstate space program for this year, the discussion of draft agreements on the Executive Committee of the Interstate Space Council, and on its budget, and the procedure of making mutual payments and ensuring the clearance of mutual payments between states.

Heads of national space research and exploitation agencies from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine put forward their concepts of cooperation.

Volodymyr Horbulin, director general of the National Space Agency of Ukraine, told a UKRINFORM correspondent the following:

"Our agency is only one year old. In that period of time, organizational issues have been settled and a number of government decisions have been adopted on developing space research for purposes of the national economy.

"Our main objective now is to reorient space programs toward solely civilian requirements and those of the national economy. The registration of enterprises and organizations of our country has been carried out in respect of their readiness to supply the needs of space research. Principles of a national space program have been worked out. Among them is the creation of our own space equipment, the development of links with the former USSR republics, the integration in the activity of the world community in researching and exploiting the expanse of space, and the introduction of mixed financing of the program, i.e. not only drawing in budgetary funds but also the capital of commercial structures."

The aim of the Interstate Space Council in the first place is to develop cooperation between the former Soviet Union republics and to draw up a joint concept, Volodymyr Horbulin noted. For example, Ukraine is allocating 36 billion karbovantsi to space programs, with 11 billion out of that amount for the implementation of the interstate program.

"Working together, we shall be able to do more for our countries and their economies", the director general stressed.

The session's final documents will be presented at a meeting between the CIS heads of state, though maybe not at the next one but in a meeting. After all, quite a lot of details in joint documents still need to be finalized.

Talbott Unveils U.S. Nuclear Arms Mediation Offer

MK1205120693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 12 May 93 p 10

[Veniamin Zasulskiy, Natalya Kalashnikova report: "Nuclear Arms Talks. The U.S. Offers Mediation to Russia, Ukraine"]

[Text] Strobe Talbott, ambassador at large and adviser for CIS issues, made a proposal yesterday in Kiev that came as a surprise to many observers, offering U.S. mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over nuclear arms. Thus the Clinton administration has once again demonstrated its interest in seeing Russian-Ukrainian nuclear contradictions resolved because in the U.S. view, they have reached too serious a point.

Speaking at a press conference after his meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, Talbott said that he had, by and large, "figured out the reasons" for Ukraine's delaying the ratification of the START I Treaty. As the adviser sees it, Kiev is in no hurry to part with nuclear arms for fear, in the first place, of a Russian military threat. This is why the Ukrainians continue to insist that security guarantees be given. Moscow, for its part, is trying to persuade both Kiev and Washington that all conceivable guarantees have already been given to Ukraine. Moreover, wishing to dispel Ukraine's suspicions that the nuclear arms that are being withdrawn from its territory may be used against it, Russia suggested that Kiev use the "nuclear stuffing" from the arms dismantled in Ukraine as fuel for its nuclear power stations. This may be interpreted as a step toward meeting Ukraine's demands that its right of ownership of the nuclear arms components located on its territory be recognized. As a specific disarmament step, it has been proposed that delivery vehicles step down from their flight assignments. This and a number of other proposals by Moscow have so far been left unanswered, which plainly shows that the bilateral talks are in crisis.

Kiev continues the bargaining over financial costs, too. Nuclear disarmament is an expensive undertaking that will cost the republic $2.8 billion, according to Ukrainian experts' estimates. The United States has promised to lend a helping hand to Kiev (judging from its own estimates, it put the amount of aid at $175 million), but only after START I is ratified.

The nuclear disputes of the two former USSR republics, which at first glance seem to be quite amenable to solution, are turning into a serious security threat to the outside world. Unless START I is ratified, START II cannot come into force (and, remember, it has many opponents in the Russian parliament), which would create significant difficulties in relations between Russia and the United States. At the U.S. Defense Department, where they no longer count on an early ratification of the treaty, talk has begun on the need "to keep their powder dry" and to resume nuclear testing in the very near future.

Ukraine's unwillingness to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (which it intended to do as a nonnuclear state) is also a matter of concern for the world community. North Korea has already withdrawn from the treaty, and the emergence of yet another nuclear state, Ukraine, may add to the problem. Finally, even if Kiev's current stance is prompted only by its desire to get certain political and economic dividends, the lack of proper control over nuclear arms is a headache for the IAEA.

In the current situation, Washington has moved to take over the burden of responsibility. There are also doubts, however, as to the prospective success of this mission: Kiev deems the U.S. stance to be clearly pro-Russian. This opinion of Ukraine grew even stronger after U.S. President Bill Clinton refused to meet with Ukraine Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. The reason given for that was just the same: procrastination on the ratification of START I.

Kozyrev Protests Estonia's Admission to European Council

LD1205122493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 12 May 93

[Report by Irina Mishina; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has put a question mark over his planned visit to Strasbourg in protest against Estonia's admission to the European Council.

Further on Protest

WS1305081193 Tallinn BNS in English 2017 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Tallinn, May 12, BNS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev refused to attend the session of the Council of Europe Ministers' Committee scheduled for May 14 to protest Estonia's full membership in the CE.

Estonia's admission should be decided May 14. Kozyrev was to deliver a speech at the Ministers' Committee session.

"It was a difficult decision since the relations between the Council of Europe and the Russian Foreign Ministry are good," head of the Russian Foreign Ministry press department, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, said.

Last week, Kozyrev sent a letter to secretary general of the Council of Europe Catherine Lalumiere sharply criticizing the Council's intent to recommend Estonia's admission in the CE. Kozyrev called the plan premature and urged the council to postpone Estonia's admission.

Kozyrev once more accused Estonia of discriminating against non- Estonians. He said that Estonia's admission to "a club of really democratic states" might be interpreted as the international legalization of the discrimination against the Russian population in Estonia.

Kozyrev also charged that Estonia's admission may cause a fall in the prestige of the Council of Europe.

Protests Viewed

PM1205154593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Gennadiy Charodeyev report: "A. Kozyrev Cancels Visit to Strasbourg As Mark of Protest Against Admission of Estonia to Council of Europe"]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has decided to cancel his official visit to Strasbourg (France), where he was scheduled to deliver a speech 14 May to the spring session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

Let me remind readers that this week the session was to have resolved the issue of Estonia's admission to the Council of Europe. Russia opposes this, stating that the rights of the Russian-speaking minority are still being grossly flouted in the republic. In a letter sent the other day to Council of Europe Secretary General C. Lalumiere, A. Kozyrev stresses that the issue of Estonia's admission must be postponed since he considers its full membership of the organization to be "premature."

Replying to a question from IZVESTIYA, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, noted that all the indications are that the Russian minister's arguments have gone unheeded in Strasbourg. "We find this surprising," the Foreign Ministry representative stated, "in view of the fairly constructive relations prevailing recently between the Council of Europe leadership and Moscow."

S. Yastrzhembskiy went on to say that, given the circumstances, the Russian foreign minister has decided to refrain from making his previously planned trip to France in order to deliver a speech to participants at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly session.

Embassy in Zagreb Releases Statement on Churkin Talks

LD1305044593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0420 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Vienna May 13—The Russian Embassy in Zagreb has released the following statement to the press:

The Russian president's special envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin on 12 May met with the President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman to discuss the situation in central Bosnia aggravated by clashes between Croats and Muslims, the problem of Krajina and prospects for the Bosnian settlement.

Churkin also met with the United Nations Forces Commander Lars- Eric Walgren to discuss U.N. force activity in former Yugoslavia.

Also on Wednesday, Vitaly Churkin held consultations in Ljubljana with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia Lojze Peterle.

Yastrzhembskiy Comments

LD1205143593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1230 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Vitaliy Churkin, a special envoy of the Russian president, flew to Zagreb today. Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Press and Information Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had this to say today about the trip at a briefing in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

[Begin Yastrzhembskiy recording] The aim of the latest working trip by the Russian envoy to the area is to continue contacts regarding the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. It is thought that today, in Zagreb, Vitaliy Churkin will meet General [Lars-Erik] Wahlgren, commander of the UN Forces. After this he is to go to Ljubljana, and then back to Zagreb, where he is supposed to meet Croatia's President Tudjman.

The extremely busy schedule for Vitaliy Churkin's visit is more evidence of Russia's close involvement in the process of the political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. We are actively involved with these problems at many levels. Contacts by telephone are going on between Russian Foreign Minister [Andrey] Kozyrev and, among others, his Danish counterpart—Denmark, as you know, chairs the EC at present. They discussed these problems. A few days ago he also had telephone contacts with Mr. Christopher. So we are constantly keeping our finger on the pulse of events.

It is not the nationalist-patriotic forces—and I would put the word patriotic in inverted commas here—it is not they who determine the nature and content of Russia's actions on the international scene, both in the former USSR and outside it.

I can see no well-grounded parallels between the present-day situation in Russia and the situation that has arisen in the former Yugoslavia. What can be said with more justification is the fact that the Yugoslav conflict and the Yugoslav crisis as a whole has not been settled and may have negative repercussions for many European states. This is a fact. [end recording]

Yastrzhembskiy on Results of Russian, Abkhaz Talks

LD1205144693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1320 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] There was a briefing by Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the information and press department of the Foreign Ministry, at the press center of the Russian Foreign Ministry today. We have already reported this. In part, he talked about the results of the Russo-Abkhaz talks held in Maykop on 5-6 May. I would recall that

earlier similar Russo-Georgian consultations had been held in Sochi. Let's hear Sergey Yastrzhembskiy.

[Begin Yastrzhembskiy recording] The Abkhaz side expressed agreement in principle with the proposals worked out in Sochi for an immediate and full cease-fire with absolutely no preconditions and also with other (?wishes) and proposals concerning ways of settling the conflict. At the same time, the Abkhaz side stressed that an agreement on the withdrawal from the conflict zone of the armed formations from the Republic of Georgia, except for the minimum number needed to guard strategically important installations and to maintain law and order as part of the tripartite subunits based on the decision of the commission for monitoring and inspection in Abkhazia, was an indispensable step. [end recording]

Yeltsin Message to Shevardnadze

PM1205155793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 93 First Edition p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Attack on Military Unit in Kutaisi: Circumstances of Tragedy Are Being Ascertained"]

[Text] The Russian Federation president's press service has disseminated the text of a letter sent by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin to Eduard Shevardnadze, head of state and chairman of the parliament of the Republic of Georgia. It states:

"Great concern is aroused by the bandit-like armed attack in Kutaisi on the military camp of the combat engineer battalion of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus and by the taking hostage of women and children.

"The impression is created that certain forces in Georgia are trying to prevent the normalization of Russian-Georgian relations and to wreck the political dialogue between us.

"I urge you to take all necessary measures for the release of the hostages without delay, for a careful investigation of the incident, and for the exemplary punishment of the criminals."

Situation Reviewed

OW1305115393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1845 GMT 12 May 93

[Aleksandr Panov report including report by Nana Gongadze in a Tbilisi studio, with recording of Gongadze interviewing an unidentified woman in Tbilisi; from the "Utro" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Panov] Half an hour ago we had a linkup with the television studio in Dushanbe, and now a completely different region from which, in recent times, we have anxiously awaited the news. You will agree that our compatriots cannot do anything else but worry about the fate of the former republic of the former USSR, and nowadays, the independent state of Georgia. The military activity in Abkhazia, the noticeable cooling in relations between Moscow and Tbilisi, and finally the impending meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze are the topics that we hope to touch upon in our meeting with Nana Gongadze, our correspondent in Tbilisi. Good morning. [Video shows Gongadze in a studio on the screen behind Panov, which then expands to full screen]

[Gongadze] Good morning. I do not think that it would be an exaggeration if I said that today the whole of Georgia is living in anticipation of the forthcoming meeting between the heads of state, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, set for tomorrow in Moscow. The main topic of these talks will naturally be Abkhazia. [Video shows armed men in a trench, people rummaging through remains of a house, an observer with binoculars, a man on the phone in a house, a deserted street, people hiding from shelling in stairwells, destroyed buildings, and a bus.]

The conflict, which has been going on for nine months, has caused 1,500 casualties. Our television crew was able to record the aftermath of shelling by Abkhaz artillery only on this side of the (Kumis) front. Access to areas controlled by the Abkhaz formations is closed to us. Sukhumi is subjected daily to massive pressure from the air, sea and land. The shells fall mainly in the new residential suburb [mikrorayon], in the area of the city market, and on the hospital in the main street. Shells even hit buses and trolley buses, and 160 of them have already been destroyed, along with 850 houses. [Video shows a man pointing to a shell crater, then cuts to show Gongadze interviewing a woman.]

[Unidentified woman] The shock is excessive. It appears they are firing specifically at us. The moment we run out for bread they begin shooting, even at night. [Video shows a funeral service, an official building, a man angrily waving a rifle, and Gongadze among the ruins of a house]

[Gongadze] This is all that remains of the house of my colleague Tenghiz (Pachkoria), a correspondent for ITAR-TASS. His father was killed, his mother blinded, and he lies wounded in a Tbilisi clinic. Death also did not miss mother Taisiya from the (Supun) congregation, her apartment received a direct hit.

The Defense Ministry of Abkhazia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, both in their announcements have many times accused the servicemen of the Russian Forces deployed in Abkhazia of participation in military actions against Georgia. Arguments are advanced that the shelling of Sukhumi is coming from the area of (Eshersh) laboratory, and that aircraft bombing the city are using the (Bombora) military airfield controlled by the Russian army. [Video shows Panov in the studio]

[Panov] This is, as they say, a view from one side of the front Nana. However, what is your prognosis on the Moscow meeting on the whole?

[Gongadze] I think that the opinions of both sides will be considered at the Moscow meeting, and the only possible correct decision will be made. Although the latest events which took place in Georgia, specifically in the city of Kutais, the attack on the Russian army military installation to capture weapons once more proves... [Video cuts to show Gongadze interviewing Lieutenant General F.M. Reut, commander of the Russian Army Group in the Transcaucasus]

[Reut, in progress] ...that apparently someone in Georgia does not want these talks. Everything possible is being done to wreck them. I had a brief talk with Eduard Ambrosovich yesterday, and we completely agree on this. However, I think that the Russian leadership, and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, our esteemed president, understands this quite well.

Kozyrev Cited on Veto on UN Cyprus Vote

LD1205203093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 12 May 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] At the UN Security Council Russia has come out against transferring the financing of the UN operation in Cyprus from a voluntary to a compulsory basis. The draft resolution on the question was therefore not adopted. According to Yuliy Vorontsov, Russian Federation permanent representative at the United Nations, a compulsory procedure for financing the operation would not be timely. Russia used its right of veto for the first time [as heard], which gave rise to some consternation in diplomatic circles.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Andrey Sturua] Andrey Vladimirovich, does this mean a fundamental change in foreign policy?

[Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev] No, it means implementing the foreign policy that the president is conducting all the time. I want to stress that the matter vetoed by us is purely financial in nature. At the moment Russia is not in a position, to put in bluntly, to undertake additional expenditure. That's the essence. But at the same time, if the question were of a political nature—in other words, if, let's say, the chances of a Cyprus settlement did in any way depend on the procedure for financing those forces—then I am sure we would opt for expenditure and would vote in favor. Our policy of partnership and alliance relationships with the outside world and with Security Council member states, especially with the permanent members, is in no way altered by that vote. [end recording]

Results of Mulroney Visit to Russia Assessed

PM1205155193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 7

[Commentary by diplomatic observer Dmitriy Kosyrev: "Russia and Canada Are Brothers Forever, Or Brian Mulroney's Farewell Visit"]

[Text] First and foremost, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's visit to Moscow is a success, a success for Canada and for Russia. Mulroney, who is leaving his post in June (his present tour of several capitals is evidently a farewell one), is handing down to Canada very promising relations with Russia.

Even special relations. Mulroney's policy, the Russian president declared at the final news conference in the Kremlin, is a policy of practical solidarity with the Russian reforms. You really cannot say this of every Western country: Right from the start of the present epoch of change, i.e. since 1985, the question "help or wait" has repeatedly faced the Western leaders—and today it could not be more urgent. But, again according to Boris Yeltsin, "there were quite a lot of doubters, although Brian Mulroney was never among them." Suffice it to say that precisely the Canadian leader was the first to start pushing "the seven" toward giving Russia effective aid. As a result, relations with Ottawa now are closer and more trusting than with Washington, London, or, still less, Tokyo.

They can now yield perfectly material fruit for Canada and Russia. Thus, a new fundamental economic agreement, whose main purpose is to help develop ties between the two countries' business circles, was signed during the present visit; they reached an agreement on avoiding double taxation and on mutual protection of investments. Two Canadian credit lines were opened for the purchase of food and for other commodities.

As an experienced politician, Mulroney naturally understands (and he spoke of this at a recent news conference) that "the architects of the new, modern Russia are the Russians themselves," that private capital can be encouraged, but that it is impossible to make it work in Russia until all the conditions for this are ripe.

I do not know to what extent Mulroney believes in the primitive schematics of Russian politics—"democratic Yeltsin against entrenched communists"—but he certainly understands that it is impossible to describe as normal and stable the situation in a country where the president believes with obvious sincerity that his power alone is legitimate, while all other power is not quite legitimate, as it were. Mulroney himself reacted imperturbably to such statements—at the news conference, at least—whereas Canadian journalists took a lively interest in what would happen to the two drafts of our constitution and in the legality of the procedure for adopting it. But these really are our problems, not Mulroney's....

An unexpected result of the talks was the position on the former Yugoslavia. Only the day before Russia's policy had seemed not independent, to say the least. After the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the Vance-Owen plan there was talk of bombing raids on the former Yugoslavia by NATO aircraft with Russia's tacit consent. Now Russia and Canada have put on a united front. At the news conference Boris Yeltsin declared: Spontaneous measures without the knowledge of the UN Security Council are ruled out here. (I will add that this resembles a hint that Russia—a member of the Security Council with the right to veto its decisions—certainly does not intend to support all "strong-arm" options unconditionally). A good move, particularly because U.S. Secretary of State Christopher's tour of Europe showed that Europeans are not delighted with strong-arm solutions either. So Moscow is not risking a great deal.

How was this "united front" formed? According to Mulroney, there are now 2,300 Canadian peacemakers on the soil of Yugoslavia and, in general, one soldier in the UN peacemaking forces in every 10 is a Canadian. Therefore his country is not indifferent to what will be done to a state (a safe position, let us note!) where Canadian citizens are serving. Yetsin also voiced concern at the position of the Russian "blue helmets." Of course, it would be interesting to learn who initiated such an approach—either Russia took the opportunity to show that it is certainly not "blindly following the West's line" or Canada helped Russia to score brownie points in future relations with the Slav brothers in the former Yugoslavia. But these are details; the chief thing is still that the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Bosnia has gained one more chance.

Admiral Kasatonov on Black Sea Fleet

MK1205115093 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 20, 12-18 May (Signed to Print 11 May) p 4

[Andrey Zhdankin interviews Admiral Igor Kasatonov under the rubric "Armies of the CIS: "Looks Like Stormy Weather Once More"]

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet currently subordinated to both Ukraine and Russia has once again become a sore in bilateral relations. The threat of dividing it up is looming once again. There is, however, also a different point of view, that of Admiral of the Fleet Igor Kasatonov, former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and today first deputy commander in chief of the Russian Navy.

[Zhdankin] Your information must be the most reliable of all. What is going on there now?

[Kasatonov] A well-elaborated plan for Ukraine's takeover of the Black Sea Fleet is being realized. Let me remind you that the Yalta and Dagomys agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine in regard to the fleet provide for a transitional period until 1995 and a moratorium on dividing it up.

Attempts are continuing to compromise the fleet's commanders, to "split up" the sailors into hostile groups, to "privatize" on the spur of the moment and by a forcible manner to seize institutions, services, subunits—that is, to transfer them to Ukraine's jurisdiction. I have a 68-item list of such takeovers. The dangerous part of it is that even a minor conflict could act as a detonator. One more example. Ukrainian servicemen become appointed chiefs of garrisons in places where no units have even sworn their allegiance to Ukraine. Ukraine's Defense Ministry, in fact, is spying on the Black Sea Fleet as if it were a hostile state. All units and subunits that were formerly directed against NATO are now working on things concerning the fleet.

[Zhdankin] Why does the Black Sea Fleet need the base in Crimea?

[Kasatonov] Crimea and Sevastopol were not randomly selected as the fleet's main base. From both the strategic and operational points of view this is the best location: the closest exit into the Mediterranean Sea basin. Crimea's coastal region has mountains that afford an effective deployment of systems to monitor and control the situation; the rocks themselves are excellent shelters. The system of airports is such that from there the most convenient and short routes originate in all directions. Russia, which has interests on the Black Sea, should most definitely have the main base of the fleet in Sevastopol.

[Zhdankin] From your point of view, is there a probability of one more Crimean War, between Russia and Ukraine this time?

[Kasatonov] Only madmen can talk about this, this option should be ruled out. I have said repeatedly that a civilized solution should be found. A number of Ukrainian politicians not infrequently make remarks like "Crimea should be either Ukrainian or uninhabited." This position is madness, especially given the fact that two-thirds of the Crimea's population are Russians.

[Zhdankin] You were saying that there is underground work in progress in the fleet. Are we in for a repetition of the Ochakov or the Potemkin?

[Kasatonov] Some cite as an example the flight of the SKR-112 patrol ship that had been sanctioned, as a matter of fact, by the Ukrainian defense minister and the commander of the Ukrainian Navy. It is as if it accelerated the organizational development of the Ukrainian navy. This is thievery, and no way to create a state's navy or army.

I have considered such things as being wrong from the very start; having scored no political or military points, they have only created a threat to human life.

[Zhdankin] It is maintained that the fleet took part in combat actions.

[Kasatonov] Taking part in combat actions implies fulfillment of combat missions. In reality the ships were

taking away property of the former Soviet Army and of the refugees, including that of Ukrainians.

[Zhdankin] The instability is surely telling on people. Are officers "fleeing?"

[Kasatonov] All our fleets, the Black Sea Fleet included, are manned with a sufficient number of officers. But there are problems with the ranks, serious problems.

[Zhdankin] Who is now financing the Black Sea fleet?

[Kasatonov] Under the bilateral agreements, Russia and Ukraine go fifty-fifty, but Ukraine has pulled out of the ruble zone, it has its own banking system, and monetary payments are constantly delayed. Besides, Ukraine obstructs the raise in pay adopted by Russia. It makes payments in coupons whereby the sailors get a third or fourth of the money.

[Zhdankin] Igor Vladimirovich, you are sometimes ranked with Makashov, Sterligov, Achalov. Do you belong in this or some other rank?

[Kasatonov] I do not belong in any rank. I am an admiral of the Russian Navy, and I serve my country. In the position of Black Sea commander, with the support of Marshal Shaposhnikov and Navy Commander-in-Chief Chernavin, I came forward to defend Russia's interests and managed to defend the fleet. As for who ranks me where, it is strictly up to those persons.

[Zhdankin] What do you think of the assertion that national- communists are genuine patriots, while today's democrats are undoers of the Fatherland?

[Kasatonov] Do not try to coax political statements from me. Every person is supposed to do his job. The army and the navy are outside party politics. They are state institutions that uphold state interests.

Government To Help Train Kazakh Nuclear Specialists

LD1205131493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Russia is to give assistance to Kazakhstan in training cadres for nuclear energy and industry. Beginning this academic year, a group of Kazakhstani students will begin special nuclear studies in Russian colleges. Under the patronage of Russian colleges, cadres will be trained in Kazakhstani educational institutions in uranium mining and some nuclear sectors of industry. The difficult situation that has currently arisen in the nuclear energy sector of Kazakhstan is due mainly to the large-scale departure from the republic of nuclear specialists from among the Russian-speaking population.

Baltic States' Council of Europe Membership Viewed

PM1305083593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 3

[Yuriy Kovalenko report: "Russia Tries To Prevent Estonia from Joining the Council of Europe"]

[Text] Strasbourg—Within the next few days, Lithuania and Estonia will be the first of the former Soviet republics to be accepted into the Council of Europe. The question of their acceptance, which was practically decided beforehand, as was the acceptance of Slovenia, is being examined in Strasbourg at a session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, and it will then be settled definitively at a sitting of the Committee of Ministers of the same European representative organization.

The situation of the Russian minority in the Baltic republics—a question which has been repeatedly discussed at various Council of Europe forums—could have been a stumbling block on this path. A year ago Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev submitted for examination by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers a memorandum which contained specific cases of violations of Russians' rights in these countries.

Nevertheless, all the indications are that the Council of Europe did not agree with this point of view. One of the documents submitted for examination by the parliamentarians, speaks of the fact that the "Russian minority in Estonia cannot be viewed as a historical minority. This is a question of a population which settled in Estonia as of the 1940's. It makes up around 30 percent of the country's total population, and does not have Estonian citizenship. The law provides the possibility of obtaining it on condition that you live in the country for at least two years and know the Estonian language."

These findings could be disputed, but nevertheless, Estonia's acceptance in the Council of Europe is practically a fait accompli. Moscow decided to put pressure on the Council of Europe to hinder this. As I was told in the Council's secretariat, Andrey Kozyrev sent a letter to Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere in which he demands that the question of Estonia's acceptance be deferred, believing the legalization of its full membership in the organization to be "premature."

The planned inclusion of Estonia in the club of genuinely democratic states, A. Kozyrev's letter says, may be interpreted as a kind of international legitimation of the continuing oppression of the non-indigenous—primarily Russian—population in that republic.

Moscow's demarche has evoked dissatisfaction in the Council of Europe Secretariat and has not found support among the parliamentarians, who assessed it as interference in internal affairs on the part of a state which for the present is not a full member of the organization. The Council of Europe never makes concessions in the face

of pressure, I was told. Furthermore, the Secretariat's spokesmen said in a conversation with your correspondent, the desire to raise the level of demands made to Estonia too high will prove counterproductive and may make the acceptance of Russia itself into the Council of Europe more difficult in the future.

M. Martinez, chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, will pay a visit to Moscow in June; in a conversation with me, he advocated Russia's speediest inclusion in this organization. At the same time, he noted that significant changes have yet to take place in Russia before it can become a full member of the Council of Europe.

I would recall that genuinely free parliamentary elections are still being named as one of the main conditions for Russia's acceptance in the Council of Europe here.

Commentary on Cooperation With Western Nations

OW1305031593 Moscow Radio Moscow in Japanese 1100 GMT 12 May 93

[Commentary by (Krischin)]

[Text] Results from the national referendum, held throughout Russia on 25 April, have been positively accepted by the whole world. Noted political critics, social activists, and mass media from all over the world have called the results of the referendum a victory for President Yeltsin and the reforms that he has been pushing.

THE FINANCIAL TIMES, a British newspaper, reported that Western nations were completely satisfied that the majority of the Russian people who cast their vote in the referendum did not refuse to support reform. It is natural that Western nations are satisfied with the results, because issues decided by the national referendum concern not only the people's confidence in President Yeltsin, but also the nation's political orientation.

Judging from various facts, the warning given by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev at the meeting of CSCE directors in Stockholm seems to have aroused the conscience of many Western politicians, despite the fact that Kozyrev did not issue the warning in any special form. What Kozyrev particularly stressed concerns what it would mean to Western partner nations if the administration or policies in Russia were to change. Western nations have supported Yeltsin's administration politically. At present, economic aid to Russia is regarded as a significant issue. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, in the article mentioned earlier, says that nothing can be achieved without taking resolute actions to stabilize the economy. It seems that the nations concerned share this understanding, and preparations are under way now. At the talks of G-7 finance and foreign ministers in Tokyo, held before the Russian national referendum, an accord was reached on providing Russia with a total of $28.4 billion in economic aid.

President Clinton also has recently disclosed he will continuously support reform in Russia in a cooperative manner, abiding by accords reached in Vancouver, Canada and in Tokyo. The EC, for its part, has expressed hope that talks for concluding the extensive coordination on partnership and cooperation with Russia will end within the shortest possible period.

Furthermore, as THE JAPAN TIMES has reported, Japan has finally decided to set aside funds for aid to Russia in its extra budget for fiscal 1993. In other words, it can be said that the national referendum results have opened up good prospects for establishing Russia's new cooperative relationship with the international community.

First of all, this has some connection with the fact that future prospects for Russian political development, which have been dragging out for so long and have aroused apprehension, have brightened. Taking advantage of this current opportunity is another question, because we have felt no dissatisfaction so far with promises made on economic assistance; however, the point at issue now is how to put these promises into practice.

Another point has to be mentioned here. What Russia needs at present is not financial aid on credit, but rather, cooperation in various forms, such the elimination of barriers to trade development; technology transfers; investments by foreign companies; and technological aid. Russia has resources that can be exchanged through trade. Only when cooperation is carried out in these ways will aid become effective and bring about positive influences on stabilizing the situation in Russia. Then the international community, which is greatly concerned with issues such as what type of state Russia will become, will experience good results.

We have just broadcast a commentary by our commentator (Krischin) on future prospects for a cooperative relationship between Russia and the international community.

Border Revision Suggested To Resolve Karabakh Conflict

MK1205125693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 p 3

[Armen Khanbabyan commentary: "Karabakh—Territory Under UN Mandate? Raising Principles to the Absolute as a Possible Reason for a Big War"]

[Text] The Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation in Karabakh has long been balancing on the brink of a full-scale war. The continuous escalation of violence and mutual accusations of aggression, while they highlight the purely military side to the conflict, make us forget

about the circumstances of and reasons for its breakout. These do not include the particularly strong hatred of two peoples for each other or the problem of religious differences, but the initial collision of two equally important legal principles: the right of a nation to self-determination and the principle of the inviolability of current borders. If we try to resolve this problem following the existing tradition, that is to say, giving precedence to the principle of border inviolability as it is interpreted now, then pacifying the region will be a daunting task. Even an immediate cease-fire without any preconditions, on which Yerevan presently insists, appears a stopgap measure in a broader context. If this is followed by talks on the future status of Karabakh, it is precisely the collision of the two approaches that would destine them to yield few results, at best an establishment of a "neither-peace-nor-war" situation, which may be used by either side to get ready for the resumption of war.

Azerbaijan feels fairly comfortable in the languid negotiating process that is dragging on under the sponsorship of CSCE as the latter strives to retain the territorial status quo. Armenia, however, does not object to CSCE mediation either: Yerevan has said that it does not have territorial claims to its neighbors, insisting only that Stepanakert be invited for talks as an independent party. So far Baku has strongly protested even an indirect recognition of Karabakh's independence. But it is also evident that without securing Karabakh's participation as an equal party, any talks would be doomed to failure.

A way out of this vicious cycle may be found in modifying the principle of the inviolability of borders. This process is effectively under way: The breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; the unification of Germany; the granting of independence to Eritrea, an Ethiopian province, on the basis of plebiscite results. A large number of old borders in Europe and outside it have ceased to exist. The CSCE's desire to keep this process within the former internal administrative boundaries is entirely understandable: territorial stability is the basis for the existing world order. Internal borders, however, have never been recognized as having the same status as interstate ones. The principle of territorial integrity is not an absolute—international law has legitimized its curtailment in the event of human rights violations, for example. So, a UN Security Council resolution has tangibly limited Baghdad's sovereignty over some part of Iraqi territory where human rights of the local population have been violated by the regime of Saddam Husayn. Furthermore, some states had recognized Eritrea's independence even before this was done by Ethiopia. A referendum along similar lines was conducted in Nagorno-Karabakh as early as December 1991. UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali recently said that the international community could recognize the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] provided Azerbaijan gives its consent.

Thus, theoretically, change is possible, if it is due. It is evident, however, that Baku will never give its consent to the recognition of the NKR. Therefore, the principle of the inviolability of borders should be modified into the principle of the impermissibility of territorial gains of one state at the expense of another. This will make it possible to marry the right to self-determination with the desire to put an end to the trend for a world territorial redivision. In this particular case, Armenia would be unable to annex Nagorno-Karabakh, but Azerbaijan, for its part, would lose the right to make war with the Karabakhis. At the same time, the solution to the problem does not necessarily mean an early recognition of the NKR as a subject of international law. A territory should "mature" to attain independence, both politically and economically. And if the United Nations declares Karabakh a territory under its mandate for 15 to 20 years, it may prove to be the best possible solution to the problem at this stage.

Yeltsin Signs Decree Establishing Ties With Eritrea

LD1305081593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation has signed a decree recognizing Eritrea as an independent and sovereign state. This decision is connected with the results of the 24 April independence referendum this year, in accordance with which the new state of Eritrea is being proclaimed. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to hold talks with the leadership of Eritrea on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of diplomatic missions at the embassy level.

Nationalists Visit Europe, Claim Western Support

MK1105121493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 11 May 93 p 10

[Yevgeniy Yanayev report published in "Russian Rightists To Get Western Aid" column: "Russian Patriots Travel to Italy, Switzerland"]

[Text] Dmitriy Rogozin, chairman of the Russian Revival Union, held a press conference yesterday in the Russian Social-Political Center, devoted to the results of the Russian patriots' visit to Italy and Switzerland. According to Rogozin, a number of important political organizations in Western Europe, as well as representatives of financial circles, promised to render active assistance to Russia even after Boris Yeltsin resigns.

According to Rogozin, it was no accident that the visit of the patriots' delegation to Western Europe coincided with the Russia- wide referendum. Had a state of emergency been introduced in Russia immediately after the referendum, Rogozin said, a permanent representation reflecting the interests of the patriots opposition might have been created. So far the patriots have not needed to do this, but in order to build up contacts between rightist

political movements in the West and the Russian opposition, a representative, whose name is not being divulged, has been left in Western Europe.

Rogozin told the press conference that the visit to Italy was made at the invitation of a public organization, the Italian Front. Rogozin noted that this front had promised to help the Russian Revival Union establish contacts with those political parties and movements in the West that are concerned over the interference by the United States and Germany in Russia's internal affairs. "In particular we have reached accord that the front will render us assistance in ensuring that the events unfolding in Russia get more accurate coverage in Western media outlets," Rogozin said.

In addition, the Russian patriots have for the first time had contacts with representatives of the Vatican. "We have found support in Central Europe. The leaders of large Italian and Swiss banks in the course of the meeting expressed their readiness to assist Russia if the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development do not," Dmitriy Rogozin said in conclusion, not specifying, however, which particular banks had promised to help Russia.

It was also announced at the press conference that the Russian Revival Union intends by 1 June to complete the formation of an election block to unite "politicians advocating patriotic positions and upholding private ownership of the means of production."

At present the Revival Union is conducting talks with the Russian National Assembly led by General Aleksandr Sterligov, and Civic Union.

Constitution Issues

Yeltsin Addresses Working Group on Constitution

MK1205111093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 12 May 93 p 9

[Nika Stark report: "Authorities After Referendum. President Sets Date for Constitutional Conference"]

[Text] Yesterday's meeting of a working group to finalize the presidential draft of a new constitution was attended by around 20 chiefs of regions, experts, and members of the presidential administration. Sergey Shakhray was urgently summoned from his North Caucasus trip to attend the meeting. Summing up the discussion, Boris Yeltsin recalled that the deadline—20 May—for making amendments and additions to the draft remained unchanged and proposed that a constitutional conference be held on 5 June to discuss the new draft of the fundamental law.

Boris Yeltsin said at the meeting that the fundamental law should be initialed by the components of the Federation. He suggested that a number of groups be set up to work on the draft so that representatives of the corresponding Federation components—krays, oblasts, republics, former autonomies, and so forth—could consider it separately. Thus the president approved an idea that was recently mooted by Karelian Supreme Soviet Chairman Viktor Stepanov that the discussion should be conducted and the work on the draft constitution arranged the way the work on the Federation Treaty was done. Addressing the audience, the president said the following of the constitutional conference: "It seems to me that this conference should later evolve into the Council of the Federation, which will be one of the parliament's chambers. Therefore, the work on the new constitution should be done and it should be adopted by you and, of course, representatives of the rest of the Federation components."

What was somewhat surprising for the participants of the meeting was a statement by Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Nikolay Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Constitutional Commission. He said that he endorsed the idea of a constitutional conference, because the adoption of the fundamental law in accordance with the old procedure—that is to say, by the congress—appears impossible. However, he continued, the procedure for the adoption of the constitution may not be established unilaterally and the constitutional assembly should necessarily include members of Rumyantsev's commission. The fundamental law that they will have adopted, Ryabov said, will have to be "consecrated by the congress."

According to reports received by KOMMERSANT-DAILY, virtually none of the representatives of the Federation components had any objections regarding the presidential draft.

Meanwhile, a meeting of the Constitutional Commission's working group was held on that same evening at the White House. Rumyantsev's commission has taken as the basic version its own draft fundamental law, which will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet for consideration on 25 May. Although the presidential draft was subjected to criticism at the previous meeting, yesterday the opinion was expressed that some provisions of the alternative fundamental law, which were being discussed at the same time in the Kremlin, will be taken into account and that the work done by the presidential team will influence the review of the constitution in parliament.

In a separate development, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, who presently disagrees with Boris Yeltsin on all counts, said yesterday, speaking with journalists, that the presidential constitution makes it possible "in effect to go over to a dictatorship, a nearly unlimited monarchy for purposes of finally seizing power and dodging legal responsibility for what they have perpetrated, including the breakup of a powerful state."

Reactions to Yeltsin's Draft Constitution Viewed

LD1205125993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] In recent days in Russia the process of drafting a new constitution has become more active. As everyone knows, the beginning of a new stage in this process was marked by publication of the presidential draft of the constitution on 29 April. The Constitutional Commission meeting on 7 May, which met without its chairman, that is, the president, was described by Boris Yeltsin as invalid. However the commission had enough power to publish its own draft constitution on 8 May—the draft which in the view of President Yeltsin was approved by the Sixth Congress [of People's Deputies] last year. It was also within the power of the Constitutional Commission to begin a kind of a constitutional race, competing with the president's team in organizing meetings of working groups, news conferences, and so on. Here is [Radio Rossii commentator] Igor Amvrosov with his analysis of the current state of that race.

[Amvrosov] Although it is very difficult to analyze this round in the game, I will nevertheless risk assessing the positions of the sides as approximately identical—identical in their strengths and their weaknesses. The weaknesses of the two sides lie in the imperfection of both constitutional drafts. All the analytical assessments of the president's draft published by today are extremely critical. Among these assessments, it is worth singling out a long article by Georgiy Shakhnarazov in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA on 8 May and a very long article by Stanislav Shatalin and Vyacheslav Nikonov in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA today, on 12 May.

Even if you disregard these, Sergey Shakhray himself, speaking on 7 May at the roundtable meeting [word indistinct], acknowledged that the president's draft is by no means perfect and requires radical improvement.

Anyone who has read the president's draft and analyzed the first reaction to it of the federation's citizens can reach this conclusion. This reaction is very indicative.

Leaders of Bashkortostan, Karelia, and Yakutiya have subjected Yeltsin's draft to unambiguous criticism. In Tatarstan they pretend the problem of the constitution does not concern them, stressing that relations between Moscow and Kazan will be based on special treaties. Yesterday in Tuva, they adopted an amendment to the Tuva Constitution envisaging the possibility of Tuva withdrawing from the Russian Federation.

That is also a reaction of a kind to the draft constitutions, both that of Rumyantsev and that of Shakhray and Alekseyev. True, the president's draft was supported by the Public Committee of Democratic Organizations and the Union of Cossack Troops, but even these have their own reservations about the draft.

According to the same presidential draft, public organizations have no legislative initiative. Now on the problem of remarks to be taken into account; yesterday at a meeting of the President's Working Commission for the Revision of the Draft Constitution, the date was named for pulling together all the remarks on the presidential draft. However, it was not made clear whose remarks will be considered by this working group and how these remarks will be actually taken into account. In the report about yesterday's meeting of the president's commission, there is a great deal of vagueness, but that is another matter.

The Supreme Soviet proposes a different procedure for work. It is planned to discuss on 14 May the issue of the procedure for taking into account the federation citizens' proposals on the draft constitution. On 25 May parliament will hear the procedure for adoption and the main provisions of the constitutional draft.

Finally, the Supreme Soviet proposes holding a constitutional meeting on 1 June with the participation of the president and representatives of federation citizens, all branches of power, leading political parties, and so on. So, 1 June is to play the role of the day when it will be decided whether the constitutional race will turn into a constitutional war. No doubt it will be possible to avoid that war if the president agrees with the Supreme Soviet's proposals to make a third draft out of the existing two. However, it is still too early to predict the president's plan for 1 June.

Yeltsin Seen 'Pushing Ahead' on Constitution

PM1205182993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Vasiliy Kononenko report: "Crisis of Power in Russia Moves Into Constitutional Area"]

[Text] In contrast to the prolonged period of indecisiveness which B. Yeltsin demonstrated before the referendum, consistency and firmness can be traced in his actions nowadays. This applies above all to the problem of elaborating and adopting a new Constitution.

Having submitted a draft Fundamental Law to the Federation subjects for discussion, and having consulted with the working commission set up to adapt the draft (the commission's membership is published on page two), the president is pushing ahead, so IZVESTIYA's correspondent has learned, with the constitutional process.

First, on his instructions, representatives of state structures and experts in the sphere of law are to visit the republics, krays, oblasts, and autonomous regions of Russia during these days (roughly through 1 June) in order to speed up the procedure for introducing additions and amendments to the presidential draft constitution, and also to remove possible contradictions between provisions of the republics' fundamental laws and the federal Fundamental Law. Incidentally, it is for this reason that Vice Premier S. Shakhray was recalled from an assignment in the North Caucasus. He was needed at the 11 May session of the working commission to adapt the draft Constitution, since he is one of its main authors. According to IZVESTIYA's information, a program of regional conferences on this theme involving representatives from federal organs of executive power has been drawn up by S. Filatov, leader of the presidential administration.

Second, in the words of V. Kostikov, the president's press secretary, the president's edict on measures to complete preparations for the new Constitution is already virtually ready. The crux of this document consists in the following.

The starting point in the process for adopting the new constitution is the 12 June 1990 Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. Confirming the position of the Federation Treaty as an integral part of the new constitution, considering that the constitutional crisis is the main obstacle to implementing reform, and proceeding from the referendum results which confirmed the president's legitimacy, the president proposes to complete preparations for the new constitution by 10 June this year, offering as its base the draft presented by the president to the Federation subjects. In order to complete work on this draft, he intends to convene a constitutional conference 5 June in Moscow, with two fully empowered representatives delegated to it from each republic, kray, oblast, autonomous region, okrug, and city of federal status as well as presidential representatives and representatives chosen from parliamentary factions by agreement. It is also planned to form a working commission under the president's chairmanship to adapt the draft Constitution and to present it to the constitutional conference.

As A. Kotenkov, chief of the State Judicial Administration under the Russian Federation president, told me, the constitutional conference is not being set up to adopt the constitution. Its main task will be to complete work

on the draft, possibly to initial it, and to define the mechanism for adopting the new Constitution. According to A. Kotenkov, there are already several options for adopting the new Constitution. But it is too early to publicize them—we must wait for the proposals from Federation subjects. At a conference in the Kremlin 11 May representatives from a number of Russia's regions reiterated the idea that the old mechanism for adopting the country's Fundamental Law is no longer acceptable.

Yeltsin's Draft Speeds Up Work on New Constitution

LD1205143493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1404 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—The appearance of a draft constitution proposed by President Boris Yeltsin forced his opponents to speed up the work on their own draft. Secretary of the Constitutional Commission Oleg Rumyantsev admitted on Wednesday [12 May] that Yeltsin's draft "added the necessary dynamics to the constitutional process".

Yeltsin, who is chairman of the commission, proposed his own draft of the basic law before the nationwide referendum on April 25.

Rumyantsev criticised the presidential entourage for "the philosophy of struggle till destruction" and said his commission may use provisions of Yeltsin's constitution "in a constructive way".

He believes the coming constitutional conference should unite, besides presidential representatives, legislators and members of the Constitutional Commission. The conference should adopt "a package of principled amendments" which curtail the powers of the president envisaged in Yeltsin's draft. The conference, according to Rumyantsev, is also to define the rights and obligations of the government and the subjects of the federation, the mechanism of creating the upper parliament chamber and the way of adopting the new constitution.

Rumyantsev told a press conference that the parliamentary draft constitution should be approved under the first reading by the Congress of People's Deputies already in July and then forwarded for further work to his commission.

Draft Constitution Commission Members Listed

LD1205140193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1334 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has endorsed the composition of the working commission to perfect the draft of the Russian Constitution, the presidential press service reported. The commission consists of

Boris Yeltsin, Russian president;
Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers;
Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the board of the research centre on private law;
Viktor Barannikov, Russian defence minister;
Igor Bezrukov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliamentary committee on legislation;
Vladimir Varov, chairman of the subcommittee of the Russian parliament on legislation;
Nikolay Volkov, chief of the administration of the Jewish Autonomous Region;
Pavel Grachev, Russian defence minister;
Vladimir Ettylen, chairman of the Chukchi Regional Council of People's Deputies;
Aleksandr Zhdanovskiy, chairman of the Krasnodar territorial Council of People's Deputies;
Boris Zolotukhin, deputy chairman of the Russian parliamentary committee for legislation;
Yuriy Kalmykov, acting Russian minister of justice;
Andrey Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister;
Yevgeniy Komarov, chief of the administration of the Murmansk region;
Aleksandr Kotenkov, chief of the state-legal administration at the Russian president [as received];
Vyacheslav Lebedev, chairman of the Russian Supreme Court;
Yuriy Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow;
Yuriy Matochkin, chief of the administration of the Kaliningrad region;
Abdurazak Mirzabekov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Daghestan;
Boris Nemtsov, chief of the administration of the Nizhny Novgorod region;
Mikhail Nikolayev, president of the Republic of Saha (Yakutia);
Yuriy Nozhikov, chief of the administration of the Irkutsk region;
Ella Pamfilova, Russian minister of social protection;
Vladimir Raifikesht, chief of the administration of the Altai territory;
Murtaza Rakhimov, speaker of the parliament of Bashkortostan Republic;
Eduard Rossel, chief of the administration of the Sverdlovsk region;
Nikolay Ryabov, deputy speaker of the Russian parliament;
Anatoliy Sliva, official representative of the Russian president for legal affairs in the parliament;
Anatoliy Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg,
Yuriy Spiridonov, speaker of the parliament of the Komi Republic;
Viktor Stepanov, speaker of the parliament of the Republic of Karelia;
Anatoliy Tyazhlov, chief of the administration of the Moscow region;

Boris Fedorov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers - finance minister of the Russian Federation;
Mikhail Fedotov, Russian minister of the press and information;
Sergey Filatov, chief of the administration of the Russian president;
Vladimir Khubiyev, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, member of the Constitutional Commission;
Mintimer Shaimiyev, president of the Republic of Tatarstan;
Sergey Shakhray, deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers - chairman of the Russian Federation's State Committee for the Affairs of the Federation and Nationalities;
Viktor Sheynis, deputy executive secretary of the Constitutional Commission;
Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, member of the Constitutional Commission;
Vladimir Shumeyko, first deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers,
Veniamin Yakovlev, chairman of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation;
Yuriy Yarov, deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers.

Further on Khasbulatov Meeting on Constitution

Election of Local Leaders Urged

LD1205162693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1526 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow, 12 May—Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov has called for elections of heads of administrations "in those regions where there have not been normal relations between the soviets and administrations" since June-beginning of July. He was making a concluding speech today at a conference of leaders of representative power bodies at the Russian House of the Soviets.

'Excerpts' of Khasbulatov Address

LD1305024793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 12 May 93

["Excerpts" of address by Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov to conference of leaders of representative power bodies at the Russian House of the Soviets in Moscow on 12 May; from the "At the Conference of Heads of the Soviets of People's Deputies of the Subjects of the Federation"—recorded]

[Text] [Khasbulatov] To beat any victory drums and to try to impose the ideology of victors on society would be an unforgivable political mistake. And here, in order to cool the ardor of these new ideologues, one needs, of course, the authoritative opinion of those very leaders of the regions, the subjects of the Federation, so that everyone has the opportunity to assess the situation that has developed in a very sober manner.

[Unidentified correspondent] Turning to the main subject of the conference, the preparation of the draft of a new constitution, Ruslan Khasbulatov noted that a new spiral of political confrontation and political games has begun in Russia. Economic questions remain in the country, and it is being proposed that the whole center of attention of society should be turned toward the constitution.

[Khasbulatov] Our first task is, of course, not to be duped in any way by any political games around the constitution, and, indeed, to look sensibly at the socio-economic situation that exists in the country as a whole and in the regions as well.

Second, we must recognize that the political situation is such that it is, of course, necessary to work more dynamically, and, indeed, more rapidly, on the draft of a new constitution. There is no doubt about that, because to delay in adopting a well-balanced and thought-out constitution, on the basis of which there are already ideas that do not require much revision; for example, the section on the Federation Treaty... [pauses] You and I have agreed that there will be a new constitution, consequently, the situation is such that what is required are our joint efforts to work without haste and without fuss and adopt this constitution.

The third point I would like to draw attention is arguably a more important one. It concerns procedural matters. It seems to me it would be simply criminal if we embarked upon a path of an unconstitutional adoption of the constitution. Therefore, the procedures for adopting a constitution, procedures that are clearly part of the framework of constitutional legality, are particularly important here. I would like to remind you that it was precisely the refusal to comply with the constitutional methods of the political restructuring of society, bypassing the existing Supreme Soviet and the USSR Congress, that led, were one of the reasons that led to the disintegration of the Union. These are roundabout ways, outside the constitutional bodies, attempts to reanimate and to implement the reforms based on the old Union. It is precisely this scenario—or rather, trap—that is now being prepared for the subjects. All these cunning games must be discarded by us clearly and deliberately. There is only one way for the state to implement constitutional reform—via the existing constitutional mechanisms. If they are imperfect, let us adopt different procedures, but legally, and not on the spur of the moment, whoever may propose this. There is a hidden side to this process, and I would like to point this out to you. The point is that those high-ranking officials who are trying to leave the constitutional space want to implicate and turn the regions, the subjects of the Federation, into their accomplices. We should bear this in mind—they are trying to somehow tarnish them with a collective guilt before history and before their own people. One should, of

course, avoid taking this bait at all costs, if we really have a responsibility to our people and, indeed, to the state.

The fourth thing I would like to remind you of is that the disintegration of the USSR meant the disintegration of Russia. Don't forget this! Attempts are now being made to achieve this disintegration, including by means, apparently, of a new constitution that they want to be adopted by non-constitutional methods. Of course, in no way should one reject the good, progressive, points that are being proposed in the draft of the president's new constitution. True, if we say that, yes, we agree to this draft, I'm not so sure that in a week's time another draft will not appear from the president, also compiled by unknown persons and an unconstitutional commission of whom he is the leader. We must bear this in mind.

The fifth thing is that a myth of the congress's alleged inability to adopt a constitution is being spread. Well, fine, if it's unable to do so, so what? But who is trying to be above the congress? If you want to argue logically, then someone else would be unable to adopt one as well. This follows the adoption by us of a corresponding electoral law, when—you yourselves know—a year and a half ago, the congress stated clearly that there should be one level for the legislative process. Yes, indeed, this is the legacy we have been given: It is not we who invented this congress. But the future legislator will be solely the Supreme Soviet. Let this Supreme Soviet adopt this constitution. I repeat that I am not in favor of endorsing the president's ideas straight off, but they must be conducted along legal channels.

Regions May Combine Drafts

PM1205184593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Irina Demchenko report: "Khasbulatov Relies on Speakers of Local Soviets, While Zorkin Recommends Americans To Revise Their Own Constitution"]

[Text] The struggle over the alternative drafts of the new Russian Constitution prepared by the two branches of federal power is taking us closer and closer to another political crisis. Opening a conference of leaders of soviets of subjects of the Federation 12 May, Ruslan Khasbulatov declared that "the referendum has brought us nothing constructive" and was only "an excuse to divert society's attention away from vitally important problems." He also rated the stoking of interest in the president's draft constitution among the "diversionary means" of this kind.

Alternating—with the logic peculiar to him—demagogic arguments that the introduction of a new constitution will not improve the life of citizens with panegyrics addressed to the balanced, considered parliamentary draft, R. Khasbulatov pointed out that "it would be criminal to abandon constitutional methods of restructuring society by introducing a new constitution in circumvention of the present organs of power." He gave a reminder that the breakup of the Union began with precisely this, and he urged the subjects of the Federation not to fall into the same trap a second time.

You get the impression that it is not the text but precisely the means of adopting the new constitution that will primarily be the main arena of struggle, because that is primarily what governs the time left in power for those personalities who today decide so confidently which questions are "vitally important" to society and which are not. At any rate, this was precisely the key point in the speaker's speech, in which he once again called for "the positive aspects of the president's draft not to be abandoned" but, on the other hand, described as an "unnecessary complication" the methods now being discussed to carry out further work on the drafts—a Constituent or Constitutional Assembly, a Federation Council, etc. In his opinion, only one method exists—through constitutional mechanisms, i.e. through a decision of the Congress. At the same time Khasbulatov did not deny that the Congress really is not capable of adopting the constitution, but he gave a reminder that the Congress itself long ago advocated that the highest legislative power be represented only by the Supreme Soviet—in its present composition, of course.

The speaker of the Russian parliament warned the leaders of local soviets about the perfidy of high-ranking officials who, going beyond the bounds of the constitutional area (a term which has no juridical status), "are now trying to smear subjects of the Federation with their own guilt by drawing them into unlawful actions."

Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin, who was present in the conference presidium, fully supported the speaker in that the restoration of the unity and the competency of state power in Russia cannot "be ensured by imposing or throwing in from the side unconstitutional interpretations of our rulings"; and he complained that the Constitutional Court was first being "ground down to a powder, then people spat in the well, and then apparently they were even pleased with the ruling that we adopted on the referendum questions."

Forced up against the speaker of parliament by the political maelstrom, the chairman of the Constitutional Court suggested at least two new ideas to Khasbulatov: He quite rightly drew attention to the fact that the balance not of two but of three branches of power had been upset (at the same time it was clear from the context of the speech that V. Zorkin believes precisely the Constitutional Court and not the civil court or the Court of Arbitration, for example, to be the embodiment of the third branch), and he once again accused the president's team of seeking to follow advice from abroad. Zorkin proposed that the U.S. President himself revise his Constitution and propose that his people adopt a different, more modern and progressive one. The speaker of the Russian parliament greeted that idea with happy, childlike laughter.

In the opinion of Aleksandr Belyayev, chairman of St. Petersburg City Soviet, who is participating in the conference, the local organs of power, which are to discuss both drafts in the very near future, will most likely arrive at a decision to combine them. Belyayev believes that this is the simplest means of once again pushing both political leaders toward a compromise. In his opinion, it is only with this option that it will be possible to adopt a constitution in a more or less legitimate way, since both parliament and the Congress have adequate opportunities for forcing the president's team to openly transgress legislation—which, as a result, could alienate a considerable section of the population from the Constitution. For example, a referendum can be scheduled only by the Congress or by parliament. At the same time both Aleksandr Belyayev and other leaders of local soviets with whom I talked in the break maintain that any option will be better than the present one, whereby there is essentially no constitution at all.

Khasbulatov Article on Ending Constitutional Crisis

PM1205115593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition pp 3-4

[Article by Ruslan Khasbulatov, speaker of the Congress of People's Deputies: "The Constitutional Crisis: Ways Out"]

[Text] **I.**

As we have repeatedly asserted, the 25 April referendum did not and could not resolve the political and constitutional crisis in the Russian Federation. It merely reflected the polarization of views in society and people's profound disenchantment with the authorities as such.

There are several reasons underlying the constitutional crisis.

First, the quest for a balance of power between the three branches of power in a reforming society cannot proceed without conflict and without the periodic waxing and subsequent waning of these conflicts. Consequently, second—and this is the main point—we need to seek the optimum ways of resolving these conflicts. The lack or inadequacy of such forms and procedures could be a source of intensification for the constitutional crisis. Thus, the May 1 events in Moscow have already led to hysterical attacks on the Supreme Soviet.

Are these forms and procedures really lacking or really inadequate today? Or is this an artificial problem that is being used by opposing political forces to achieve their own narrow party and group ends?

Clearly, it is both of these. But it is equally clear that a solution to these problems can only be found within the constitutional process and on the basis of the existing Constitution and the cautious transformation of existing power institutions. The other route—using extreme means, **unconstitutional methods for adopting a constitution,** and undermining the prestige of state organs of power in the process of pitting them against new formations (a constituent assembly [uchredilovka], a Constitutional Assembly, a Federation Council, and so forth)—is liable to sharply exacerbate the sociopolitical situation and further weaken the state and the state's will, which is based on the composure and confidence not only of millions of officials, but of tens of millions of our fellow citizens.

If there are forces today attempting to change the existing constitutional order outside the framework of the Russian Federation Constitution, such actions by any person, including the highest official, cannot be described as anything other than an attempted unconstitutional coup. All the more so as, following the referendum—when the citizens who turned out expressed their confidence not only in the president (about which a great deal is being said) but also in people's deputies (which is being kept quiet)—the potential for protecting constitutional legality in society, including among the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Court, and law enforcement organs, has increased. This is an exceptionally important and constructive consequence of the referendum, together with the negative consequences, which have marked a sharp split in society.

There are plenty of reasons for the constitutional crisis—both objective and subjective. Let us try to examine one of, in my view, the most important.

The form of the constitutional crisis today is a manifestation above all of the contradictions between the emergent civil society and a political regime that is totally geared to the "most revolutionary" changes in record time—that is, between the country's various sociopolitical forces on the questions of the strategy for the state's further development and, above all, in the sphere of economic reform.

The objective socioeconomic contradictions in a society in transition have, regrettably, been turned into a constitutional crisis (not by parliament!). Certain political forces are presenting the executive's inability to cope with the growing economic and sociopolitical crisis, the continuing contradictions in national state policy, and the reluctance to resolve the Federation Treaty provisions enshrined in articles of the Constitution as a consequence of the "incompletion" of the transformations in the political sphere. Consequently, it is necessary to "complete" these transformations in any way possible. If, for instance, a constitution were adopted, things would be "in the bag"—a bag with which a newly happy people would then be saddled. That is their thinking.

There is a certain logic to this thinking and, correspondingly, to their actions, if you proceed on the basis of the thesis that revolution always means violence, and that

the seizure of political power and a dictatorship are the prerequisites for transformations in socioeconomic relations.

Is Russian society ready for another revolution? Is it ready to annul the democratic achievements of recent years, to destroy the foundations—only just laid—of a rule-of-law state, and to enter the era of a "non-rule-of-law area"?

The current acute conflict between the executive and the representative branches of power began to emerge in the spring of 1992, when the first results of "shock therapy" became evident. Having determined that there was a divergence between the Russian population's expectations of economic reform and the measures being implemented by the government, the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies considered it necessary to make amendments to economic policy with a view to preserving sociopolitical stability in Russia, and pointed out the futility of pursuing a tough line of "shock therapy." The Congress' appeal was not heeded by the executive. By December 1992 the development of the economic situation had exceeded the gloomiest forecasts, undermining the faith of the majority of the Russian Federation's population in the success of reform, and creating mass support for hardline opposition forces and, to a certain extent, for revanchists. The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies naturally reflected this new breakdown of forces in their decisions—this is the natural function of a parliament in a democratic state, in any modern state.

There are, however, no grounds for reproaching the Russian parliament for having opposed the socioeconomic reforms. The voters' mandate given to people's deputies to implement profound reform has been fully realized in the Supreme Soviet's lawmaking activity. The Supreme Soviet has not blocked anyone, and not a single law drawn up by the government has been delayed. Rather, it should be reproached for making excessive concessions to the government. Even with new deputies both the president and the government would find things very difficult.

Parliament, I repeat, has not rejected a single important draft law from the president or government aimed at reforming ownership, land, or labor relations. At the same time, the executive's norm-creating activity has repeatedly gone beyond the bounds set by the Constitution and the laws—that is, the balance of social consensus achieved within parliament through the adoption of laws. These deviations have given rise to a whole series of acute socioeconomic, organizational, and administrative conflicts.

II.

The most vivid example of the executive's "revolutionary violence" against the objective processes of the evolutionary transformation of society can be seen in the practice of the privatization of state and municipal enterprises. The 3 July 1991 Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation, the 5 June 1992 changes and amendments to it, and, finally, the 11 June 1992 State Privatization Program for 1992 and a number of accompanying legal acts that developed this model seemingly created the necessary legal foundations for privatization to go ahead. What is more—and this should be particularly emphasized—a definite consensus about the given model of privatization had been achieved in society. It was based on the following principles:

participation in privatization by broad sections of the population via the mechanism of personalized privatization checks;

a distinction between "small-scale" and "large-scale" privatization. And, although "small-scale" privatization was to have been carried out on a tight schedule, no excessive acceleration of the privatization process was envisaged with regard to major state enterprises. Moreover, the tasks of carrying out restructuring and improving the efficiency of production complexes were to have been resolved in the course of privatization. The parameters of the state sector were to have been clearly delineated—to specify just which sectors and spheres of production would remain within the state sector system—and the mechanism for organizing and running it was to have been defined. This was not done;

the separation of powers between the State Committee for the Management of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo] and property funds at all levels.

Subsequent normative acts—above all, presidential edicts (On Organizational Measures To Transform State Enterprises and Voluntary Associations of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies; On Carryiong into Effect the System of Privatization Checks in the Russian Federation; On the Features of Transforming State Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies in the Fuel and Energy Complex, and others)—and, primarily, the practice of accelerated privatization led to the emergence of a number of acute socioeconomic and political conflicts. These include increased corruption in the course of "piratization," swindling, and the emasculation of the slogan of "people's privatization" are evident among the entire population (the mass media have been full of stories about such cases—stories which, sadly, seem not to be of much concern to the executive and law enforcement organs).

The practice of accelerating privatization has led to an awesome threat of fragmentation for unified production and technological complexes, and of destruction for the country's production potential—which has been noted repeatedly by economic leaders themselves, enterprise collectives, entrepreneurs, trade unions, and even by the Russian parliament. That is why it is natural that the Goskomimushchestvo's activity received a negative assessment from the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet at its session in late April.

It should be noted that the contradictions between parliament and the executive in the sphere of privatization are no accident. They are deep-rooted. I recall that the government headed by Ye. Gaydar defined the "formation of an effective market economy" as a means of achieving the goals facing society. This was enshrined in its initial program—which was not ratified by parliament, incidentally. For its part, the Supreme Soviet in its many documents stressed the need to create a "modern, socially oriented market economy."

Thus, setting ourselves and all of society the one goal of the state's economic and social development, both the government and the Supreme Soviet (along with various sociopolitical forces) were proceeding on the basis that the way to implement this goal was through building the foundations of a market economy. This demonstrates once again the groundlessness of looking for opponents of the transition to the market economy among the structures of authority (and, above all, among most of the Supreme Soviet and its leadership). But, at the same time, there are grounds for pondering on whether the ways and means used by the government to create a market economy are the "only right answer," and on just how closely the concepts of an "effective market economy" and a "socially oriented market economy" are related.

Hardly anyone expressed doubt about the fact that the creation of the foundations of a market economy would result in definite social casualties. But the question of the scale of these unavoidable social losses has by no means been resolved in identical terms by the Supreme Soviet, the government, and various social forces. In this respect too, the government's approaches and programs have been typified by the least possible punctiliousness in defining which of the goals set by the government itself were actually attainable.

Thus, in concrete terms there have been and continue to be considerable differences between the two outwardly fairly close formulas used to describe the goals—the "creation of an effective market economy" (the government) and the "creation of a socially oriented market economy" (the Supreme Soviet). These differences applied first and foremost to defining and formulating specific ways of moving toward a market economy, as well as the choice of priorities at different stages of the transition.

III.

On the basis of world experience, which virtually all supporters of the transition to the market system of economic management are fond of citing today, we can talk about various models of the market economy. Among the main features which fundamentally distinguish one model from another we should note the different weighting of private and state forms of ownership, features of the distribution of national product (including specifics of tax policy), the principles of the investment policy followed in the country, the investment opportunities for foreign capital, and a number of other distinctive characteristics. Put briefly, it can be said that the essence of any particular market economy model is determined by the economic and social role to be played by the state in society [kotoraya yemu otvoditsya v obshchestve]. And it is unambiguous that there is a direct link between a growing role for the state and an increased social orientation in the economy.

Following this logic, it becomes obvious that the course toward an "effective market economy" pursued by the government (both the old government, and the new) is a movement toward the liberal model. This model is based on the absolutization of private property and the principles of economic self-organization, and presupposes a sharp reduction in the state's functions both in the economy and in the social sphere. Whereas the Supreme Soviet and most political movements today support the alternative course—of developing and strengthening the social thrust of the economy and preserving a high-profile role for the state in society.

Thus, the government's economic policy which began to be implemented in early 1992 has been marked by the choice of the liberal market economy model typical of the United States, for instance. This also explains the Ye. Gaydar cabinet's absolute orientation toward the recommendations of the IMF and U.S. economic consultants. (I am not denying the need to use any positive experience, but why transplant to Russian soil seeds that will undoubtedly fail to take root here because of a huge number of factors?)

The implementation of the abrupt liberalization of prices, the (failed) attempt to pursue a rigid monetarist course, and the desire to carry out the rapid privatization of state property are a manifestation of the government's choice of a liberal course for the development of the market economy. This was a strategic error if only because such a course presupposes that the nonstate sector of the economy is predominant. Attempts to apply methods based on the "Chicago school" have led to failure even in countries with a "mixed" economy and a developed state economic sector. I make special mention of this because now there are new calls being made to "accelerate" privatization. As though this had not led to disaster before (slogans akin to "let's produce corn in Arkhangelsk Oblast" type).

At the same time the Supreme Soviet's course toward intensifying the state's role in the process of the transformations and giving the reforms a social thrust (this was shown particularly clearly at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies) reflect parliament's desire to form another variation of the market model, that is a socially oriented model of the market economy. It is that model which is most widespread in modern states and it helps them to avoid serious social upheavals, for example in Eastern Germany, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak lands.

Different conceptual approaches to the formation of a market economy prevent the legislative and executive branches of power from coordinating activity, which leads, in particular, to a sort of conflict of the laws—when laws and decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet clash with edicts of the president who is bonded with [v svyazke s] the government.

Of course the executive should be subordinate to the law and the Constitution, that much is plain. But what see in practice is something else.

What is happening thus is first and foremost an economic confrontation between the two authorities, which gives rise to political disagreements. This is an important factor which shows, first, that the present constitutional crisis has an economic basis, second, that the problem of seeking economic consensus has become quite difficult because the differences in the sides' positions are found not in the sphere of the tactics of the reforms but in the sphere of strategy, and third, it shows that the executive is constantly breaching the constitutional rule-of-law.

As we can see, the point is not that the parliament represents some kind of "revanchist forces." No, parliament rejects the idea of "revanche" no less than the government does. People cannot fail to see that. The attempts to "link" parliament with the revanchists is a vile propaganda trick which nevertheless for the moment is regrettably producing results. But that is indeed "for the moment."

At the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies I expressed the idea that the congress must make the choice between two models of the market economy and thus two strategies of reforms. However the question was left unresolved then even though the congress decree made a major shift toward a social orientation of economic policy and legislative practice. I would like to hope that the work of the roundtable, which was set up by joint decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Russian Federation Government at the beginning of the year (in accordance with the decree of the Seventh Congress itself), will be productive and that we will soon produce an agreed draft of the economic reform. A worried society expects this from us and this is particularly important after the referendum with its ambiguous results.

At the same time there is concern at the fact that the government still believes that there is no need for a change of course in the economic reform and that the task is merely to "improve" it.

The government has thus not realized that the harsh financial policy which has been pursued has brought it into conflict not just with the Supreme Soviet but with many political forces and virtually all the social groups of the population. The negative role played by the cash crisis at the end of May through July 1992, which then led to the creation of an explosive and, in a number of regions, uncontrolable situation, as Ye. Gaydar was forced to admit after his resignation, is common knowledge. It was only the abandonment of the austere restrictive money-credit and budget policy that made it possible to temporarily ease the tension in society.

However, the situation is qualitatively different now. The government has again returned to a tightening of credit and monetary policy and to the practice of the rigid sequestration [sekvestirovaniye] of budget expenditure and at the same time has, in practice, committed itself to the need to carry out in record time the virtually complete lifting of the restrictions in money-credit and budget policy because of the host of social promises made before the referendum.

IV.

How can the present constitutional crisis be resolved?

First. Abandon the unconstitutional attempts to adopt a Constitution. Having expressed confidence in both the president and parliamentarians, those citizens of Russia who took part in the 25 April referendum advocated the need for constructive cooperation among all branches of power and for respect for the law and the constitutional rule of law. Consequently the adoption of the new Constitution is the exclusive prerogative of the Congress of People's Deputies.

However, the work to prepare the new constitution must be accelerated on the basis of the Constitutional Commission's draft, whose main provisions (together with the Federation Treaty) were ratified back at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies. I would remind readers that the president is also chairman of the Constitutional Commission. Together with the adoption of the Constitution the corresponding electoral laws must also be adopted, laws which would define the procedure for the election of deputies and the president and all other related issues.

Second. If the congress adopts a coordinated decision on early, simultaneous elections of the president and people's deputies (after the adoption of the Constitution) people should be under no illusions that this measure in itself is not sufficient to remedy the general situation in Russia. After all, the socioeconomic crisis is intensifying and an effective system of state management is needed to combat it. Furthermore, the pre-election campaign and, accordingly, the growth of political confrontation in that period and the inevitable decline in the effectiveness of decisions pertaining to the running of the country both from the president and parliament may yet aggravate the situation even further.

Third. Consequently, the enhancement of the role, responsibility, and authority of the federal government in these conditions is an urgent necessity. It must be strengthened if these questions are to be resolved. This is not yet another variation on a theme of the "state of emergency" ["chrezvychayshchina"]. The government must act in strict accordance with the law and within the clearly defined limits of its competence. However, a

sense of responsibility for Russia's historic destiny may make it necessary to extend the bounds of the powers given to it for a strictly limited period—until the elections of the president and people's deputies are completed.

Fourth. The government must actively exercise its right to initiate legislation, a right that it received as a result of amendments to the Constitution made at the Seventh and Eighth congresses of people's deputies. In this regard the government's activity must be deideologized as much as possible and protected by the authority of the congress against attempts by various forces to exploit specific difficulties to engineer government crises.

Fifth. The government will be able to fulfill its functions as an institution stabilizing the sociopolitical and economic situation only when it becomes a government of national accord. This means that parliament must return both to the government's action program and to the principles on which the government is formed. Most probably the program of the roundtable meeting will serve as the basis for the formation (reorganization) of the government.

V.

A critical analysis of the period of "shock therapy" and its results by leading sociopolitical and professional associations and specialists has graphically demonstrated that the blind advocacy of the previous course accompanied by references to the results of the referendum is futile. But intensifying this course is the short route to catastrophe. In view of the present arrangement of sociopolitical forces since the 25 April referendum the government will only be viewed as an institution of national accord if it takes the following propositions into account in its activity:

abandonment of forced and chaotic privatization in its present forms, which are a factor in the collapse of the existing production potential. The use of the state sector as a basis for stabilization and subsequent development which, however, does not rule out the need for its purposeful and consistent transformation as the market infrastructure is created;

the establishment of order in the approaches to financial and monetary stabilization, whereby the government proclaims the rigorous pursuit of stabilization as an aim but the president's edicts serve to nullify it. All this is leading to a deepening of the slump in production, the increased threat of mass unemployment, and the further intensification of the crisis;

the adoption of effective measures to wipe out corruption and bribery and economic violations of the law as a whole at federation level and the removal from office of all the people named by Vice President A. Rutskoy at the Supreme Soviet session since in the eyes of public opinion they are discrediting state power as a whole and undermining people's faith in the state's ability to combat crime successfully;

the adoption of effective measures to prevent the further impoverishment of the people: Even if they are not all that great, positive results from the reforms must become tangible in the near future. The government's calls for further social sacrifices in the name of building the market economy do not correspond to the main goal of the reform—the prosperity of society—in which building a socially oriented economy is a means of achieving it (and not an aim in itself, as Shumeyko, Chubays, and other officials think);

major amendments must be made to hard currency and foreign economic activity which will exclude the artificial devaluation of the nation's wealth and the form of exports [vyvoz] which is ruinous for the state and for its components, but which will stimulate the export [eksport] of finished products;

changes to tax policy and the abandonment of "edict-based" norm-setting in this sphere which is having a disastrous effect on the whole on the economic activity of both state and nonstate enterprises, firms, and companies;

the intensification of the state's economic role in regulating economic processes and in the formation and implementation of the state's industrial, agrarian, technological, and cultural policy.

These and other aims were formulated in the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies Resolution "On the course of the economic reform," in a number of Supreme Soviet resolutions since then, and in decisions of the Eighth and Ninth Congresses. The government is indeed moving toward carrying out these tasks but its progress is intolerably sluggish and inconsistent. The necessary lessons of the obvious bankruptcy of the course of "shock therapy" have not been learned, a fact which is being noted not only by a considerable section of the population and people's deputies but also in the regions, at sessions of the roundtable conference, and in speeches by scientists, specialists, managers, entrepreneurs, and bankers. Even in articles by foreign specialists one increasingly frequently comes across the idea that this method of implementing the decisions of the supreme organ of state power is not conducive to the attainment of national accord and the successful implementation of the economic reforms.

VI.

Four months of activity by the V. Chernomyrdin government have shown that the formation of a cabinet without the consent of parliament in the present transitional period, when there is a growing polarization of opinions on ways to reform society, pose a threat that the government will not react appropriately to the consequences of the course that is being pursued. It is obvious that the formation of a government of national accord requires a review of the present procedure for appointing cabinet members and the coordination with the Supreme Soviet of candidacies not only for the four ministries but the entire composition of the federal government. Here,

as I have already said, it is necessary to give the government the opportunity to act independently, the sole restrictions being those that I mentioned in a previous article in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, while making full use of the vote of confidence which the participants in the referendum gave to the president and his socioeconomic policy.

The only condition essential to the implementation of such a reform is political stabilization, the clear condemnation of all manifestations of extremism, whether from the left or the right, the prevention of confrontation, and a course aimed at the coordination of the reforms and political, organizational, and other actions on the part of the federal and regional powers and officials.

It is necessary to reduce the negative consequences of the split in society which resulted, as we predicted, from the referendum. Thus we must all be patient and tolerant and work for national accord while renouncing the imposition of one opinion, one approach, and one "absolute" truth. Even if it seems to us to be the most democratic.

It is well known that the "most" democratic idea ceases to be such as soon as the rulers resort to force to affirm it.

Political Issues

Chernomyrdin Chairs Council Presidium Session

LD1305074493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0620 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 13 May—Under the chairmanship of Viktor Chernomyrdin, a routine session of the Presidium of the Russian Council of Ministers began today. On the agenda are questions of the draft federal program of structural perestroyka of the economy for the period up to 1995 and the drafting of federal purpose-oriented programs for the development of the Russian Federation, for subsidizing import purchases of sugar, and on the draft provision of the Russian Federation Committee for Tourism.

Council Calls For Draft Programs

LD1305114193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The draft federal program for restructuring the economy up to 1995 and drawing up federal targeted programs for the development of the Russian Federation are probably the main issues now being discussed at a routine session of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of Russia. It is taking place under the chairmanship of Viktor Chernomyrdin.

[Unidentified correspondent] The main point on today's agenda for the Presidium of the Russian Council of Ministers was so important and all-embracing that the hall was full of interested representatives of ministries and departments.

The draft federal program for structural reorganization of the economy in the period up to 1995, and drawing up targeted development programs is being discussed. This has been prepared by the Ministry of Economy. The program envisages a range of measures of state influence on the development of the economy based on budgetary regulation of federal programs. The draft identifies among its priorities cutting the amount of materials and energy used in public sector production. It is thought that the Russian Government's economic course up to the year 2000 will be drawn up on the basis of this document.

However, in their speeches, representatives of a number of ministries subjected the draft to fairly harsh criticism for not taking full account of priorities already set by the government, and for not specifying sufficiently precisely the aims of economic development.

The session heard proposals that three versions of the program, one pessimistic, one optimistic, and one in between the two, be drawn up over one month.

Rutskoy Relieved of Duty of Receiving Ambassadors

LD1305144693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1346 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Boris Yeltsin deprived his Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy of the last remaining duty—to receive credentials of foreign ambassadors in Moscow—and welcomed three CIS and two foreign plenipotentiary envoys on Thursday [13 May] himself.

The Russian president received credentials from ambassadors of Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, South Korea and Greece.

Earlier Rutskoy, who openly opposed Yeltsin's transformations, lost the presidential assignments to head agricultural reform in Russia, as well as the commission on anti-crime fight.

On Wednesday Rutskoy's staff was drastically reduced.

Yeltsin Assassination Attempt Reports Called 'Provocative'

OW1305034493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1845 GMT 12 May 93

[From the "Utro" program]

[Text] Speaking at a 12 May press conference, Sergey Baburin, coordinator of the Rossiya faction and chairman of the All-Russian Union, called reports that an assassination attempt was being planned against the Russian president provocative, and said they were aimed at eliciting a new enemy image in society. He refuted a report made by Barsukov, chief of the presidential guard, that Pamyat and other patriotic movements are creating armed formations with the aim of removing Boris Yeltsin. Baburin accused Barsukov of being devoid of political ethics and said that the situation reminded him pointedly of the murder of Kirov, which Stalin used to get even with the opposition.

Kozyrev Comments on Recent 'Cadre Purge'

MK1205125293 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 15, 12 May 93 (signed to press 11 May) p 1

[S.P. report: "Kozyrev Approves Purge in Presidential Team"]

[Text] Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Kozyrev said in an interview with SEGODNYA's correspondent that he "approves of the cadre purge in the presidential team."

"The president has received a mandate of trust to pursue a perfectly concrete program. He is obliged to form, as far as possible, a homogeneous team capable of implementing this program," Kozyrev explained.

The minister said that he is "surprised" by the conduct of people who are showing themselves to be principled opponents of the president's policy: "All of them should have resigned long before the referendum."

"Politics presupposes confrontation of various points of view," he went on. "When, for instance, Aleksandr Vladimirovich [Rutskoy] is elected by the people, he will also kick us all out, and he will be right."

Yeltsin Aide on Reshuffle, Rumored Replacement

MK1205110093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 p 1

[Aleksandr Nadzharov report: "Khizha Fired After Skokov. President's Press Secretary Comments on Personnel Changes in Russian Government"]

[Text] Answering a question asked by your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent about the reasons for the dismissals of Yuriy Skokov, secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, and Georgiy Khizha, deputy chairman of the Russian Government, Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president's press secretary, noted that these should be viewed in the context of a personnel policy that Boris Yeltsin began carrying out after he received a popular mandate for radical economic reform at the all-Russian referendum.

[Kostikov] In order to fulfill the mandate for the promotion of reform and Russia's revival, the president needs statesmen and leaders who entirely share the reform-oriented ideology.

[Correspondent] Didn't Khizha and Skokov share it?

[Kostikov] I can speak only about Skokov, because I have not yet seen an edict releasing Khizha of his duties. So, Yuriy Vladimirovich has repeatedly demonstrated at the recent deputies' congresses, both directly and indirectly, his stance, which differs from the president's. Generally speaking, however, in both of these cases the president is taking steps toward that part of the democratically minded public which gave him the most massive support during the preparations for the referendum and which, naturally, expressed its wishes to Yeltsin regarding the reform of his inner circle.

The president's press secretary declined to answer the question about the probability of new reshuffles in the Russian government, but he did not rule this out, because the need for uniting the presidential team at a time when the country has yet to be lifted out of the crisis is evident. Most political scientists also believe that the pain may be minimized in this process only if the executive branch has strong and cohesive leadership.

Regarding the post of Russian Security Council secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov said that the president was considering a number of candidates. In his view, this position is one of the most important and prominent in the civil service. The person who occupies it must have a certain combination of characteristics. The press secretary mentioned among such characteristics the qualities of a powerful and strong-willed politician who is able to think big and who is acceptable for the entire society and not only for some of its sectors, and, finally, who simply shares the president's views.

If we put to rest the suggestion that it is perhaps the president alone who can be the best candidate to take over the post of Security Council secretary, the man who is coming to the foreground, according to most experts, is Sergey Stepashin, former chief of the Leningrad KGB, Russian deputy security minister, and, later, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Defense and Security Committee. He has so far declined to comment on the subject.

Some information was obtained from Georgiy Khizha's staff. According to these reports, the goings-on are yet another example of what can happen if politics are put ahead of economics. Echoing Vyacheslav Kostikov's view, a staffer of the former deputy prime minister who asked not to be identified believes that the dismissals of Khizha and Skokov took place according to the wishes of the radical wing of the democrats. He also emphasized that his chief has never been engaged in politics, devoting his attention to the problems of industrial reform. Khizha, he added, had only one difference of opinion "with certain aspects of the way the government's privatization program was being implemented."

That difference, however, was not of an overriding nature, Georgiy Khizha's staffer said.

As usual, no commentaries were forthcoming from the staff of Yuriy Skokov, who formerly also clearly shunned any contacts with the press: All of his officially listed telephones, including his government "hot line," simply did not answer.

Further on Shakhray Comments at Roundtable

PM1305081793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Robert Minasov report: "Are Soviets Incompatible With Parliamentarianism?"]

[Text] This categorical judgment was made by Russian Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs, at the fifth session of the "roundtable"—set up by decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Russian Federation Government to elaborate recommendations for programs of anticrisis measures and the development of reform—held in the capital's "President Hotel" 7 May under the chairmanship of Vladimir Ispravnikov, deputy speaker of parliament.

In his report Sergey Shakhray noted that full equality between Federation components will never be achieved, but it should be striven for in order to prevent the collapse of Russia. In his opinion, this should be the fundamental principle in the draft new constitution. Shakhray admitted that the president's version published the other day is by no means complete and requires fundamental improvement.

At the federal level, the speaker noted, we encounter a phenomenon which does not square with common sense—a two-headed executive (the president and the government) and legislature (the Congress and the Supreme Soviet), and a three-headed judiciary (the Constitutional and Supreme Courts and the Court of Arbitration). The vice premier stressed that all executive power should be concentrated in the government, whereas the president is being cast as referee in this sphere. We need to abolish the Congress of People's Deputies and elect a bicameral parliament.

There are just as many problems at regional level. Federal taxes and subsidies, for instance. We are in a situation, Shakhray said, where some regions remit less tax to the federal budget than they receive from it. And vice versa. The regions should be granted powers on a scale that ensure that socioeconomic and political ties are not broken.

As for the soviets—the traditional form of parliamentarianism in our country—in Shakhray's opinion they should end at city level, below this there could be municipal committees.

Shakhray upheld the institution of presidential representatives at local level, but in a somewhat different form—representation from the regions.

The vice premier's report produced a mixed reaction during the debate, in which representatives of the soviets from Vologda, Voronezh, Krasnodar, Samara, social and political movements, and administrative organs took part.

During the recess at the "roundtable" session a brief press conference was held, with Vladimir Ispravnikov and Sergey Shakhray taking part.

The former, in particular, noted that the referendum results can be interpreted in different ways, and there is therefore no point in diligently appealing to them. We should not make any abrupt unconstitutional moves. Deputies are not scared of new elections, Ispravnikov said. Probably only one of the referendum results is indisputable—the people advocated a stable situation in the country.

In his turn, Shakhray stressed that the Rumyantsev draft new constitution died at the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies, where the overwhelming majority failed to support it. That is why the president's version has appeared. In his opinion, the Congress does not have the right to adopt a new constitution because most of those who took part in the referendum gave it a vote of no-confidence. The document should be adopted by a constitutional assembly.

Referendum Results Show 26 Territories Opposed Yeltsin

LD1205114893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Speaking today at a conference of the heads of the soviets of the subjects of the federation, Vasiliy Kazakov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for holding the all-Russian referendum, informed those present of some of the results of the voting on 25 April. He announced, inter alia, that the president obtained the least support in the Caucasian autonomous entities of Russia. Boris Yeltsin obtained maximum support in Yekaterinburg, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and some other electoral districts.

Kazakov said 26 territories did not express confidence in the president during the voting. Kazakov also announced that the electors made practically no distinction between questions one and two.

Presidential Aide Volkov Interviewed

PM1205145193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 May 93 p 2

[Interview with Russian Federation people's deputy Vyacheslav Volkov, deputy chief of the president's

administration, by Lyubov Tsukanova: "The President Will Manage to Find the Correct Solution and Ensure Civil Accord in Society"]

[Text] [Tsukanova] Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, it is clear that the president, on the basis of the referendum results, intends to take a number of decisive steps. Although it was emphasized several times at the Central Electoral Commission session, when they were summing up the official results, that it was a consultative referendum. So the results of the vote are being interpreted in various ways, are they?

[Volkov] The talk about the consultative nature of the referendum is an extension of the trickery employed by the Congress in relation both to the questions and to the system for counting the votes. If the president had lost, they would have called the decision constitutional. But he won—so it was consultative. The referendum has legal force and the president and his socioeconomic policy have gained the approval of the people, that is clear. So if the Congress and the Supreme Soviet block the reforms the president has every right to ignore such decisions and conduct the policy that was started in 1992.

[Tsukanova] Has a significant mechanism for the adoption of a new Constitution been worked out? As is known, the Supreme Soviet has stepped up the constitutional process and the stages of work on the draft, approved at the Sixth Congress, have been determined. Is the new Constitution going to be another battlefield?

[Volkov] The mechanism for adopting the Constitution is currently being determined by the president, but he is not linking it to the Congress of People's Deputies, because it was clear actually before the referendum that the Congress is not prepared to adopt a new Basic Law. The president's draft has been distributed for study and consultation to the components of the Federation, and the most liklely route is through the Federation Council, through wide-ranging consultations with public organizations and parties, with people's deputies, including, I believe, the Constitutional Commission. Indeed, it is known that 60 percent of the provisions of the two constitutional drafts coincide. The positions could come even closer together during the discussion, amplification, and amendment process. And this is realistic insofar as the body of deputies appreciates, on the basis of the referendum results, that it is necessary to go for concerted work rather than seek new confrontation.

[Tsukanova] But recent events in the Supreme Soviet rather indicate the opposite.

[Volkov] I still hope that this is inertia. I believe that the deputies will reach a stage where they begin to come to their senses. But if this does not occur, the president will have to clearly determine the date of the elections and, perhaps, issue an edict approving the laws on elections and on political parties, which are necessary for these elections.

It is necessary to keep track of the processes and make the kind of decisions that will enable one at least to remain within the sphere of the civil accord that took shape after the referendum. No one intends to split society further. Contrary to what the speaker said, the referendum united society. Had it not been for the events of 1 May, I am sure the cohesion process would have continued on the basis of common work on the Constitution. But now, of course, the new unrest and the judicial investigations are certainly not contributing to accord. It is clear too who benefits from this. A kind of vicious circle is taking shape. The more conditions are created for the irreconcilable oppositioon to lead a political life, the more scum sticks to it. Embittered people are are uniting and setting out on the path of crime, the path of blood.

[Tsukanova] Radical democrats are being accused of inciting the president to take tough steps, which is leading to new confrontation. Perhaps it is true to say that if on 1 May people had not been prohibited from going where they wanted to go there would have been no bloodshed?

[Volkov] I do not agree. If we intend to live in a rule-of-law state, we have to learn to observe law and order. That is talking in general terms. In this specific case both the president and the Moscow government were acting in accordance with the law. There was a system, the route had been mapped out, and the proper preparations had been made. If the organizers of the demonstration really had been law-abiding citizens they should have either acted within the agreed framework or, if they did not agree, they could have refused to hold the demonstration. Incidentally, that would have had a much stronger social impact. Only by taking small steps like these can one progress toward the building of a rule-of-law state and civil society.

[Tsukanova] But now it would seem there are again grounds for talking about a split in society. How strong is our social peace?

[Volkov] I said it before and I say it again that there has been no split in society. The very fact that all the republics, except Chechnya, held the referendum unequivocally indicates that there is unity and there is an appreciation of the need to resolve the conflict at the top, which has occurred not as a result of the clash between the legislative and executive authorities, but as a result of contradictions in the Constitution, on the basis of which both sides are right in their own way. The matter should have been resolved a long time ago, and it is no accident that the president marked out the new Constitution before going ahead with the referendum. Judging by the president's recent contacts with the heads of the republics and chiefs of administrations, one can say that in principle they are ready to work with the president and they expect him to carry out the reforms he began in 1992.

[Tsukanova] Are you not overestimating the democracy of the republics' leaders and their willingness to continue the reforms? There are many indications that it is in the provinces that the reforms are stuttering most, because the old nomenklatura remains in power there and the inertia is greater there. What guarantee is there that the republics' heads sincerely support the president and are not playing their own game, shall we say?

[Volkov] Be that as it may, there are no conflicts like the one that has occurred at the top in a single republic at the moment. Except for Mordovia, but that is simply a Supreme Soviet bridgehead, and we know how all that came about. But that is an isolated case, in fact. From my constant contacts I can say there is definite mutual understanding. But as well as that, it is necessary to move on from the Federal Treaty that was signed more than a year ago (and the president has taken this path) and grant the Federation's components greater rights. Not to relieve the center of the responsibility for carrying out the economic reform, but to ensure that the general course of the reforms pays closer attention to the regions' specific requirements. At the moment they blame all the shortcomings of the reforms in the provinces on the fact that they do not have sufficient rights. If they get the rights, they will no longer be holding the president responsible, but the people will be holding them responsible. No matter whether they are democrats or communists.

There must be a clear delimitation of rights and responsibility. This brings us to the treaty mechanism. This question has been raised twice, and, to the people's deputies' credit, has twice been reflected in documents, at the eighth and ninth congresses. There should be a commission functioning under the president's chairmanship to elaborate a mechanism for implementing the Federal Treaty. If this runs parallel with work on the new Constitution, I am sure that 50 percent of the comments and proposals on the draft will actually be a means of implementing this treaty. There will be little in the way of politics, but there will be proposals on the actual demarcation of powers. Then there will be material for the commission, chaired by the president, to work on.

This parallel and simultaneous work could provide the most successful mechanism for the adoption of the Constitution.

[Tsukanova] But, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, what if events do not develop favorably and the president is again accused of acting unconstitutionally, does he have enough power—political and state—to be able to continue his policy?

[Volkov] I believe he has enough. He has withstood so many blows, above all political, that he is capable of finding a solution that could ensure civil accord and keep society from civil war, which our particularly wild opponents are quite obviously pushing us toward. And I think he will manage to avoid offending the dignity of the people's deputies. He is democratic enough for that. But he is strong too, and decisive.

Social Democrats Elect New Leaders; Party Splits

MK1205134493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 12 May 93 p 10

[Yelena Khampira report: "Congress of Social Democrats. Supporters of President Elected as Party Leaders]

[Text] **The Fifth Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, in which 96 delegates from 60 regions around Russia took part, ended in Nizhniy Novgorod late on 10 May. The Congress assessed as unsatisfactory the performance of the party leadership and elected a new board now consisting exclusively of supporters of the president. Anatoliy Golov was elected chairman of the party.**

Differences between the centrist leaders of the party and its regional sections, which fully support Boris Yeltsin's policy, became apparent as early as the time of preparation for the referendum. At that time, the St. Petersburg Social Democrats decided, in defiance of the party board's decision, to express at the referendum confidence not only in the Russian president but also in the economic policy he followed.

The issue over whether to give Boris Yeltsin unreserved support in the future as well was the key question at the party congress that took place. As a result of the voting, the previous leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Russia who take the centrist stand were not reelected. Anatoliy Golov, a radical democrat, was elected the party's new chairman by a majority of votes. He is former head of the St. Petersburg regional organization of the Social Democrats.

"I assess this as a political coup," Igor Averkiyev, ex-chairman of the party told your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent. Now, according to Averkiyev, only Democratic Russia supporters are on the new board of the Social Democratic party.

The Congress adopted a political statement in which the Social Democratic party renounces its former idea of calling a Constituent Assembly in the near future, and voices support for the president's current political line.

In their turn, the former leaders Pavel Kudyukin and Igor Averkiyev created a new Unified Faction to bring together all proponents of the centrist position. Participants in this faction plan to draw up their political program in the near future.

By all appearances, the congress in Nizhniy Novgorod has put an end to the Russian Social Democratic Party as a single and independent political organization. Its radical democratic part has now in fact identified itself with the Democratic Russia movement. As for the Unified Faction, one should expect that it would also lose political independence very soon and join a bloc with Civic Union.

Gaydar Interviewed on Possible Return to Government

MK1205104093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 12 May 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with former Russian Prime Minister Ye.T. Gaydar by Yana Yurova; in Moscow; date not given: "What Is Faithful Gaydar Silent About?"]

[Text] It has been rumored that the ex-premier is being invited to work in the government. During the public holidays MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS' correspondent managed to force her way into Yegor Timurovich's office to obtain first-hand information.

[Gaydar] I, too, have heard on the radio, read in the newspapers many times about my comeback. I even heard that I initially agreed to return to the government but then changed my mind. All this is very interesting and surprising and therefore at this point I have to say: So far neither the president nor the premier have approached me officially.

[Yurova] There is no smoke without fire....

[Gaydar] As far as I know, right after the victory in the referendum natural polemics began within the political leadership as to how to handle the fruits of success. Intensive talks were under way; serious disagreements surfaced, including those of an organizational and personal character. In other words, all the rumors about me are echoes of the internal discussion between the government and the president.

[Yurova] Recently Yeltsin told a press conference that you do not want to return to the government.

[Gaydar] In that case, the president is simply misinformed.

[Yurova] Do you think government members have again developed an interest in you as a professional economist, or as a political figure symbolizing the deepening of the reforms?

[Gaydar] I think that this interest is of a mixed character. Partly it is naturally connected with our joint work, purely professional interaction. Partly, of course, with so-called token problems: Either to indicate or not to indicate a course toward the continuation of the reforms. This is a matter of serious choice, and to a large extent it goes beyond the level of a particular individual.

[Yurova] If you receive a proposal to return to the government, will you agree without reservation or will you make certain conditions?

[Gaydar] Everything depends on which policy the government will be pursuing. After the referendum some absolutely unique opportunities have opened up for a sharp acceleration of the reforms, about which one could not even have dreamed back in 1992. It would be unforgivable in my opinion to miss them for some personal reasons. Therefore, if the idea was to really use this chance, I would agree. If, on the other hand, the situation is used only to state that everything is okay, that the reforms have been approved "thank God for that, and let us for the time being wind them up and begin restoring the manageability of the national economy," then it is not quite clear just what my role in the government might be.

[Yurova] It is no secret that when your were premier, you reversed your policy several times yourself.

[Gaydar] Indeed, I revised my policy. Some three times. We pursued extremely tough anti-inflationary measures approximately until May 1992. By that time we were very close to success on a number of lines toward stabilization, but politics is the art of the possible. At the time we were only beginning to prepare the foundations for structural reforms, primarily for privatization. By May, however, a powerful pro-inflationary political coalition took shape, declaring that all the problems stemmed from a low money supply in the economy. Having liberalized prices and assumed responsibility for a whole number of problems of the former Union, we provided ground for the formation of this broad coalition.

Beginning in May and June it was simply impossible to stand up to the pressure it was exerting. After all, the government is not a court that has the power to veto any decisions. It cannot block increases in budget spending, Central Bank credits. In response it can do only one thing—resign. And so when it became clear that the weakening of the financial policy was inevitable, the question arose: Either to agree to a weakening of positions, a tactical retreat, or to resign. Resignation, however, essentially meant that the development of large-scale privatization would also be abandoned. Therefore we decided to go ahead with privatization and after that, having restructured our forces, return to a tighter monetary policy.

From September, when the beginning of privatization made it possible to break through the pro-inflationary front, we eventually got a chance to return to tougher positions. Beginning in September we had a deficit-free budget, which enabled us in October to reduce the rate of the money supply growth and in November to cut it down to a quite acceptable level of 5 percent and create prerequisites for a fall in the exchange rate.

Further, the stabilization program hinged not only on Gaydar's political will and his ability to convince the president of the need to support this course. It was based on the interests of a substantial part of society and the industrialists, who understood that inflation is not a blessing but a colossal additional tax on any money holder.

[Yurova] It is not only unpleasant but also dangerous to be under constant pressure. Today you are again ready to pursue reforms—is it the economic situation or the lineup of political forces that has changed?

[Gaydar] I repeat: Today there are great possibilities for pursing a consistent stabilization policy. First, the economy has to a large extent adjusted to free prices and a free currency market. Second, it is ready for a low volume of military production orders, which was a terrible blow in 1992. Third, it has learned to react adequately to measures of financial and monetary-credit regulation. Fourth, there is generally recognized political support.

[Yurova] You have mentioned political will. Current Finance Minister Fedorov has also described it as one of the conditions for a rapid stabilization of the ruble....

[Gaydar] I entirely agree with Boris Fedorov. To stabilize the ruble today it is vital to prevent a sharp increase in the budget deficit, which since March has begun to grow. One must have the courage to apply measures directed toward price liberalization; it is necessary to adjust one's financial appetites to reality, to stick to those monetary policy guidelines that were worked out and coordinated with the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. This is quite sufficient for reducing the rate of inflation within a month. After the referendum this will must above all be displayed by the president and the head of government.

[Yurova] Yeltsin is going to sign a package of documents to speed up the reforms....

[Gaydar] It contains, in my opinion, some substantial documents, including those providing for the expansion of citizens' rights in the course of privatization. The most important thing is that these reformist acts not be undone by insufficiently coordinated day-to-day work.

[Yurova] I would like to take a look ahead. What will happen if, let us say by fall, the government embarks down the path of rapid acceleration of the reforms?

[Gaydar] Before fall it would be possible at least to complete the first stage of destatization of the economy and ensure some clarity with regard to ownership, thus creating prerequisites for raising the efficiency of enterprises. Second, to effectively reduce the rate of inflation to a level below 10 percent. This is a very decent result for us. On this basis it would be possible to stabilize the ruble in relation to the dollar and therefore lay down the foundations for the stabilization of the entire system of economic relations.

[Yurova] But the government may also move in a different direction....

[Gaydar] Of course, something quite to the contrary could be done. For instance, continue the policy of broad money handouts and hold on to the leftovers of administrative price controls. In addition, get a huge extra budget burden related to the need to maintain prices for oil and oil products and be confronted with the necessity to increase, further and dramatically, the volume of the money supply in Russia. The course of events with regard to inflation could again be reversed, with the ruble-dollar rate falling sharply and monthly inflation rates accelerating. All this would substantially complicate the prospects of buying harvested crops, because this is very difficult in the context of a sharp upsurge in expectations of inflation. Attempts could be made to institute control and manageability of the economy. But immediately insoluble tasks would emerge since there are no structures that could deal with this in earnest. All this fuss could considerably complicate the operation of enterprises and introduce elements of chaos into the economy.

Therefore the present crossroads in our path is of a fundamental nature.

Economic Issues

Soskovets Gives News Conference on Industrial Policy

LD1205143193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 12 May 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Oleg Soskovets, a recently appointed new deputy prime minister in the Russian Government, held a news conference in Moscow today on industrial policy in the Russian Federation.

[Correspondent Nikolay Ivanov] Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of Russia's Council of Ministers, today met journalists for the first time since his accession to the post. The new appointment nearly coincided with his birthday—he was 44 yesterday. Oleg Soskovets was once the metallurgy minister in a Soviet Union government. In 1992, he was a deputy prime minister in Kazakhstan. His most recent post before this one was that of chairman of the Russian committee on metallurgy.

The deputy prime minister will deal directly with organizing and managing the industrial complex. He said that his thoughts today were directed at the continuation of reform in Russia. Soskovets mentioned the possibility of declaring individual enterprises in Russia bankrupt—but only after consideration is given to the enterprise's social significance and social protection for its staff.

On the question of mothballing loss-making coal mines, the new deputy prime minister noted that sometimes technical surveillance over mothballed mines was less profitable than letting them run idle. At the same time, differences in coal prices in CIS countries were forcing the Russian Government to consider leveling prices for the coalminers' output.

At the news conference, Oleg Soskovets was surprised at the suggestion that he had something to do with directors' lobby in the government. He did note, however, that establishing relations between the government and the corps of directors was one of his priorities today.

Comments on Economic Reform

PM1305150593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 93 First Edition p 2

[Valeriy Konovalov report: "Oleg Soskovets Believes Reform Is Progressing Successfully and Should Be Developed"]

[Text] The first question asked at the first news conference to be given by Oleg Soskovets, the Russian Government's new first vice premier, came from our newspaper: "Are major alterations in the course of the economic reforms necessary today, and can a switch in economic policy be anticipated in the light of the personnel changes in the government leadership?"

"In my view, reform has been taking hold over the past year," the vice premier declared. "On the whole, the work to transform the Russian economy has constituted a positive phenomenon. As a result, the approaches and evaluations of the majority of enterprise managers and workers have changed, and new economic relations have begun to form. We must continue to develop the course of reforms under way. At the same time, due account should be taken of errors which have led to a slump in a number of production areas, and the demise of investment activity."

Soskovets did not begin to explain precisely which errors requiring rectification he had in mind. What is more, he answered several other questions fairly evasively. So even after the news conference, journalists were actually not much clearer about what makes the new vice premier tick.

His recent appointment prompted much supposition and interpretation. Does the appearance of Soskovets in parallel with [newly appointed First Vice Premier and Economy Minister] Lobov signify a strengthening of the "anti-Gaydar" tendency in the government? Or, on the contrary, is it a trade for the more odious Khizha? There is even an assumption that Soskovets's appointment was made under the patronage of Shumeyko, who intends to increase his influence in counterbalance to Chernomyrdin. Finally, Soskovets is seen as a contender for the post of Russia's representative in the CIS coordinating organ.

Oleg Soskovets is quite young—he was born in 1949. But already he has put in work not only as general director of the major Karaganda Metallurgical Combine but also as a minister of the Union government, minster in the government of Kazakhstan, and chairman of the Russian Metallurgy Committee.

The vice premier suggests that it is necessary to actively push ahead with the process of privatizing enterprises, although with due account of each sector's specifics. "We have done a lot of work recently with my colleague Chubays," he announced, "and there is mutual understanding between us here."

As for the possible bankruptcy of loss-making enterprises, Soskovets declared that this is a natural, essential process, and that it is merely necessary to carefully set in place measures of social protection for workers.

Chernomyrdin Urges 'Cooperation' Among Various Forces

LD1205181293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 12 May—"Social and economic transformations are demanding increased activity and responsibility from each citizen of Russia. One should do one's job calmly, persistently, and competently," Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian Government, said today addressing a conference of leaders of bodies of representative power at the House of Soviets.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers is convinced that in the present conditions it is necessary to deepen cooperation between the government and various social and political forces. "From the practice of one-off consultative meetings we should turn to constructive cooperation on a permanent basis," Viktor Chernomyrdin said.

The premier particularly noted "an exclusive importance of forming a constructive bloc of reformative forces, intended to support the government in the implementation of concrete measures to surmount the crisis in the economy."

"What is under discussion here is business cooperation between democratic and centrist forces and also part of those forces which regard themselves as the opposition if they have the good will to do this," he clarified.

Describes Government's Economic Policy

LD1205170493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1441 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow, 12 May—Describing the strategy of the government's economic policy, Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed that the government in its work today is proceeding from the situation which has been formed and from the actual resources it has. "Possibilities to reconsider the strategy are being reduced at present to a minimum. It is necessary to support both the population and production, but we cannot do it at the cost of inflation gathering even greater momentum as it reduces to nothing all our efforts and causes more serious damage to those who need this practical help," the prime minister noted.

Assessing the economic situation which has formed in the country since the beginning of the year, Viktor Chernomyrdin noted that throughout this entire period the economy has been functioning in conditions of very high inflation, which amounted to 220-230 percent in

the consumer sector from January to April. "However, one cannot fail to notice a gradual slowing down of inflation," he added. "From January to April the consumer price index has dropped from 127 percent to 117 percent, which is the lowest for the past eight months."

A weekly drop in the rate of inflation for April, from 6 percent in the first week to 2.8 percent in the last week, was also noted. According to Chernomyrdin's assessment, this tendency shows that a restrained money and credit policy enables "the processes of inflation to be slowed down, if not fully suppressed. As a result of the joint efforts on the part of the government and banks, the slowdown in the rate of issuing credits is starting to produce its first shoots and first promising results."

At the same time, the prime minister said, there is still the danger of an inflationary explosion, which could be detonated by the sometimes poorly coordinated actions for raising incomes in the budget sphere, the indexation of investments of the population, and additional credit emissions.

Viktor Chernomyrdin reported that the volume of industrial output has been practically unchanged since September 1992. The volume of industrial output in April this year was the same as in March. At the same time, "compared with last year, production continues to decline. In comparison with April last year, the drop in production is 17-18 percent."

The head of the government went on to say that the population "is beginning to return to the lost level of consumption of consumer goods." In the past four months the population has acquired 30 percent more goods than last year, although this is still less than two years ago. The government believes, however, that for the majority of people the most difficult period is already over.

Speaking of the government's future plans, Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed that it will definitely give a clearly expressed social orientation to this work. The targeted nature of social support will be intensified, the work that has been begun to protect the population's savings will be continued, and inadmissible anomalies in the differentiation of earnings are to be sorted out. The prime minister stated that by way of a legislative initiative the government will submit a draft law to the Supreme Soviet on regulating earnings in the Russian Federation. Work is presently under way on a draft law on the minimum income level. Work is nearing completion on finalizing a federal program to promote employment for the population.

"The pursuit of a severe anti-inflationary policy is the government's most urgent task," Viktor Chernomyrdin emphasized. In this connection he noted the need to put credit emission within a strict framework and added that in the second quarter the growth of centralized credits will be limited to 30 percent, in the third quarter to 20 percent, and in the fourth to 15 percent. The prime minister stressed that there is now an urgent need to free coal prices and to reach a decision on the pricing mechanism for other energy resources.

Calls For Accord in Curbing Inflation

LD1205164493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1444 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin called on various political forces to conclude an agreement and join efforts in curtailing inflation, supporting industrial production and stabilising the living standards.

Rallies and demonstrations will not take Russia out of the crisis, he told a meeting of legislators from Russian regions on Wednesday [12 May].

"Social-economic transformations demand from every Russian increased activity and responsibility", he said, adding that the results of the April 25 referendum call to pay more attention not to contradictions, but to the problems where there is a unity of opinions.

The prime minister believes it "exclusively important to form a constructive bloc of reformist forces" which will support the government in its anti-crisis policy. The bloc is to unite "democratic, centrist and also a part of those forces who call themselves the opposition if they wish so", he added.

He also called for permanent contacts between the government and various political forces. "We should switch from the practice of one-time consultations to constructive interaction on a permanent basis", Chernomyrdin said.

Yeltsin Issues Decree on Privatization Guarantees

LD1305075593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] A decree by Boris Yeltsin on state guarantees of the right of the Russian people to take part in privatization has been issued for publication today. This establishes that 29 percent of the shares in all joint-stock companies being created from state enterprises should be available for sale for vouchers, no later than three months from the formation of the enterprise. The decree also provides for other measures to protect the right of the citizens of Russia to take part in privatization.

Supreme Soviet

Yeltsin's Actions on New Constitution Challenged

LD1305081393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0748 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—The Council of the Republic, one of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament, will discuss today an appeal to the Constitutional Court. The chamber is going to request the court to rule on the constitutionality of the Russian president's actions connected with the procedure of adopting a new Russian Constitution.

The proposal to discuss the issue was made by People's Deputy Vladimir Isakov. "Two parallel constitutional processes are gaining momentum in the country, which poses a threat to the integrity of the state and the federation," Isakov said.

Isakov added that he had a draft appeal to the Constitutional Court and a draft resolution on the chamber ready for endorsement.

Constitutional Commission Timetable Reported

LD1305062993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0500 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] The Constitutional Commission of the Russian parliament is planning to submit the fully finalized draft of the basic law for consideration by the parliament on 6 July. Prior to the plenary sitting of the Supreme Soviet, the draft constitution is to be discussed at parliamentary hearings where the procedure for adopting the basic law is also to be discussed. A plenum of the Constitutional Commission has been scheduled for mid-June in order to examine the results of the discussion of the draft constitution by the Federation subjects.

Exclusion of Officials From Rostrum Protested

PM1205141793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 1

["Statement by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Parliamentary Press Service"—ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA headline]

[Text] On the nationwide Victory Day holiday 9 May the leaders of the Supreme Soviet and the Russian Federation Constitutional Court attended the opening ceremony of the first phase of the memorial complex dedicated to the Great Patriotic War at Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow. The ceremony was attended by thousands of Muscovites and guests of the capital, including war and labor veterans.

But the leaders' path to the rostrum, which was occupied by Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin and Mayor Yu.M. Luzhkov of Moscow, was barred by A.V. Korzhakov, chief of the president's bodyguard, who stated that the presence of the leaders of parliament and the Constitutional Court on the rostrum was not envisaged, and this event was being conducted solely for the Russian president.

The parliamentary press service considers this attitude by the president's bodyguards with regard to the country's top leaders to have been tactless.

[Signed] Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Parliamentary Press Service

[Dated] Moscow, House of the Soviets; 9 May 1993

Soviet of Nationalities Adopts Bill on Auditing

LD1305104793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities today adopted a draft law on auditing activity in the Russian Federation in the first reading.

The draft law defines the legal status of audit officials and their organization, the procedure for, and the forms of licensing the auditing activity, and provides for the establishment of an auditing chamber under the control of the parliament and the Ministry of Finance.

Regional Affairs

Chechen Parliament Removes Dudayev From Government

LD1305010993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0000 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] The Chechen parliament has released General Dudayev from the post of head of government, the ANI agency reports. Yaragi Mamodayev, a former vice prime minister, has been appointed the republic's new prime minister [as heard]. By doing this, the Chechen parliament, which is in opposition to Dzhokhar Dudayev, has deepened the confrontation with the leader of the North Caucasian republic. In the meantime, supporters of the opposition continue their rally on Theater Square in Groznyy. They intend to go on rallying until 9 June.

More on Chernomyrdin Visit to North Caucasus

PM1205135593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Viktor Chernomyrdin Discusses Acute Problems of the North Caucasus With Its Leaders"]

[Text] During a trip to the North Caucasus, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin met with leaders of Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan, and took part in a session of the North Caucasus Coordination Council.

In Nazran the new Ingush leadership described to Viktor Chernomyrdin the disastrous situation in the republic—64,000 refugees, 253 Ingush who are still missing, a 61 percent fall in production in the past year, and a 26 percent reduction in the number of people employed in industry. President Ruslan Aushev of Ingushetia drew the Russian premier's particular attention to the need to resolve territorial problems. He attributed the mere 3

percent of votes that Boris Yeltsin was given at the referendum to the fact that "people cannot return to their homes."

In his turn, V. Chernomyrdin noted that all territorial disputes should be resolved exclusively by peaceful means. The prime minister also reported that a directive has been signed on the creation of a government commission for the determination of the borders between North Ossetia and Ingushetia. At the same time, he noted that the latter still has not signed the Federation Treaty. Responding to a request for a 60 billion ruble and $10 million credit, V. Chernomyrdin said, as RIA reports, that "money by itself solves nothing... Specific projects are needed."

At a meeting with V. Chernomyrdin in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetian leaders and representatives of the public noted that in order for the Ossetian-Ingush conflict to be normalized, the Russian Supreme Soviet must review the individual provisions of the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples, and in particular, rescind Article 6, which stipulates that the borders of their former place of residence be restored. It was also stressed that the Russian leadership must make a political assessment of the tragedy that has occurred, name its organizers, and take them to court. V. Chernomyrdin answered that a hearing would definitely be carried through to a conclusion.

Trip Results Evaluated

PM1305134393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 May 93 p 1

[Sergey Karkhanin report: "The Caucasian Heights Cannot Be Seen From Moscow, and Therefore Viktor Chernomyrdin Has Visited the Conflict Zone in Order To Ensure That Government Policy in This Region Suits the Interests of the Peoples and Is Realistic"]

[Text] This trip, as was to be expected, was complex. The explosive situation in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone still exists, and it is no accident that North Ossetian Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Galazov stated prior to his meeting with the Russian prime minister that "We hope that Viktor Chernomyrdin will make the kind of decisions at local level that will enable him to match words with action, and paper with real life." Much the same hopes were expressed by the Ingush leader R. Aushev when he spoke about the problems of refugees and hostages: "Everything could flare up again with renewed force, and unless the government makes some sort of decision the situation will get worse."

For the time being one thing is clear: The premier's trip is an attempt to finally take active steps in North Caucasian policy. The need for such steps is understandable: To temporize would mean driving the conflict underground and running the risk of the fire flaring up again. But will it be possible to reach agreement on measures that will suit both sides and alleviate the lot of innocent casualties? After all, in addition to economic support, assistance is required to look for a compromise in the status of the disputed Prigorodnyy Rayon and a political assessment of the reasons for the armed conflict. The diametrically opposed positions of the two sides have made the premier's mission extremely difficult.

Following a session of the North Caucasus Coordination Council held in Nalchik under his chairmanship, the leaders of both republics commented on the results of the trip. R. Aushev stressed once again that the Russian Government had to fulfill in a clearer and more consistent manner all the decisions it has made to settle the conflict and assist Ingushetia. For his part, A. Galazov noted that the refugee problem should be resolved in an integrated manner. V. Chernomyrdin himself, however, assessing the results of the session, stated that ethnopolitical issues in the North Caucasus should be resolved at both federal and local level, and moreover in a considered manner.

Another very important purpose of the prime minister's trip was to establish coordination of joint actions regarding economic reform. Having met with the leader of Kabardino-Balkaria, he adumbrated that in the course of its reforms, Russia should not gear itself to importing Western technologies but concentrate on domestic production. According to him, the West has made up its mind to "absorb" Russian industry and its technology. Speaking about the difficulties faced by Russian industry in connection with processing agricultural products, the prime minister stressed that processing enterprises should be founded on domestic hardware and technologies.

Kabardino-Balkaria President V. Kokov stated that the republic's power structures and most of its inhabitants support the federal government's reforms course, and Kabardino-Balkaria itself "is one of the few southern Russian regions where stability has been preserved." He asked the Russian federal authorities to help implement measures to rehabilitate the Balkar people.

And so the main results of the trip were personal impressions of events in the region. These impressions are sure to be useful to the prime minister when he has to define the government's position on any new problems that might arise in the North Caucasus. One of these became apparent literally the other day: A number of opposition leaders in Chechnya have called for Chechnya and Ingushetia to unite in a Veinakh Republic within the Russian Federation, and R. Aushev would become president of the Veinakh... Under this scenario, retirement would be on the cards for the "rebellious General" D. Dudayev, and the "Chechen problem" would be reserved a place in the archives of Russian history. However, for the time being this is only a draft, and whether or not it is implemented depends to a considerable extent on the position of the federal organs of the Russian executive.

Shakhray in Murmansk To Explain Yeltsin Constitution

LD1205194693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 12 May 93

[Report by correspondent Anuchin, with recorded statement by Russian Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russian Government Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray today arrived in Murmansk on a one-day visit. The aim of his visit is to seek understanding of and support for the draft constitution of the Russian Federation proposed by President Boris Yeltsin from heads of the Russia's northeastern oblasts and republics who came to meet him today. Sergey Shakhray also had a meeting with heads of the Russian northeastern territories and heads of the enterprises of the Murmansk oblast.

[Shakhray] It it impossible to proceed with the economic reform without solving the question of the Russian Federation constitutional system. As a member of the government, I know this from my own experience. The dyarchy should be overcome. The constitution and elections are the only peaceful means by which we could overcome this diarchy. I am making a series of visits of a purely working nature, such as this visit to Murmansk, in order to discuss praoblems of the regional policy and the constitutional reform and also to understand people's attitudes to the prospects of the constitutional reform and the way the draft is drawn up, to find out to what extend the draft reflects the specific needs of the regions. My meetings with heads of the oblasts and republics of the northeastern region are very important in this respect.

Aushev Welcomes Plan for More Troops in Ingushetia

LD1205202293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Ingush President Ruslan Aushev described as positive the reaction of his republic's leadership to Moscow's plan to send additional armed formations to the zone of Ossetian-Ingushetian conflict. In an interview with INTERFAX today, he said that this will help to ensure the security of the Ingushes who are returning to Prigorodnyy rayon, Ossetia. Earlier, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin announced the intention to send additional armed formations to the zone of conflict during his trip to the North Caucasus.

Yeltsin, Chita Administration Head Discuss Referendum

LD1205144993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] A few hours ago, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had a telephone conversation with Boris Ivanov, the head of the Chita Oblast administration. During the conversation, a detailed analysis was carried out of the results of the recently held referendum. The Russian president dwelled on problems relating to the upcoming sowing season, which, because of the shortage of fuel, is on the brink of disruption. Boris Yeltsin mapped out ways for Chita Oblast to come out of the economic impasse which has arisen.

Dudayev Views Relations With Russia, Ukraine

AU1205194993 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 6 May 93 p 2

[Interview with Dzhokhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic, by Maria Bazelyuk in Groznyy; date not given: "The Withdrawal of Russian Troops is a Guarantee for Peace in the Caucasus"]

[Text] **Russian tanks encircled Chechnya expecting an explosion, but contrary to all expectations, no explosion took place. Yet another attempt has failed to break the people's will to achieve independence. The confrontation is gradually subsiding: There were no serious grounds for it.**

Two days before the streets of Groznyy filled with rallying people, our correspondent met with Chechen Republic President Dzhokhar Dudayev.

[Bazelyuk] More than a year ago, our newspaper presented the Chechen president to Ukrainian readers for the first time and wrote about the events in the republic. Since that time there has been growing interest in Chechnya. I would like to know how you, Mr. President, assess the one and one-half years that Chechnya has been building an independent state.

[Dudayev] I think that we are a proving ground for testing the right of small groups to exist and develop independently under conditions that are at the borderline of what is possible for society. In my opinion, the viability of the Chechen people and the experience that they have acquired over the last 300 years suggest a conclusion that we have chosen the right path to follow and that otherwise we will not be able to win. We control the situation in Chechnya and analyze it thoroughly in order to be able to proceed toward building our state and improving the economic and political situation.

There are not many people in our republic who would be able to fully understand the essence of the concept of state building. We have powerful scientific potential—more than 50 doctors of sciences, but unfortunately they only studied political economy, and an academic economy differs from the real one so greatly that sometimes there are no common grounds in them and they may be in direct opposition. It is no accident that the scientific academies around the world, not to mention those of the former Union, are unable to create an even approximate model that could help normalize the economies of the CIS countries. This is an indication of how far science has become alienated from real-life economics.

[Bazelyuk] Russian-speaking citizens constitute one-third of the Chechen population. Does Russia really care about them when it creates conditions of blockade for the Chechen Republic?

[Dudayev] Protection of the population is the right and the duty of any state. Infringement upon the interests of other people while building one's own future is an absurd occupation, something that Russia has always done and continues to do. We ourselves will defend the interests of Chechen citizens and not allow anybody to put pressure on other people. Of course, there are many attempts to provoke conflict. It is difficult to list everything our enemies resort to in order to provoke a confrontation. Our citizens are beaten severely and literally tortured in Russia. As soon as some action is planned, shootouts and murder of Chechens begin. The rounding up of Chechens has become common practice. The Chechens are killed directly in the streets of Moscow and abroad by the same methods and with the same type of weapons. Sick people, students, and people crippled during the Afghan war are annihilated. We do not have special clinics for treating them, and when these poor creatures, who have lost their health in order to create Moscow's bridgehead in Afghanistan, go to Moscow for treatment, they are caught in hotels and tortured almost to death. Isn't this appalling? Well, when they [the Russians] see this, they expect a reciprocal response. In the course of our struggle for one and one-half years, we have not yielded to their provocations and, perhaps, thereby forced Russia to resort to sabotage and terror. The nerves gave way—big Russia began to organize terrorist acts against small Chechnya, by labeling us before the whole world as mafiosi, terrorists, and bandits and by slandering us in other ways. The recent series of killings is horrendous. In Moscow, three Chechens were simultaneously killed near a hotel; a similar murder of three Chechen citizens took place in Abkhazia; and in the same manner, two of our citizens were killed in Great Britain on the same day. Identical methods of sabotage were used during an explosion on the train running from Kislovodsk to Baku when it was crossing our territory.

[Bazelyuk] Chechnya is the only Caucasian state where there are no soldiers of the occupation army. At the same time, Chechnya has not been recognized as a state for fear of Russia.

[Dudayev] I will tell you that it is not worth taking recognition in its present form too seriously. Mutual recognition implies obligations to one another. For example, one jumps up all of a sudden and offers: You recognize me and I will recognize you. So what? By the time the legitimate power was overthrown in Georgia it had been recognized by 29 countries, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council. They were silent when the coup d'etat took place in Georgia, however. The recognitions granted by the United Nations are all bluff and mirage. As soon as a state is recognized, its people relax and lose vigilance and viability in the hope that the world will protect their interests, and precisely then the bloody blanket of misfortunes is pulled out from under them. It comes as a shock when, by the right of strength, terrorism begins against people. This is not war. Wars have their laws, rules, and structures. What we are dealing with is pure genocide under the roof of interethnic conflicts. Mind you that peoples do not have armed forces or weapons of their own, and at the same time huge arsenals of military technology and special shells, even those banned in international practice, appear on one side and then on the other. Civilian population—children, women, and elderly people—suffer from this. Fear, humiliation, and uncertainty about the future—defenseless people doomed to extermination by Moscow, people who have no one to appeal to for support have to suffer from all of this. I do not want such recognition.

[Bazelyuk] It is not quiet in the Caucasian home. Peace only prevails in Chechnya. As a matter of fact, all other peoples in the Caucasus involved in warfare have yielded to expansion on the part of the pro-empire forces. What can, in your opinion, be a guarantee for stability in the Caucasus?

[Dudayev] The major factor for stabilizing the situation in the Caucasus is the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. It is the main and indisputable condition. The presence of Russian troops who sell and pass on weapons and who regulate all the processes of armed banditry resulted in a situation when the conflicts did not die down and temporary victories were gained alternatively by one side or another. In the future, the international "Caucasian Home" forum will act as a guarantor of stability in the Caucasus. This forum already has its bylaws and platform. It is now creating its own security council and filling its structures with significant content. The security council and its structures will become a guarantor of stability in the Caucasus, promote integration of economic cooperation and natural resources, and promote creation of a single economic zone and a single economic space in the Caucasus.

I would like to particularly stress the prospect for cooperation between the Caucasus and Ukraine, cooperation that will be joined by Krasnodar Kray, Stavropol Oblast, and Rostov Oblast. This is enormous potential, and there are no boundaries to the development of economic, social, spiritual, and cultural problems, as well as defense. It is a pity that Ukraine does not want to offer its assistance to the Caucasus.

It so happened that at this most difficult stage, Chechnya alone acts as a guarantor of stability and peace in the Caucasus. Unfortunately, this is true. We needed support and assistance from such states as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but today they have found themselves in the backyard of their colonial past and cannot extricate themselves from those senseless wars.

[Bazelyuk] As far as I know, there exists economic cooperation between Ukraine and Chechnya, but perhaps not on the scale that one would like it to be. In your

opinion, what are the priorities that can be identified in the cooperation between our states?

[Dudayev] First, mutually advantageous interests. In the past, we supplied Ukraine with huge quantities of products, including those of heavy machine building. Ukraine has a great potential—agrarian, industrial, and scientific. Integration and mutually advantageous cooperation depend upon geopolitical interests, the availability of railroads, highways, airlines, airfields, natural resources, and identical levels of economic and industrial development; there already exist integrated networks. There is no need to create them anew. They must only be expanded. It is possible to create new, mutually advantageous and interesting industries, for example, in our country and, at the same time, equip our processing industry with Ukrainian technology. We are not being idle and we also have much that may be useful and interesting for Ukraine.

We do not want to impose ourselves upon others and must overcome our ailments on our own. Ukraine is stronger. It must see our difficulties and go and meet us halfway. Our relations with Russia scare the leaders of many countries, including Ukraine. We forgive it for this fear and do not want to cause it additional trouble.

Ukraine is very dear to me for many reasons. First, I lived in Ukraine in the fine town of Poltava. After the 15 years in Siberia, Ukraine was, for our family, a wonderful land with kind and hospitable people. We had a warm reception and we responded in kind.

Ukraine is a powerful state with huge capabilities created by its geopolitical situation and by its natural, human, scientific, technological, and climatic resources. It constitutes a deep-seated historical root of all Slavic peoples, since the Ukrainian nation is one of the oldest in the world and is, therefore, a founder of the culture and history of the Slavic peoples. Of course, Ukraine has a great future and, today, despite all its difficulties, it must actively pursue its foreign policy and generate and determine the main trends in policy and mutual relations within the CIS.

[Bazelyuk] Thank you for your wonderful words about our people. Our heart is with Chechnya and it goes out to your and our freedom.

International Affairs

Strobe Talbott, Delegation in Kiev for Visit

LD1205152793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 0000 GMT 12 May 03

[Excerpts] A U.S. delegation headed by special envoy of the U.S. President, Strobe Talbott, arrived in Kiev for a two-day visit. The American delegation, which included leaders and representatives of the National Security Council, the Central Investigation Agency, and the united committee of Chiefs of Staff, Departments of Defense and Finance, and the department for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had meetings and talks with a group of parliamentarians led by First Deputy Verhovna Rada, Chairman Vasyl Durdynets, Vice Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov, and Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko. [passage omitted]

The Americans expressed hope that they'd succeeded in explaining to the Ukrainian colleagues the U.S. position on this issue. Both sides found that their understanding of the problem of nuclear disarmament had much in common. Mr. Talbott continued to say that preliminary agreements had been reached concerning the creation of bilateral groups who would be busy with military issues and conversion.

The American side offered its assistance in conducting privatization in Ukraine and expressed its readiness to act as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia, provided both sides will express their consent. The idea was put forward and approved to prepare, by June, a Ukrainian-American charter which would become the basis for further development of diverse relations between the countries.

Speaking after the U.S. President's special envoy was Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Boris Tarasyuk. We agreed to maintain constant relations at (?all) levels, Boris Tarasyuk is saying. An agreement has been reached to continue consultations of experts. During consultations, both sides ascertained an unsatisfactory condition of Ukrainian-American relations which was observed over the past few months. Measures were discussed to drastically change this situation.

The journalists showed an interest in whether the visit of the U.S. delegation should be considered as a change in the attitude of the Clinton administration toward the signing by Ukraine of the START Treaty and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The American special envoy stressed that the U.S. Government treats Ukraine seriously and that the visit of the American delegation to Ukraine helped both sides to better understand the positions of their two states. Ukraine ascertained its course toward the ratification of the treaties and reapproved its strivings.

The nuclear arms is not the only field of cooperation between our two nations in the future, emphasized Mr. Talbott.

Trip Shows Change in U.S. 'Tactic'

PM1205153793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 93 First Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "United States Changes Tactic To Persuade Ukraine To Renounce Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] During the Senate hearings on the question of ratification of the Russian-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher voiced the hope that Ukraine will very soon ratify the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the START I Treaty.

A breakthrough was made during the recent visit to Kiev of Strobe Talbott, U.S. ambassador for relations with the countries which have emerged in place of the former Soviet Union. This high-ranking U.S. representative was, to all appearances, to have resolved at least two tasks: to persuade Kiev to fulfill its promise to become a nuclear-free state and to ease tension in U.S.-Ukrainian relations.

Until recently Washington's position on the problem of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory had been noted for its toughness. Matters reached the point where, during Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's recent U.S. visit, President William Clinton refused to meet with him, thereby expressing Washington's displeasure at the delay over settling the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy. In response Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk originally refused to receive Talbott, claiming to be too busy. Still, the meeting did take place in the end.

Washington's political pressure on Kiev produced the opposite effect—the positions of supporters of preserving the republic's nuclear status were strengthened in the Ukrainian parliament, and last month they almost succeeded in adopting a decision to renounce the previously adopted pledges.

It was all this that evidently caused Washington to change its tactic. In Kiev Talbott endeavored to convince the republic's leadership that on the question of nuclear weapons the United States is not operating in Moscow's interests. At the end of the visit he also declared that Washington now has a better understanding of Ukraine's position, although, to all appearances, there have been no changes in it. Kiev still voices concern at the threat to its independence from Russia, insists on special guarantees of its nuclear security, and demands compensation for disarmament to the tune of $2.8 billion.

Talbott gave partial replies to the Ukrainian terms. He promised to use the good relations which the United

States has established with Russia and Ukraine to assist in settling problems between Moscow and Kiev. In addition, in the event of the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the two treaties, relations between Washington and Kiev will be "considerably improved."

These promises enabled Talbott to smooth the sharp corners in U.S.-Ukrainian relations and once again to secure the Ukrainian leadership's assurance of its adherence to the idea of the republic's nuclear-free status. It is hard to judge at present the extent to which Talbott's visit has changed the sentiments in the Ukrainian parliament. U.S. Secretary of State Christopher obviously took this ongoing factor of uncertainty into account when he tried to convince the senators that in any case they have "no reason not to approve the START II Treaty."

Results Seen as 'Nil'

MK1205123493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko article published in the "Ukraine" column: "On Nuclear Weapons in a Broader Context. U.S. Ambassador at Large Visits Kiev"]

[Text] The result of a two-day visit to Kiev by an official U.S. delegation led by Strobe Talbott, ambassador at large and special adviser to the U.S. secretary of state for contacts with the newly independent states, according to his statement at a press conference concluding his visit is a "more clear-cut perception of the Ukrainian point of view." As Talbott said, during the meetings in Kiev the main attention was devoted to Ukrainian-U.S. cooperation in all spheres, including nuclear disarmament. Among the concrete results achieved during the meetings and talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, first deputy parliament speaker Vasiliy Durdinets, Vice Premier Viktor Pinzenik, Defense Minister Konstyantyn Moroz, and Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, Strobe Talbott noted preliminary accords on creating bilateral Ukrainian-U.S. groups to work on military questions and the implementation of conversion projects in Ukraine. In addition, in Kiev the U.S. side offered its assistance in privatization and expressed its readiness to act as mediator in normalizing Ukrainian-Russian relations provided Moscow and Kiev agree. Support was expressed for the idea to prepare by this June a Ukrainian-U.S. charter as a basis for further deepening of comprehensive Ukrainian-U.S. relations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstyantyn Moroz was invited to come to the United States on an official visit.

Boris Tarasyuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister and chairman of the Ukrainian National Disarmament Committee, stated at the press conference that although it was noted at the talks that Ukrainian-U.S. relations had deteriorated in recent months, the sides agreed that this situation should be remedied. According to many politicians in Kiev, however, little was done at the negotiations to fundamentally improve Ukrainian-U.S. relations, while the visit was a preliminary, fact-finding mission. Neither was any progress made on the deadlocked question about Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and its ratification of the START I Treaty. Prior to his visit, in an exclusive interview with the parliamentary newspaper HOLOS UKRAINY, Strobe Talbott said: "We will be seeking to talk about the nuclear weapons still located in Ukraine in a broader context that would take into account Ukraine's legitimate concerns about the guarantees for its security. Therefore we will discuss with the Ukrainian leaders the actual long-term interests of your state in respect to security. We would also like to discuss in what way the United States could help it ensure these interests." At the same time, in the same interview Talbott stated: "Of course, while establishing truly partner-type relations with any country, one must be sure that one's partner fulfills international obligations. And we will also discuss this in Ukraine when the question of ratification comes up."

Presumably all this was actually discussed in the course of a private talk between Strobe Talbott and Leonid Kravchuk, which the U.S. guest described as the visit's culmination and during which he gave Kravchuk a personal letter from U.S. President Bill Clinton. Strobe Talbott said that he had received from Leonid Kravchuk an assurance of Ukraine's undeviating course toward acquiring nonnuclear status. And still many in Kiev have assessed the results of this meeting as nil. Kiev politicians still see some hope for a change in the U.S. attitude to Ukraine in that the United States will want Ukraine to be a military and political counterbalance to Russia and a guarantee of stability in the East Europe region. Talbott's words suggest that these hopes are not groundless: "Above all we are thinking about your security and the security of the entire region—after all, stability in East Europe to a large extent depends on Ukraine."

Environmental Protection Minister Views START I

WS1305113193 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 28 Apr 93 p 1

[UKRINFORM report: "On the START I Treaty"]

[Text] Ukraine needs $3 billion to become a nonnuclear state. This is the opinion of Ukrainian Environmental Protection Minister Yuriy Kostenko, who spoke at a press conference on the results of the session of the special working group engaged in the preparation of START I for ratification.

Scientists of Ukrainian military and civil research institutes, experts of the military-industrial complex, along with people's deputies have discussed the scientific-technical aspect of nuclear disarmament. Pros and cons of both nuclear and nonnuclear stature of Ukraine were discussed, and a divergence of views was noted. The

issues of the use of the components for missile warheads in the national economy, as well as the issues of the dismantling of missile silo launchers caused heated discussions. In addition, the clauses in START I, which was signed by the USSR and the United States 10 years ago, do not correspond to the present reality, and Ukraine will have to bear heavy additional financial losses.

The journalists were informed that the ratification of START I is closely connected with the Ukrainian military doctrine which had not yet been adopted in connection with the continuing discussion of nuclear disarmament. However, if the nuclear missiles are taken off combat duty, issues of their supervision and ecological security will arise.

Yuriy Kostenko said that Ukraine is a nuclear state, and until now it has not violated any of the international juridical norms. It is, however, under constant pressure from other countries. In addition, Russia has stated that in the event Ukraine does not sign the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear arms, Russia will stop deliveries of nuclear fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power stations and will refuse it technical aid. Yuriy Kostenko stated that France and Canada support Russia's demands.

Russia has no rights regarding the nuclear warheads, but can carry out technical supervision of strategic nuclear arms. Kostenko denied the information alleging that nuclear weapons in Ukraine are not secure. The warranty time period for storing the nuclear warheads in Ukraine has not yet expired, he stressed.

Defense Minister on Black Sea Fleet Ownership

LD1205160393 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1153 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] The fleet must be ours, Ukrainian, because Ukraine is and will be a maritime state, Defense Minister Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov stressed regarding the Black Sea Fleet problem. He spoke before the servicemen of the Lviv garrison and the Lviv public in the course of a planned one-day trip to the troops of the Carpathian Military District.

Kostyantyn Morozov told them about the work on military doctrine, and on enhancing the Ukraine Army's operational efficiency and the Defense Ministry's activities in providing the armed forces with the material and technical means. He said that the drafts of the new military statutes have been published, discussed by experts and the public, and will be approved by a decree of the Ukrainian president in the near future.

Russian Envoy Blames Ukraine for Stalemate

LD1305092493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] Yuriy Yarov, head of the Russian delegation at negotiations with Ukraine concerning the Black Sea Fleet, informed journalists in Moscow: A dead-end situation arose at the negotiations after the Ukrainian side announced that all land-based facilities of the Black Sea Fleet belong to it and are not subject to division. However, in the period when the Yalta and Dagomys agreements were signed, all facilities on land and the sea were included within the composition of the Black Sea Fleet.

The Ukrainian delegation is also not pursuing the negotiation of issues connected with Sevastopol. Russia's position is known, stressed Yuriy Yarov: The Russian part of the Black Sea Fleet should have a base in Sevastopol. There can be no question of Russian territorial claims against Ukraine. We are not talking about the town or part of its territory, said the Moscow representative, but precisely about the naval base. The development of a mechanism for the bases' existence on a long-term lease or otherwise is the subject of additional negotiations.

Plyushch Meets With Iran's Hashemi-Rafsanjani

LD1205215293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2100 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] On 12 May the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation led by the Verkhovna Rada [Supreme Council] chairman, Ivan Plyushch, met with Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani in Tehran. Bilateral and some international issues were discussed. Later in the day the delegation left for Esfahan. Tehran and Kiev will continue developing all-round relations between the two countries, which will become a significant factor of strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state, declared Ivan Plyushch to the press conference after today's meeting with the Iranian president.

Last year's visit of President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk to Tehran and agreements signed during that visit opened up a new page in the history of relations between both states, noted Ivan Plyushch. In his turn, Hashemi-Rafsanjani underlined that the two states have a firm political will for strengthening all-around ties and an example of that is the realization of the already attained agreements, especially in the sphere of power engineering and gas transportation.

Morozov Holds Meeting With Polish Army Chief

LD1205112393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] A meeting of Ukraine's Defense Minister Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov, with Armor General [heneral broni] Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army who is in Kiev on an official visit, was dedicated to development of contacts on military and political issues between the two states. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's press service reports the sides exchanged experiences in establishing their own armed forces, set up contacts in the field of military educational reforms, the provision of support, and settling other problems of military policy.

Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, chief of the General Staff of Ukraine's armed forces and first deputy minister of defense, took part in the meeting.

Agreements Reached With Turkmenistan in Transport

LD1205145493 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1152 GMT 12 May 93

[Report by UKRINFORM correspondent Oleksiy Trotsenko]

[Text] Kiev, 12 May—An agreement between Ukraine and Turkmenistan on cooperation in the sphere of transport was signed here today. Yuliy Ioffe, deputy prime minister of Ukraine, and Nazar Soyunov, first deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, put their signatures to this document.

The signed document, noted Nazar Soyunov, will contribute to the implementation of the accords reached by the presidents of the two countries during Leonid Kravchuk's visit to Turkmenistan. In particular, this concerns cooperation in the sphere of transport, the Turkmenistan side utilizing Ukrainian maritime ports to export its products, simplification of customs processes, and other important issues.

The leader of the Turkmenistan delegation also emphasized that both sides desire cooperation to be speeded up. There is already an accord on such an important matter as delivering gas, cotton, and other products to Ukraine.

National Affairs

Parties Hold Talks on Possible New Constitution

LD1205170193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Bilateral consultations between the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine [Sotsiyal Demokratychna Partiya Ukrayiny] and the Ukrainian National Conservative Party [Ukrayinska Natsionalno Konservatyvna Partiya] have taken place in Kiev. The possibility of influencing the process of adopting a new constitution was discussed. It was stressed that both parties recognize that it is necessary for a specially convened constitutional assembly to adopt a new basic law. The two parties have turned to all political forces that share their views regarding a constitutional assembly with a proposal to take part in working meetings, roundtables, and scientific-practical conferences. The participants spoke in favor of forming a national constitutional committee of representatives of parties that would present an agreed position to the president and the Supreme Council.

Democratic Party Urges Extraordinary Measures

LD1205174893 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1153 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] The presidium of the National Council of the Democratic Party of Ukraine adopted an appeal to the president and the Supreme Council of Ukraine at its meeting. It says:

The deepening of the economic crisis in our young state calls forth deep concern. The difficult legacy of the times of colonial dependence, the existence of destructive forces in society, which are endeavoring to turn development back or who are engaged in enriching themselves under the guise of reform, selling off national riches for a trifle, and unheard of economic pressure from outside, are creating a real threat to Ukraine's independence, threatening to transform its statehood into a pure formality.

To avoid such a course of events, Ukraine's Government may have to undertake extraordinary measures. The introduction of an extraordinary economic state without proper legislative provision could, however, under certain circumstances turn it into a means of eliminating democratic freedoms and instituting a totalitarian regime. Proceeding from this, we consider it necessary urgently to submit for examination by the Supreme Council a draft law on an extraordinary economic state and a clause which would define the conditions and procedure for putting this law or any of its articles into practice.

The Democratic Party of Ukraine, the program of which is in favor of introducing an extraordinary economic state for a period of two years in the country, is prepared to present an appropriate draft law in the stipulated term, and also to take part in discussing alternative draft decrees.

Greens Party Opposes Retention of Nuclear Arms

WS1305113793 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 28 Apr 93 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Greens Advocate Nuclear-Free Ukraine"]

[Text] "The nuclear shield will crush us with its weight." This phrase from an open letter written by the Ukrainian Party of Greens [PZU] to Supreme Soviet deputies at the end of 1992 was pronounced at the news conference entitled "Nuclear Arms and Nuclear Power in Ukraine." The news conference was dedicated to the seventh anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident.

After recalling the aftermath of the unprecedented tragedy that confounded the whole world seven years ago, PZU leaders stated that their party would never give up the fight to liberate Ukraine from nuclear arms and nuclear power plants. They furnished examples of an irreversible mutual dependence between nuclear industry and nuclear arms. According to the Greens,

possession of nuclear industry and nuclear arms will fail to strengthen the young state's position in the world community. Quite to the contrary, it will bring Ukraine to her knees.

PZU members believe that if Ukraine makes attempts to preserve and build up its independence by means of nuclear arms, it will be trapped in the net of commitments to the "nuclear club" states and forced into coordinating its political course with these states, as well as building close and burdensome relations with them. The best guarantee of Ukraine's security would be a permanent nonnuclear membership in the UN Security Council.

Deputy Supreme Soviet Chairman's Remarks Criticized

WS1305120593 Kiev SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 30 Apr 93 p 1

[Report attributed to UNIAR: "Hryniov—a Double-Dealing Politician?"]

[Text] "In my view, Sevastopol should be transferred to Russia on the basis of a long-term lease," Volodymyr Hryniov, deputy Supreme Soviet chairman and chairman of the Nova Ukraina Association Council, has said. In an interview to the Kharkov Oblast Soviet newspaper PANORAMA, he supported the idea of creating "a single economic space in the former USSR." Hryniov also said that he considers himself a cosmopolitan and that "Volodymyr Lanovyy has been our partner." PANORAMA has also published a commentary on this interview by Stepan Khmara, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party chairman. In Khmara's opinion, "Hryniov is a very dangerous man, perhaps the most dangerous man for Ukrainian statehood. He is a double-dealing politician, and the ideas that he advocates do Ukrainian independence no good."

Parliament Decrees No Price Raise Until After 18 May

AU1305081393 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 11 May 93 p 2

["Ukraine's Supreme Council Decree on the Question of Socioeconomic and Political Situation in Ukraine" issued in Kiev on 6 May]

[Text] Ukraine's Supreme Council decrees as follows:

1. To instruct Ukraine's Cabinet of Minister to submit, on 18 May 1993, for the consideration of Ukraine's Supreme Council, a report on the socioeconomic and political situation that has taken shape in Ukraine, as well as on ways of emerging from it.

To invite the chairmen of oblast, Kiev, and Sevastopol city councils of people's deputies, and also the heads of oblast, Kiev, and Sevastopol city state administrations, to the given plenary session of Ukraine's Supreme Council.

2. Not to raise prices that would affect the population of Ukraine until Ukraine's Supreme Council completes its discussion of the report submitted by Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers.

I. Plyushch, chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council

Kiev, 6 May 1993

Economic Statistics Released for First Quarter

LD1205212193 Moscow ECONOMIC NEWS AGENCY in Russian 1600 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] According to the Ukrainian Ministry for Statistics, the gross income of the republic fell by 10 percent in the first quarter compared with the same period in 1992. Expenditure exceeded income by 56.7 billion karbovantsy. The emission of money in the first quarter increased 16.6-fold compared with the corresponding period of 1992 and amounted to 405.1 billion karbovantsy. State trade prices have risen 14-fold including 16-fold for foodstuffs and 12-fold for non-food products. The rates for paid services increased 15-fold for paid services and 18-fold for consumer services. The population's income has risen 1.4-fold on average.

Cabinet, Trade Union Groups Sign Agreement

LD1205173593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] A news conference held on 11 May at the Trade Union Federation of Ukraine was dedicated to concluding a general tariff agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers and the trade union associations of Ukraine for the current year. As the journalists were informed, the negotiations with the participation of plenipotentiary representatives of both sides began on 16 February and ended on 30 April. Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and the leaders of the trade union associations signed this document, which envisages a number of specific guarantees on issues of labor relations.

Labor Minister Mykhailo Kaskevych, who was cochairman on the government's side at the negotiations, stressed in his speech at the news conference that the contracting parties displayed understanding and a constructive approach in these times, which are hard for our country. He expressed the hope that they will further be able and willing to agree on all those issues put forward by the trade unions.

As Oleksandr Stoyan, cochairman on the trade union side and chairman of the Trade Union Federation of Ukraine, pointed out at the news conference, this is the first time that negotiations at such a level have been held in our state.

Taking part in the elaboration of the general tariff agreement were plenipotentiary representatives of 12 national trade union associations, and in the final stage the All-Ukrainian Association of Working People's Solidarity joined them. This important document, whose significance for the understanding of joint efforts in the name of protecting people can hardly be overestimated, was not signed by the Independent Trade Union of Miners.

Oleksandr Stoyan said in conclusion: We want the agreement, which envisages fundamental rules of social partnership of the sides, and control and responsibility for its fulfillment, to be filled with real actions and concrete steps.

Belarus

Defense Pact on Bilateral Contacts With Poland Signed

WS1205123193 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Belarusian 4 May 93 p 2

["Text" of "Agreement Between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland on Bilateral Contacts in the Military Sphere"; signed on 21 April 1993 in Minsk]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland, henceforth referred to as the parties:

—In line with the principles of the treaty on cooperation and friendship between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Poland which was signed on 23 June in Warsaw;

—In an effort to strengthen the European mechanism for security, stability and cooperation based on the international agreements in the sphere of disarmament and security, as well as the documents adopted at the All-European conference on security and cooperation in Europe;

—In an effort to maintain and develop friendly relations between the parties;

Have agreed on the following:

Clause 1

1. The parties will carry on bilateral contacts in the military sphere in the line with commonly accepted principles and norms of international law, especially with the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

2. For the purpose of the development of bilateral contacts in the military sphere, the parties will coordinate within their competence the issues of mutual interest, paying special attention to issues of mutual security, including measures for strengthening confidence along the border area.

Clause 2

1. The parties will coordinate the issues of cooperation in the sphere of scientific research and special design research, as well as the principles of exchange of military-technical and military-legal information.

2. The parties will cooperate in the sphere of mutual transfer of military techniques, spare parts, instruments and tools, as well as armaments.

Clause 3

The parties will hold the following bilateral contacts:

1. Official visits and working meetings at the level of the administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland and the General Headquarters of the Polish Army.

2. Training of the military at military schools.

3. Participation in the demonstration of technology and armaments.

4. Cooperation in the spheres of culture and sports.

5. Other forms of contacts by mutual consent.

Clause 4

1. The parties will name specific issues of bilateral contacts in the military sphere in separate protocols which are signed by their plenipotentiary representatives.

2. Based on this agreement, the parties will develop annual plans of bilateral contacts in the military sphere which specify actual activities as well as the ways and means of their fulfillment.

Clause 5

The parties will exchange delegations and develop other contacts between the Armed Forces of both states on the basis of the following principles:

1. The party forwarding a delegation must bear the expenses on return tickets and overheads.

2. The party receiving a delegation must bear the expenses of accommodation, catering, free medical care, and transport on its territory.

3. The side which receives a delegation must bear the expenses on accommodation and catering for a delegation of ten persons if the number of additional personnel has not been mentioned separately.

Clause 6

This Agreement is valid for five years.

Unless any party serves notice about its decision to renounce the agreement six months before the end of a corresponding period, it will be automatically extended for a year.

Clause 7

The Agreement is enacted from the moment of its signing.

The Agreement was signed on 21 April in Minsk in two copies in Belarusian and Polish languages, and both are equally valid.

[Signed] For the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus: Colonel-General P. Kozlovski

For the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland: Dr. Ja. Onyshkevicz

Kebich's Visit to United Arab Emirates Achieved Goals

LD1205191793 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1715 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] The first official two-day visit to the United Arab Emirates by the Belarusian Government delegation headed by Vyachaslav Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers, was completed this morning. The delegation was received by the president of that Arab country and held a number of negotiations with a deputy prime minister and the minister of state for foreign affairs. The minister of oil and natural resources of the United Arab Emirates and other officials took part in the negotiations. Development of trade and economic relations between the two countries was the main subject of the meeting. Possibilities of direct investment and investment in Belarusian industry are being considered. The visit achieved the delegation's goals especially in the sphere of the development of business links between Belarus and the United Arab Emirates, said Vyachaslaw Kebich to an ITAR-TASS correspondent. He expressed particular content concerning the achievement of full mutual understanding at the top level of [words indistinct]. The leadership of the Emirates expressed interest in cooperation with Belarus, stressed the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. Today, the Belarusian delegation left for India by air.

Delegation Attending CIS Summit 'With Guarded Optimism'

LD1305110693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] The Belarusian delegation is going to Moscow with guarded optimism, said (Mikhail Shlemnev), member of the Belarusian delegation for the 14 May summit of the CIS leaders in Moscow, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet Commission on Ethnic Policy and CIS Issues.

According to him, the summit is to examine issues of the first stage of economic alliance—the taxation and pricing issues—since the remaining issues are, on the whole, not yet ready to be examined. (Shlemnev) also thinks that for the time being there is no uniform approach toward an all-round economic alliance.

Import of Russian Newspapers, Except IZVESTIYA, Banned

PM1205134593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 93 p 2

[Oleg Stepanenko report: "Ban on Import of Newspapers From Russia"]

[Text] Minsk—The Belarus Ministry of Communications yesterday issued a telegram on the halting of subscriptions to all Russian newspapers except IZVESTIYA. The next step will be to return subscribers' money.

This action is being taken on the basis of a decree by the Council of Ministers and the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, which introduces a new procedure for setting the rate of the noncash ruble. At today's rate one Russian ruble is worth two noncash Belarus rubles. Thus the amount that subscribers to PRAVDA and indeed any other Russian newspaper pay will be only half as much in Russian rubles. The republic's Ministry of Communications cannot compensate for this discrepancy.

The Council of Ministers and National Bank Decree No. 146/12 was signed 12 March 1993. However, neither the correspondents of Russian newspapers, the representative of the "Pressa" Publishing House in Minsk, nor the Belarus Ministry of Communications Department of Postal Communications and Press Distribution knew anything about it. In addition, on 7 May the subscription deadline was extended to 15 May. Then came the telegram announcing the end of subscriptions.

A strange decision. After all, many subscribers have paid in Russian rubles because they are used like Belarus rubles in payment for manufactured goods and services at a rate of one to one.

Army Shortfall Attributed to 'Draft-Dodgers'

WS1205140893 Minsk RID in Russian 1100 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] General Prosecutor Shaladonov, Minister of Internal Affairs Yegorov, and other officials and representatives of public organizations have taken part in a recent expanded session of the Defense Ministry Board. They subjected the progress of the military draft campaign to an in-depth analysis. The session participants pointed out that a lack of human resources is complicating the process of manning the Armed Forces. Preliminary calculations show that about 16,000 conscripts will join the Army this spring, with demand assessed at some 32,000. Aside from that, the sad truth is that the number of draft-dodgers is constantly growing. More than 2,000 conscripts have failed to show up at assembly centers as of 5 May. Measures are being taken by central and local departments in order to secure a more organized spring draft.

Servicemen Banned From 'Sociopolitical' Activity

WS1205124793 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] In response to letters by Belarusian citizens and servicemen on the Army's depolitization received by the Defense Ministry, its press center has issued a statement: The Supreme Soviet has adopted an amendment to Article Six of the Servicemen Status. The article's new version prohibits servicemen from participation in

sociopolitical activities. The adopted legal acts were received with understanding by the Army. The majority of officers participating in the Slav Assembly, the Komsomol, the Belarusian Officers Union, and other organizations have reported on halting their political activities.

Moldova

Parliament Discusses Draft Law on Status of Gagauz

AU1205204293 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1813 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Chisinau, ROMPRES, 12/5/1993—The parliament of the Republic of Moldova has begun debates on the draft law of the special juridical status of the territory with a compact Gagauz population.

The greater part of the members of parliament taking the floor spoke against the adoption of the said document, on grounds that one cannot speak of a territory "compactly populated" in the case of the Gagauzes, as there are several "corridors" made up of non-Gagauz villages. It was also shown that adopting the bill would mean the beginning of the Republic of Moldova's federalization and a legal recognition of the current state of conflict, a camouflage for a form of Gagauz state on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The upholders of that point of view underscored the fact that the Gagauzes were not a people but an ethnic group, which can enjoy the right to territorial self-determination only in the context of the general territorial-administrative reform in the Republic of Moldova.

The parliament members representing the Southern districts—where the Gagauzes live—stated they would adopt a flexible position in order to get a local autonomy within the independent Moldovan state and that the theses comprised in the bill were more of a "psychological nature."

At the end of the morning sitting the floor was taken by the president of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, who said the above mentioned bill was one of compromise, that its stipulations agreed with the international law in the matter and with the juridical frame existent in the Republic of Moldova, and that the bill could solve the problem of the Gagauzes without injuring the rights of the republic's indigenous population.

Mr. Snegur also said that a solution to that problem would open the way to a settlement in the republic's Eastern districts.

Snegur Urges Accord With Gagauzia

AU1305111993 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1759 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 12/5/1993—During today's speech in Parliament, the president of the Republic of Moldova Mircea Snegur estimated the project of the law concerning the "special status of Gagauzia" to be right, a document which "has the seal of compromise, a compromise which was very difficultly concluded by confrontation, which was unfortunately not always of a political nature." The head of the state compared the situation which is actually created in the regions with a predominantly Gagauz population with "metastasms of general tumours which were the former USSR." In his opinion, the coincidence of revolts and disorders in some districts from the south involving anti-Moldovan bandit pro-imperial forces are too frequent not to consider whether the old problems of the dictatorship are pursued in order to reanimate this regime into perhaps becoming a new and more monstrous one. Adopting a retrospective view on the events in the south of Moldova, Snegur especially referred to the fall of 1990 when Parliament of Moldova was not ready to discover a solution which was reciprocally acceptable and Komrat began to organise non-constitutional organs according to foreign scenery. It was during that period, estimated Snegur, the danger of the substitution of political methods by military ones appeared. The head of the state explained the impossibility of resolving the conflict in 1990 by the fact that Moldova remained part of the USSR being oriented towards independence but the Gagauz population voted for a revival of the USSR. For the past two years Moldova's Government has been undertaking steps towards reviving and developing education and Gagauz culture: In Komrat a university was opened, the Gagauzina language is studied in 1297 classes at schools and in the University in Chisinau, in a teachers' college from Cahul, Komrat. Snegur reiterated that the respective project of the law "excludes territorial prejudice, sovereignity and independence of Moldova," estimating that by approving this law "the world prestige of Moldova will increase.

Ethnic Gagauz Reserve Right to Self-Determination

AU1205120693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1904 GMT 11 May 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 11/5/1993—During the Congress of Deputies, at all levels from the self-proclaimed Gagauz Republic, which unfolded on Saturday [8 May] in Ceadir-Lunga, the project of the status for Gagauzia elaborated by a parliamentary subcommission for problems in regions densely populated by the Gagauz ethnics was discussed with representatives from Komrat. Mikhaliy Kendighelean, the president of the supreme soviet in Komrat, declared to a BASAPRESS correspondent that 17 articles from the project were voted for without changes. The most essential change was performed on article 3, which was unanimously adopted with the following words: "If Moldova loses its status as an independent state and member of the United Nations Organization, the Gagauzian people is to obtain the exclusive right to self-determination."

The adopted project provides that the "Gagauz Eri" is a national territory, populated by Gagauzians, but remains a component part of the Republic of Moldova. The status of regions densely populated by Gagauzians will

be discussed during the session of the parliament in Chisinau, which started its work today, on 11 May.

Gagauz Leader Analyzes Prospects for Settlement

MK1205133093 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 20, 12-18 May 93 (signed to press 11 May) p 4

[Lyudmila Petrova report: "The Ice Has Been Broken But Not Melted"]

[Excerpts] Beginning 5 April, in an atmosphere of strict secrecy, talks have been under way between a Moldovan parliamentary delegation and representatives of Komrat. The only thing known about the talks is that they are being held to resolve the problem of the status of Gagauzia, or what Chisinau prefers to term as "areas densely populated by the Gagauzes." [passage omitted]

People in Komrat, however, so far refrain from making optimistic comments. Gagauz Republic President Stepan Topaz, recalling his impromptu meeting with Parliamentary Chairman Petru Lucinschi in Istanbul (the former was there on a visit at the invitation of the Turkish Government, and the latter as a participant in the conference of Black Sea Basin countries), noted that the new parliamentary leader is a man "to deal with, he is willing to resolve the Gagauz issue; however, I have not yet noticed a desire on his part to resolve it the way we want it to be done."

"And how do you want it resolved?"

"We are ready to reach agreement on the condition that Gagauzia is recognized as an autonomous republic within Moldova. Whichever way we are called—an autonomous republic, the land of the Gagauzes, or Gagauzia—really makes no difference. What is important is what the document on its status will contain. We believe that Gagauzia ought to be a national-state entity. Chisinau insists on a national-territorial status. We are speaking about the need for having our own constitution which would be in line with the provisions of the Moldovan Constitution, but one that will give us the right not to apply laws that may in one way or another infringe on the interests of the Gagauz people. Chisinau keeps saying that it cannot accept this.

Our draft says that if the Republic of Moldova changes its status, say, joins another state, Gagauzia will reserve the right to determine its fate on its own. This is indispensable!

Regarding economic relations with Moldova, they are the same as they were a year ago. We have not cut the economic ties and have no plans to do so, but we have started drawing up our own budget."

"And how do your relations with the Dniester Region fare?"

"Much better than those with Moldova. We will do our utmost so as to ensure that the fate of the Dniester region is decided along with ours. Whenever we speak of the integrity of the Republic of Moldova, what we mean is the self-determination within it of both the Gagauz region and the left-bank Dniester Region—otherwise there will be no peace in Moldova."

"But do you think Chisinau will accept your autonomous status?"

"I would rather not engage in fortune telling. One thing I can tell you is that the issue should be resolved."

Whether the commission is able to reach some agreement is yet unclear. The sides have agreed not to release any information for the press until specific results are produced so as not to stir up passions. Judging from recent statements by President Snegur, Moldova is ready to give the Gagauz a special legal status "on the basis of a high degree of local self-government," but... "the people will never accept the creation of a confederation." [passage omitted]

Government Achieves Understanding With Dniester

LD1105153493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1428 GMT 11 May 93

[By MOLDOVAPRES-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Chisinau May 11 TASS—Mutual understanding has been achieved on several basic principles, apt to provide the basis for further political dialogue between the two sides, in the course of a meeting between Moldovan President Mircea Snegur, Parliament Speaker Petru Lucinschi and Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli, on the one hand, and Dniester leaders—on the other, says a report released by the Presidential Press Service here today.

The participants of the dialogue agreed that problems of Moldova's territorial pattern were of decisive importance for the final settlement of the conflict. They have reaffirmed their desire to renounce military-power methods and threats to use force in their efforts to settle disputes. Both sides have expressed the hope that the existing contradictions would be surmounted in the course of future meetings and through the efforts of several commissions set up for this purpose.

In spite of the existing differences, the most urgent economic problems must be resolved without procrastination and the traditional economic relations must be restored. This brooks no delay and meets the interests of all the population of Moldova. The meeting, which was also attended by the heads of individual ministries, departments and enterprises, has elaborated a common approach to the solution of problems relating to the operation of the republic's transport system, financial and bank transactions, and to the functioning of statistical bodies.

Dniester Leader Caraman Cited on Talks With Snegur

AU1205121293 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1904 GMT 11 May 93

[Text] Tiraspol BASAPRESS, 11/5/1993—We conveyed with the leadership of Moldova not to broadcast more

information about our negotiations than the official communique, declared Aleksandr Caraman, the vice president of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic. "It was a gentlemen's agreement which I do not want and cannot overstep," communicated Caraman. The cited source mentioned that during yesterday's negotiations of the Tiraspol leaders with the leadership of Moldova, they did not sign any document or agreement. "There were some preventive negotiations," concluded Caraman. During yesterday's talks they discussed a great deal about Ilascu's trial, underlined Caraman, refusing to communicate other details.

Memorandum Signed With CSCE Mission on Dniester

LD1205172193 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1430 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] The Moldovan Government signed a special memorandum on the Dniester region with a CSCE mission which has arrived in the republic. The document sets out conditions for the mission's activity on the republican territory for settling the situation in left bank areas. Timothy Williams, head of the CSCE mission, and Moldovan Foreign Minister Nicolae Tiu expressed the hope that joint efforts would help to bring peace to the region. The mission has already been allocated 500,000 dollars from abroad.

Dniester Republic Bank Financed From Moscow

AU1205121093 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1904 GMT 11 May 93

[Text] Tiraspol BASAPRESS, 11/5/1993—From sources close to the leadership from Tiraspol, a BASAPRESS reporter was informed that 1.375 billion rubles were transferred on 8 May to the account of the Zhilstrolbank bank from Moscow.

Yaroslav Bergulea, the vice president and cash-chief of this bank institution, declared to BASAPRESS that it was true that money transfers from Moscow really take place from Moscow to Tiraspol. "But not such sums and not being titled assistance," clarified Bergulea also stating that Moscow is paying Tiraspol the money for good that were delivered before that. Bergulea refused to inform what kind of goods were delivered merely underscoring that the self- proclaimed Dniester Republic has direct commercial relations with Moscow.

Sangheli Receives UNDP Officials, Discusses Assistance

AU1205170893 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1235 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Chisinau ROMPRES, 12/5/1993—The premier of the Republic of Moldova, Andrei Sangheli, received Reinhart Helmke, director of the UNDP [United Nations Development Program] department for Europe and CIS, and Winston Temple, UNDP resident at Chisinau and UN representative in the Republic of Moldova.

Mr. Temple showed that according to UNDP estimations, the Republic of Moldova would need and could receive around 250 million dollars annually for the achievement of concrete programmes. He mentioned that Moldova had received only $28 million so far.

Premier Sangheli asked that the office in Chisinau extend its prerogatives and deal with all the relations of the Republic of Moldova with the United Nations. He said that apart from the eight projects presented to the UNDP, Moldova would need assistance in some other vital domains.

Snegur Meets With UN Official

AU1205203493 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 12 May 93

[Calin Petrescu report from Chisinau]

[Text] The importance of setting up a national agency with the goal of judiciously distributing the foreign aid granted to the Republic of Moldova for priority areas was the focus of the discussions which President Mircea Snegur held today with Reinhart Helmke, director of the Department for Europe and CIS of the United Nations Development Program [UNDP].

The prompt achievement of such goals as the reform and social protection for the population during the period of transition to the market economy, as well as local self-administration are possible, Helmke said, the moment the United Nations will open missions in the world countries, including the Republic of Moldova, a proposal that was actually made by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. The creation and operation of such missions, Helmke specified, will permit the granting of substantial aid to newly created states to solve the domestic and external problems confronting them.

Snegur emphasized that such a UN mission in Chisinau will indirectly help achieve stability in the republic. At the same time, Snegur asked for the assistance of the United Nations to stop the trial of political detainees in Tiraspol by the illegal authorities of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic.

In this sense and with the aim of continuing negotiations in connection with the release of the Ilascu group which has been detained for almost a year now, Vasile (Sirzea), deputy prosecutor general of the Republic of Moldova, told MOLDOVA PRES that tomorrow representatives of the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Moldova will go to Tiraspol where they will meet with the prosecutor of the self-styled Dniester Republic.

Armenia

Spokesman Discusses Developments on Tripartite Plan

NC1205193493 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Last week, when the representatives of the Armenian Foreign Ministry and the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities announced their position on the tripartite Russian-American-Turkish initiative on a Karabakh solution, many rushed to describe it as the Armenian side's rejection of the initiative and accused Armenia of trying to undermine the mediation effort.

In a (?television) interview yesterday, Aram Safaryan, head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry press service, announced that on the whole, the Armenian side's proposals should not be seen as an attempt to evade the initiative, but as an effort to place it on a constructive course. The official Armenian view is that Armenia welcomes those parts of the initiative that concern our republic and expresses readiness to contribute to this process. As for the points concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia supports the views of the Karabakh authorities. The views of officials in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] are also clear: The hot spots and measures to be taken in them should have been defined in the cease-fire schedule to open the way for talks at the working group of the Minsk Conference. As for the NKR Armed Forces' entry into Kelbadzharskiy Rayon, which was necessitated by military operations: The withdrawal of troops will continue as long as practical mechanisms are created to prevent new bloodshed and international guarantees are obtained for the security of the people of Karabakh.

According to Safaryan, the Armenian side's proposals have been received with understanding by those who initiated the plan and the interested member countries of the CSCE's Minsk Conference.

At the very least, this is confirmed by the ongoing dynamic political work. Recently, Armenian specialists have established a constant diplomatic link with the American, Russian, and Turkish sides; they were given additional clarifications and explanations on the proposals that were advanced. Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan held a telephone conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin on 10 May, when our position was again expounded. The impression is that the plan's initiators are treating the proposals by Armenia and the NKR authorities seriously. A tripartite meeting of the sides involved in the initiative will take place in the coming days with the participation of the United States, Russia, and Turkey. The meeting will discuss the position of Armenia and Karabakh and a schedule for establishing the cease-fire and resuming the talks.

Karabakh Official Comments

NC1105164393 Yerevan SNARK in English 1245 GMT 11 May 93

[Text] Stepanakert, May 11 (SNARK)—"The tripartite initiative doesn't correspond to the 822 Resolution of the Security Council of the UNO. That's why the schedule of the measures should be corrected," Arkadiy Gukasyan, counselor of the Defense Committee head [foreign affairs adviser to chairman of Karabakh State Defense Committee], has informed SNARK's reporter. According to Gukasyan, the Kelbadzharskiy problem is being considered within the 822 Resolution as the part of the cease-fire, the document which represents the tripartite initiative state the Kelbadzharskiy troops withdrawal as the preliminary condition to begin the negotiation process. Azerbaijan is doing a lot to torpedo the peace-making process to regulate the conflict and is trying to solve the Karabakh problem by military means. Gukasyan considers the words of Arif Aliyev, head of the press-center of the Azerbaijani president, as ultimatum which can't be accepted by any state. The Karabakh leadership is of the opinion that the peace-making initiatives should take into consideration the interests of all sides. Karabakh and its population. [as received] As for the process of negotiation, such process should be started without any preliminary conditions. The republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the CSCE are speaking for it.

Azerbaijan Said Provoking Karabakh To Start Offensive

NC1205161693 Yerevan SNARK in English 1055 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Stepanakert, 12 May (SNARK)—Yesterday evening and last night the positions of the Karabakh Forces of Self-Defense distributed at Askeranskiy, Martuninskiy and Gadrutskiy regions of Karabakh, were shelled by the Azerbaijani artillery. The Karabakh side didn't retaliate.

"Azerbaijan is trying to provocate Karabakh to undertake the adequate measures. The aim is to undertake the large-scale military actions against Karabakh,"—Marsel Petrosyan, head of the Karabakh department of press and information, has said to SNARK's reporter. The Karabakh Forces of Self-Defense have been ordered not to be the first in shelling. According to Petrosyan, the Azerbaijani side needs cause to begin the offensive actions. Azerbaijan is going to accuse Armenia and Karabakh of the tension escalation and the fact that they didn't accept the tripartite initiative suggested by Turkey, Russia and the USA. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is accumulating military forces at the south borders of Karabakh and Lachin humanitarian corridor.

More on 'Provocative Activities'

NC1205183293 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1330 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Dear listeners, we now report on the latest situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Operationally, things remain unchanged in Nagorno-Karabakh. No serious incident has occurred on the battlefronts, although brief exchanges of fire have taken place between the two sides, which have been trying to avoid large-scale military operations. The NKR's Self-Defense Forces have not retaliated against the fire coming from several Azerbaijani positions in the region.

While the exchanges of fire have decreased and no large-scale combat operations have occurred, tension prevails on the NKR's border with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has reportedly massed many units and armored vehicles in its rayons bordering NKR territory. Things have been unstable in the disputed region during the past two days. The NKR Self-Defense Committee has said tension was created, most notably in the south of the humanitarian corridor in Lachinskiy Rayon, last night. Azerbaijan's military units in Kubatlisnkiy Rayon fired on NKR self-defense positions guarding the corridor with artillery. The Armenian forces returned fire. No one was hurt on the Armenian side and traffic in the corridor is moving unimpeded.

The Azerbaijan presidential press service has claimed that the Armenian forces in Karabakh fired on Agderinskiy, Fizulinskiy, and Kubatlinskiy Rayons yesterday and last night. The objective of Azerbaijan's unfounded reports is to justify its provocative activities. The Armenian side has never been the first to open fire.

Exchanges of fire have also taken place on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Our republic's border areas have been fired on from Azerbaijan with various types of arms during the past few days. Azerbaijan's military units fired on Yekhegnadzorskiy Rayon's border areas early on 11 May. The fire was directed against the defense positions in [placename indistinct]. The Armenian border guards retaliated and forced the enemy units to cease fire. No one was killed or wounded on the Armenian side.

The Armenian Defense Ministry press service has said tension prevailed in the border areas of Khachik and Aneri in Yekhegnadzorskiy Rayon on 10 May. The fire [words indistinct]. No one was hurt on the Armenian side. Nakhichevan's military forces fired on [words indistinct] with tanks and infantry combat vehicles that morning. The Armenian fighters returned fire and forced the enemy to abandon its provocative activities.

Regrettably, those were not the only incidents on the border. Exchanges of fire have also taken place near (Suren) and Berdaper in Idzhevanskiy Rayon.

Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan knows problems and disputes cannot be solved by armed clashes, but it does not intend to abandon its policy of force. It seems that Azerbaijan's leading officials are convinced that fighting is the only way for them to safeguard their positions. We do not believe the people will support that policy and [words indistinct].

Defense Department Reports 3 Soldiers Wounded

NC1205163393 Yerevan SNARK in English 1303 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Yerevan, 12 May (SNARK)—Three Armenian soldiers were wounded as the result of the last night shellings of the frontier posts at the Sisianskiy region of Armenia. The Armenian Department of Defense has also informed of the shellings of the Araratskiy and Yekhegnadzorskiy regions of Armenia. The shellings were from the territory of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. There were used armored military machines, "Shilka" launches and Howitzers.

Azerbaijan

Foreign Ministry on 'New Armenian Aggression'

NC1305164393 Baku TURAN in English 1223 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] Baku, 13 May (TURAN)—Today the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan made a statement which said that the beginning of a new Armenian aggression against Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic confirmed Azerbaijan misgiving about the unwillingness of Armenia to satisfy the demands of the UN SC [Security Council] Resolution number 822 of April 30 1993.

The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan stresses that the massed shelling of villages and town of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic lately led to great casualties and destructions. The escalation of military operations against Tauzskiy and Kazakhskiy districts of Azerbaijan disproved once more the affirmation of Yerevan of the non-participation of Armenia in the conflict. Armenian side actions prove again that territorial expansionism raised to the rank of state policy is the basis of the conflict, said in the foreign ministry statement.

The foreign ministry of the republic regards Armenian aggression against Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and its frontier districts as a refusal of Armenia republic to follow the demands of the UN SC resolution and its unwillingness to comply with the joint peaceful initiative of the United States, Turkey and Russia.

Calls For UN Action

LD1305030993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2200 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] The UN, 13 May—Azerbaijan has called on the UN Security Council to "take resolute severe measures against Armenia." This is contained in an Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry statement that was issued on Wednesday at the headquarters of the community of nations as a Security Council document.

The Armenian Armed Forces, the document points out, are continuing combat actions in the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic. In recent days, beginning from 1 May, populated localities in the Kazakhskiy, Tauzskiy, Kedabekskiy, and Zangelanskiy rayons of Azerbaijan, and also Sadarakskiy rayon of Nakhichevan, have been subjected to artillery shelling and bombardment from the territory of the Republic of Armenia. There have been casualties among the peaceful population and considerable destruction.

The letter says that "building up its military presence and strengthening its positions in occupied Azerbaijan territory, the aggressor continues to move deep into Azerbaijan, expanding the zone of combat actions." At present, six villages in Kazakhskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan have been seized by Armenian armed forces, and a further 10 villages are under threat of occupation. The number of refugees amounts to 7,000 people. The offensive by Armenian forces is continuing in Agderinskiy, Geranboyskiy, and Fizulinskiy rayons of Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry, the statement stresses, "calls on the UN Security Council to take resolute severe measures directed at curbing the aggressor and defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan."

Defense Ministry Reports Continuing Armenian Fire on NAR

NC1205155593 Baku TURAN in English 1409 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Baku, 12 May (TURAN)—According to the Defence Ministry of Azerbaijan the Armed Forces of Armenia continue to fire the populated areas of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic [NAR]. In the morning May 12 the regional centre of Sadarak and the positions of Azerbaijan Army were under shelling from the territory of Araratskiy region of Armenia. There are great destructions. Three soldiers of Azerbaijanian Army were wounded.

The subunits of the Armed Forces of Armenia try to begin active military operations on the occupied Azerbaijanian territories. On May 12 the enemy supported by the armoured equipment attacked the village of Kalaychylar of Agdamskiy region. Three Azeri soldiers were wounded while they repulsed an attack.

More on Fighting

LD1205151793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1447 GMT 12 May 93

[By AZERTAC and ARMENPRESS correspondents for TASS]

[Text] Baku May 12 TASS—Armenian units continue shelling populated localities of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, says today's communique of the Azeri Defence Ministry. The administrative centre of the Sadarak district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and positions of the Azeri Army situated in the district were shelled from heavy guns on the night to May 12 from the territory of Armenia's Ararat district, says a report of AZERTAC News Agency. Destruction was caused in Sadarak. Three fighters of the National Army were wounded.

On Wednesday, Armenian units using armoured equipment launched an offensive from the positions in Agderin region on Galaychylar village adjacent to Karabakh's highland part in the Agdam region, AZERTAC reports using the information of the Defence Ministry. Forces of the National Army repulsed the attack. Two Azeri soldiers were wounded. Military experts in Baku believe that these actions of Armenian armed units attest to the intentions of the Armenian military command to resume military operations against Azerbaijan, the AZERTAC report says.

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Yerevan May 12 TASS—Shelling of the positions of self-defence forces in Askeran, Gadrut and Martuni districts was resumed on Wednesday, says a report of the Department of Information and the Press of Nagorno-Karabakh. A report of ARMENPRESS says that Karabakh forces have not returned the fire.

ARMENPESS writes that, in the opinion of the Nagorno-Karabakh Department of Information and the Press, Azeris, believing that the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic rejected the tripartite initiative for the settlement of the conflict, are provoking the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in order to launch an offensive themselves. To prove this view ARMENPRESS cites the fact that Azerbaijan continues concentrating the military potential—armoured equipment, tanks, and in the recent days also helicopters—on the southern borders of Nagorno-Karabakh and in the zone of the Lachin humanitarian corridor.

Troops 'Forced' To Retaliate Against Armenian Shelling

NC1305164893 Baku TURAN in English 1223 GMT 13 May 93

[Text] Baku, 13 May (TURAN)—In the evening May 12 the subunits of Armenian National Army each 10 in number having crossed the frontier of Azerbaijan from the side of Krasnoselsky district of Armenia made an

attempt to capture Murtuz-Dag mountain height in Kedabekskiy district of Azerbaijan. After the two hour fighting with the Azeri frontier-guards the attackers were forced to retreat. During the fighting one artillery subunit of the enemy was annihilated.

In the morning May 13 the Armenian troops were shelling the villages and positions of Azerbaijan Army in Fizulinskiy, Geranboy [Shaumyanovskiy], Agdamskiy and Kubatlinskiy districts. Azerbaijanian side was forced to open the retaliatory fire.

Mitterrand Letter Notes Concern Over Conflict

NC1205160093 Baku TURAN in English 1319 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Baku, 12 May (TURAN)—Today the President of Azerbaijan Elchibey received the French Ambassador in Azerbaijan Jean Peren. The ambassador handed to Elchibey a return letter of the president of France.

The President Mitterrand expresses his concern in the connection with the expansion of new military operations around Nagorno-Karabakh. He notes that France demanded a withdrawal of Armenian subunits from the occupied Kelbadzharskiy district. He noted that France Government decided to render an urgent humanitarian assistance to the refugees from this district.

President of France expressed hope that Azerbaijan would support any efforts to resume peacemaking process under CSCE auspices for only this process could stop the expansion of the armed conflict.

National Assembly Confirms 10 Cabinet Ministers

OW1305045293 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Russian 1500 GMT 12 May 93

[From the "Telefaks" newscast]

[Text] The Azerbaijan National Assembly has confirmed the following ministers in their duties:

National Security - Fakhreddin Takhmazov
Foreign Affairs - Tofik Gasymov
Finance - Salekh Mamedov
Material Resources - (Farukh Azeynalov)
Culture - Polad Ogly Byul-Byul
People's Education - (Filidun) Dzhalilov
Information and the Press - (Sabir Ruslankhorly)
Enlightenment - Tofik (Gadzhiyev)
Health - (Ruslan Guseynov)
Labor and Social Protection of the Population - (Akif) Kerimov

Mullazade To Head Foreign Relations Department

NC1005201793 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1900 GMT 9 May 93

[Text] President Elchibey has instructed that Asim Nazim ogly Mullazade, special presidential representative to the talks held on the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, be appointed director of the foreign relations department of the state adviser's office on foreign policy.

Georgia

Hostages Freed From Russian 'Army Township'

LD1205104193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0707 GMT 12 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—Seven women and one child—seized on March 11 [date as received] before a raid on an Army township of Russian troops in Kutaisi were freed on Tuesday [11 May] evening. Nobody of them was hurt, ITAR-TASS learned today from the Press Centre of the Russian forces in the Transcaucasia. The Press Centre reported that on that evening Russian troops regained control over the Army township.

The local authorities are conducting an investigation to establish who is responsible for the bandit action against the Russian Army township.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Kutaisi Investigation

LD1205124793 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 0900 GMT 12 May 93

[Interview granted by State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze to unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] Yesterday's tragedy in Kutaisi showed us once again that they [not further identified] are working very hard to keep this country in constant chaos. It is not by coincidence that this tragedy precedes your meeting with Yeltsin. What do you think?

[Shevardnadze] I would like to say something else before I answer your question. In order to investigate the matter in detail and fully, a government commission has been set up. It is headed by Zurab Kervalishvili, and it comprises the procurator general, Tedo Ninidze; Irakli Batiashvili; the mayor of Kutaisi, Teimuraz Shashiashvili; the deputy defense minister, Gia Vashakidze—who was appointed today; and others.

It is difficult to make a full conclusion at the moment. I said at the first meeting of this commission that the Kutaisi incident was an unsanctined attempt from an unofficial formation to invade a military town. We were

told that about 20 people with military equipment invaded the Russian troops' territory in the military town, and then the tragedy followed. Such action cannot be justified and it is always connected with grave consequences.

[Correspondent] This fact unfortunately speaks of a low standard of discipline in our army.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, that is right. In my opinion, the military personnel could have avoided the bloodshed but, sadly, it did not happen. They should have informed the mayor of Kutaisi, but he was told nothing. That is why this tragedy could not be avoided. I think that the commission must establish if there was a prearrangement between the attackers and the representatives of the military unit.

I think that this incident was provoked in an attempt to wreck my meeting with Yeltsin. The Russian military does not want this meeting to take place and does not want it to have a positive outcome. Neither am I ruling out that there are forces here in Georgia who want this meeting to be wrecked.

The most important thing now is to avoid further complications. We are facing the most difficult task; the schedule of the withdrawal of the Russian forces had been drawn up and they were to be withdrawn in a just over a month's time from the military unit where the incident took place. If such an uncontrollable series of actions take place, then we will probably face a catastrophe. So I would like to remind everybody that before we have a unified, centrally governed, well-organized army, we will have many such incidents and we will not be able either to win the war or carry out patriotic deeds.

The new defence minister, Gia Karkarashvili, brought me a draft of the new structure practically embracing all armed forces except for the Interior Ministry armed forces. I will discuss this structure further tomorrow, and ratify it. After that, a new popular movement should start in Georgia to create a unified and well-organized army. Then such incidents will no longer take place. These are my general conclusions.

[Correspondent] Thank you. [end recording]

Russian Troops Press Cited

LD1205145093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1317 GMT 12 May 93

[By GIA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 12 May—Today the press center of Russian troops in the Caucasus region made a statement regarding Eduard Shevardnadze's statement on the armed conflict in Kutaisi.

The Georgian Information Agency has sent the text of this document to ITAR-TASS. In particular, it said: "The head of the Georgian state said that one can see that the Russian servicemen's behavior is directed at wrecking the negotiations between him and Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on 14 May. This causes perplexity."

The statement notes that "the command of the Russian troops in the Caucasus region appealed several times personally to Eduard Shevardnadze and the parliament of Georgia to take measures in order to prevent attacks on military compounds and subunits of Russian troops which have became much more frequent since March. In this connection the command of the Russian troops in the Caucasus region believes that this statement has no grounds and is one more attempt by the Georgian side to absolve itself of blame for what has happened".

Rocket Attack Against Sukhumi City Center Reported

LD1205123493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] In the meantime, at 1300 hours today, Sukhumi was again shelled from Grad rocket launchers. About 45 rockets exploded in the city center and adjoining areas.

Recent Resignations of Kitovani, Ioseliani Analyzed

MK1305124693 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 20, 16 May 93 (signed to press 11 May 93) p A12

[Akakiy Mikadze report: "Decorated Officers Forced Out"]

[Text] Georgian Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani and Security and Defense Council member Dzhaba Ioseliani have resigned. Having one year ago brought to power Eduard Shevardnadze, the incumbent parliament chairman, they have recently placed themselves in opposition to him. The situation of dual power was clearly inconvenient for Shevardnadze. In the past few months, a confrontation with Kitovani and discretionary actions by the latter in Abkhazia gave rise to rumors about a possible coup d'etat in Georgia.

Against this backdrop, a statement by the parliament speaker that he is relieving Kitovani of the post of defense minister came as an even greater surprise. Right after this, the Georgian Security and Defense Council demanded that Dzhaba Ioseliani should resign too. Ioseliani was quick to respond: "If the problem is with me, then I quit." However, as Eduard Shevardnadze's most influential opponents were leaving the political scene, they were careful to pick up reliable successors to take over from them.

Giya Karkarashvili was appointed Georgia's new defense minister.

34-year-old Karkarashvili fought in Afghanistan and has the rank of a Soviet Army captain. He also fought in South Ossetia, where he met with Tengiz Kitovani,

whose protege he is believed to be. During the coup of December 1991-January 1992 he was commander of the White Eagle battalion. Later he served as military commandant of Tbilisi, commander of the National Guard, and commander of the Georgian Armed Forces in Abkhazia. Karkarashvili was quoted as saying: "I will not spare 200,000 Georgians to exterminate 90,000 Abkhazes."

The outgoing Dzhaba Ioseliani put Teymuraz Khachishvili, who has shown the former loyalty and resisted Shevardnadze's efforts to control him, in the key position of internal affairs minister. On the second day after his resignation, Ioseliani mustered the Mhedrioni troops to tell them that this force would have active branches throughout the republic. Even having been forced to resign, Kitovani and Ioseliani are not leaving politics. They have an opportunity to keep afloat primarily because they have specific persons behind them who have already divided the spheres of influence in various sectors of the economy. This is also clear to Shevardnadze, who decorated both men before their resignations with Georgia's highest military award—the First Degree of the Vakhtang Gorgasal Order "For Contributions to the Attainment of Independence and the Formation of the Georgian Armed Forces."

The departures of Kitovani and Ioseliani are bound to bolster Shevardnadze's foreign policy standing. In Ankara, during the funeral of President Ozal, former U.S. Secretary of State Baker expressed surprise at seeing this odd couple in the Georgian leader's entourage. As soon as they were banished from the political scene, it was announced that a meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze, which had been postponed several times, would take place on 13 and 14 May.

One difficulty that will henceforth compound the situation is that Shevardnadze has lost a pretext for justifying the continuation of the Abkhaz war by citing the lack of a single military command and differences of views in the political leadership.

Estonia

Talks With Russia on Military Withdrawal Resume

LD1205182093 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 12 May 93

[Tet] Another round of Estonian-Russian talks began today in Lohusalu. The work started in the morning with a plenary session for the delegations and discussions have continued in all four working groups.

Minister Juri Luik, leader of the Estonian delegation, stated again that the Estonian delegation's main attention at this round of talks is focused on the Russian troop withdrawal. He said that today, indeed, the most noteworthy discussion had taken place in the military working group, where the deadline for the Russian troop withdrawal from Paldiski had been debated. Unfortunately, the Russian delegation's positions on this matter have remained the same. The years 1998 and 1999 are being offered as deadlines, with the willingness to remove the nuclear equipment within the next year. The Estonian side has not gone back on its position that the Russian troops must be withdrawn completely from Estonia by the end of 1993. This should also be technically feasible for the Russian side.

Regarding economic issues, Luik highlighted discussions about the $80 million belonging to Estonia which is frozen in Moscow. According to him, Russia has not yet abandoned delaying tactics, and for this reason the final solution may be postponed until later if matters continue like this.

Defense Minister Rebas Interviewed

PM0705161693 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Apr 93 p A6

[Report on interview with Defense Minister Hain Rebas by Mert Kubu in Tallinn; date not given]

[Text] He is a well-paid history professor in Kiel. He grew up in Goteborg. He is a reserve captain in the Swedish signal corps. His family lives in a two-story villa on Hisingen. How can it come about that such a person—entirely of his own free will—takes on the job of the miserably paid defense minister of Estonia who is contantly under attack?

This remarkable man is Hain Rebas, 50. Last fall he took over responsibility for a literally barefoot army. A few months ago his men did not even have proper shoes.

Rebas was born during World War II in Tallinn. His parents fled to Sweden before he was two years old. He grew up in a patriotic Estonian home, went to school in Goteborg, took his doctorate in history as Jorgen Weibull's pupil and was going to seek a university lecturer's job in Stockholm but was given a tip about a professorship in Nordic history in Kiel. That was 13 years ago.

We found Defense Minister Hain Rebas in a rundown house in Tallinn's Old Town—a house which is next door to the infamous former KGB headquarters.

Two soldiers on guard duty wearing what most resembled the French Foreign Legion's desert fatigues checked our papers. Worn stairs led us to the defense minister's office in an attic room.

[Kubu] Has he taken the job for the honor, for the power or is he a great patriot?

"Someone has to do the job. There were not many people who would be able to manage it in an acceptable way. It is an important job for Estonia and I am managing quite well, better than people here think," Rebas replied.

Out of patriotism, therefore.

But how can he afford it?

Naturally taking leave of absence from his professorship in Kiel is not an entirely simple matter, he admitted. In Kiel he has a home that has to be paid for, and in the West the rent for an apartment is slightly more than 25 rubles. Nor is he wealthy like another Swedish Estonian, former ABBA [expansion unknown] director Jaan Mainitski, the former Estonian foreign minister, now the government's expert on privatization, who commutes between his villa on Djurgarden and Tallin on a diplomatic passport, or like Swedish Estonian Madis Uurike, the present finance minister, and former BGB [expansion unknown] director with his golden parachute.

No, Rebas admitted, his minister's salary is around 3,000 kronor a month—not even a subsistence level wage in Sweden. He is being forced to empty his bank accounts in a way that is driving his wife, Tiina, a school teacher in Goteborg, to desperation. But Rebas dismissed worldly considerations and said instead:

"Barefoot army. No, not any more. Now our men have proper shoes and uniforms. Norway sent ski boots which are called marching boots, the French the legionnaires' uniforms. Last summer there were only 250 hand guns; now we are trying to buy proper arms. We buy where things are best and cheapest."

And Sweden's efforts for the Estonian defense forces?

Poor. Sweden lags far behind other nations. Anxiety about making decisions, Rebas said.

He is quick in his responses and says what he thinks. It is easy to understand that this irritates many people here in Estonia, particularly his opponents in parliament who think that he is too cocky. They are constantly attacking him, and every other day they demand the defense minister's resignation.

His most irascible opponent in parliament is called Mr. Toomepuu, a retired colonel from the United States, a Vietnam veteran, who publicly called Rebas something that can be translated as "a common thief of state

money." The former U.S. colonel considered that the Swedish reserve captain had not paid for his breakfasts at the government hotel where the defense minister lives in Tallinn.

Rebas in his turn countered by saying in the press that former Colonel Toomepuu only understood leaping out of helicopters at the head of a company to spray napalm over some poor village in Vietnam....

The tone in the Estonian political debate is tough.

How large are the forces which Hain Rebas heads?

A Russian general would of course snort contemptuously at this Lilliput army. When everything is complete Rebas will have four battle-ready battalions with a total of 2,000 men. They will be professionals, technically well equipped, very mobile with portable missiles and rockets, and ready to "attack and worry" the enemy in small groups, as the defense minister puts it.

In addition there will be 6,000 men in the Kaitseliit (home guard), trained for guerrilla warfare, and another 2,000 men guarding the border.

How will an enemy attack Estonia?

Hain Rebas knows very well. On his desk he has had the former Soviet Union's secret plan for how the capital of Tallinn was to be attacked in connection with the August coup 1991.

"If revanchist circles in Russia were to come to power, the Spetsnaz troops would strike in the night and murder 30 to 40 leading Estonian politicians. They know exactly where they would find all of them. Someone would be allowed to survive and would be forced in front of the television cameras the following morning. Then the occupying forces would flood in."

The Spetsnaz troops do not have far to come. In the past they were stationed in the Estonian city of Viljandi, but were moved to just over the border in the Pskov region of Russia. In fact their barracks lie only 1,500 meters from the Russian-Estonian border.

The whole of the Estonian general staff is said to consist of former "polkovniks" [colonels] who were trained in the Red Army. Now a NATO officer, retired Estonian Alexander Einseln, is to become supreme commander in Estonia.

Is this a happy combination?

Hain Rebas dismissed the problem and said:

"Colonel Einseln will be a good supreme comannder. He will build up a modern defense force on Western lines.

"It is correct that we have four or five former 'polkovniks' who come from the Red Army. But I have already fired several who were unsuitable, and we are going to fire a few more figures from the general staff."

Is it true that a former red "polkovnik" can only attack en masse?

"There is something in that. They were taught something that is called company reconnaissance. One hundred and fifty men were sent out across a field. Just to see where the enemy's machine guns began to fire from. Obviously they would simply be mowed down," Rebas explained.

An Estonian defense minister who speaks Estonian, Swedish, English, German, and French, but not Russian—how does he manage to negotiate with the Russians?

"Excellently. Excellently," Rebas assured me. The Russians do in fact have more respect for someone who comes from the West. He told me about his meeting with the Russian defense minister, who subsequently contacted their Lithuanian counterpart, complained that Rebas was a "difficult" man, and wondered whether it was not time for a proper night on the vodka with Rebas.

And indeed, with the Lithuanian as go-between, agreement has been reached on a proper session. But Rebas, who does not like vodka, has said that he will take a bottle of whisky with him.

What is the size of the occupying forces still in Estonia?

Perhaps 7,000 uniformed men. In addition there are a further 9,100 "retired" officers. However, many of them are not particularly old and many have weapons at home. Then there is a gang from GRU, the former Soviet military intelligence service, and a number of old KGB men.

Hain Rebas also keeps a watchful eye on a signals intelligence installation close to Tallinn.

Why does Estonia not stop paying out Estonian kroons, a hard currency, for the upkeep of the Russian occupying forces? That would accelerate the withdrawal.

"Yes, I think so too. But for some reason the people in the government do not want to do this," Rebas said.

He admitted that there are also differing views within the governing coalition about Estonia's defense forces. The Christian Democrats are the most aggressive, the Social Democrats more pacifist.

How does Hain Rebas deal with all the attacks from the opposition, the accusations that he as an Estonian based abroad is a "star player?"

"It can be a burden from time to time. Certain forces in Estonia do not want us to have defense forces at all, at least not forces that are integrated with the West. They work against me and spread lies."

They also say that you are an incompetent defense minister and demand your resignation.

Hain Rebas ignites, grows angry, hisses:

"Incompetent? Say those who have never even done military service or who have at most fired three loose shots in their lives. I at least am a trained Swedish officer and also I have always been interested in defense and security policy. And what is wrong with Swedish Defense Minister Anders Bjorck's competence? After all he was only a common soldier.

"By the way, Anders Bjorck is coming to Estonia on a visit in May. I will give orders for a guard of honor. He generally likes that sort of thing."

Rebas laughed. Perhaps he also finds comfort in the thought that he can always go back home to Goteborg where he has his supporters in the Estonian colony. "Tubli poiss" (clever boy) they say of Hain Rebas' work in Tallinn.

Latvia

Ministry Protests to Russia Over Baltic Maneuvers

LD1205190393 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] In the Baltic Sea the Russian Baltic Fleet has started maneuvers, lasting until 15 May. During the maneuvers, combat training and the use of ammunition are envisaged near Latvia's territorial waters. The ammunition is to be used only one day, 14 May. In this context today the Latvian Foreign Ministry presented a note to the Russian Federation Embassy in Latvia. The note points out that the command of the Latvian Navy has received the announcement from the command of the Russian Baltic Fleet that for a time a section of the Latvian economic zone in the Baltic Sea will be closed to shipping because of the firing of rockets.

More on Protest

LD1205194893 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] The Latvian Foreign Ministry draws the attention of the Russian side to the fact that the Baltic Fleet's maneuvers contravene the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Latvian laws on the economic zone and the continental shelf, and the agreement initialed between Latvia and Russia on the transit of warships through waters under Latvian jurisdiction. The Latvian Foreign Ministry regards this Russian resolution on maneuvers by the Baltic Fleet as an unfriendly act toward Latvia, to say nothing of the economic losses incurred by Latvia. The Latvian Foreign Ministry expresses a protest to the Russian side and demands the cancellation of all the planned actions by the Russian Fleet and that they not be allowed in the future.

Russian Stance on Estonia Council Membership Criticized

WS1305085293 Riga LETA in English 1501 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Riga, May 12 (LETA)—Presently the European Council is discussing a possibility to grant two Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania, a full membership of the international organization. The Latvian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement concerning this, which points out that a positive decision would mean an important move of the two neigbouring countries towards their further integration into Europe.

"In the present situation," says the statement, "an opinion expressed by Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrey Kozyrev in a letter to the Secretary General of the European Council Catherine Lalumiere, seems to be embarrassing. In this letter the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry calls on the European Council to refrain from granting Estonia membership of this organization, misinterpreting the situation and making unsubstantiated allegations to Estonia."

The Latvian Foreign Ministry pointed out that Moscow was obviously seeking to set up hindrances for new members to be admitted to the European Council, though Russia itself was not a member of the European organization. The Latvian Foreign Ministry welcomed the eventual admission of Lithuania and Estonia to the European Council and expressed hope that such a move would improve political and economic stability in Europe and namely in the Baltic region.

Iraqis Said Receiving Russian Training at Naval Base

LD1205183293 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 12 May 93

[Excerpt] Why are Saddam Husayn's countrymen living at Bolderaja [naval base outside Riga], and who is the owner of a forged temporary passport? Baiba Saberte tried to find that out today. She turned to Maris Plavnieks, director of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

[Begin recording] [Saberte] Today I managed to get to Bolderaja. I could not believe my eyes! Coming toward me were Saddam Husayn's countrymen [words indistinct] obviously the Russian Army still has not ceased cooperating with Saddam Husayn and observing the contracts (?it has concluded), whether in matters of (?organizing) training or in the rehabilitation of those who have (?completed it). Could you now answer this question: How many of them are there and what are they looking for here?

[Plavnieks] As far as what goes on at Bolderaja is concerned, I suppose a lot more could be added by the apparatus of the minister of state, the Bureau for the Control of the Withdrawal of the Russian Army. Unequivocally the activity, the training of Iraqi fighters

here, is illegal. This is yet another crude slap in the face for Latvia, but that is the actual situation, and possibly we don't know much because the state of Latvia is not allowed on its own territory into every place, to see and check what is going on. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Premier, Delegation Return From Visit to France

LD0905220393 Riga Radio Riga Network in Russian 2000 GMT 9 May 93

[Text] A Latvian Government delegation has ended its official visit to France. Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and a number of Latvian ministers arrived at Riga Airport today and reported about agreements signed between Latvia and France.

The LETA news agency reports that on the whole the visit was successful.

Lithuania

Foreign Minister Meets EC Commissioner

LD1205103693 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2300 GMT 11 May 93

[Text] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys met Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the European Community van den Broek in Brussels today.

Possibilities to expand cooperation between Lithuania and the European Community were discussed at the meeting. The Russian Army withdrawal from Lithuania and problems of Lithuania's meat exports to the European Community countries were also discussed.

The Lithuanian foreign minister also met Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly Peter Corterier and Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner today.

Tomorrow Mr. Gylys is planning to continue his meetings with NATO experts and European Community officials.

On Thursday, the Lithuanian foreign minister is going to Strasbourg, where Lithuania's admission to the European Council is due to be officially confirmed on 14 May.

Presidential Aide Discusses Foreign Policy

WS1305120393 Vilnius VALSTIECIU LAIKRASTIS in Lithuanian 20 Apr 93 No. 33 p 5

[Interview with Justas Vincas Paleckis, president's aide for foreign policy, by Romas Masteika: "There Is A Great Lack of Confidence"]

[Text] [Masteika] **Your name was mentioned when forming Lubys' government, where you had a chance of becoming the foreign minister. However, your former colleagues from the LDLP [Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party] opposed this. Why? What did this opposition include—party veterans or its pragmatic junior members?**

[Paleckis] I have heard that there were different opinions. The most hostile people were those for whom my withdrawal from the LDLP was a dramatic emotional experience, and those who rejected the argument that I left the LDLP, which wanted to transform itself into a social democratic organization, for the Social Democratic Party. This was a small leap.

[Masteika] **Will your cooperation with the president influence the forming of foreign policy? In other words, will you be only a consultant, an aide, as is your official name, or will you draft programs, prepare agreements, and assist in implementing them? How could you define your cooperation with the Foreign Ministry?**

[Paleckis] Neither I nor the foreign policy group will prepare agreements. This is the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry. However, we will have to cooperate in projecting the strategy of foreign policy and in discussing and correcting its key principles. My specific task will be to help the president, because it is he who enjoys the constitutional right to form the concept of Lithuania's foreign policy that meets the interests of our state.

I am not going to pay compliments to the president and say only pleasant things. It will be my duty to express my opinion on the current situation without lies and hypocrisy. I understand that the influence of all aides will depend on the manner of presenting their ideas and the extent to which they coincide with the president's views.

Regarding my relations with the Foreign Ministry ... I believe that the group of aides will prepare president's regulations which will define our contacts with the Foreign Ministry and other official institutions.

[Masteika]**Are you starting your work with anxiety or confidence? Do you think that the Foreign Ministry is unnecessarily splitting wood, since the stack remains intact? I mean the new delegation for talks with Russia, the Surgut conference and others.**

[Paleckis] Our public is anxious not only about foreign policy. All of us—together with the large and the small opposition—must strive for more confidence. Certainly, the negotiating delegation could be bigger and more imposing. (We learned after this interview that the delegation had been enlarged with some new members: V. Vadapalas, E. Jarasiunas, and R. Ozolas; C. Stankevicius enjoys a consultative vote—R. M.). There should be more continuity. Its absence reflects the situation in the Seimas and society. The precipice between the position and the opposition is too wide. Who is responsible for this? Usually both sides are to blame.

[Masteika] **What is your impression of the foreign policy section in the government program? Is it balanced or vague? Do you think that our diplomats do not know what definite moves should be made? Here is one sentence from**

the program: "To activate the negotiations with the Russian Federation." What does this mean? The behavior of the Foreign Ministry has so far displayed only concessions.

[Paleckis] The program deserves criticism for many reasons. Reproaches were expressed at the meeting of the Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee. The government promised to present a program of definite actions that would also include politics. There are very broad possibilities for enlivening our talks with Russia, because we need definite agreements with its government on a number of programs—from economic to political ones, to say nothing of the ultimate withdrawal of its Army. Cooperation with Russia opens up new options, especially for businessmen.

[Masteika] **Should we look to the east or to the west?**

[Paleckis] I could reply this way: Lithuania has no good relations with the east, and it is not interesting to the west. From another perspective, a Lithuania that does not aspire to membership in the European Community will not be able to survive.

[Masteika] **Do you think that the current political situation is reminiscent of that of 1940? First of all, the situation in Russia—the strengthening of the communist and antidemocratic movement, and the statements by Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev and Defense Minister P. Grachev on suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states....**

[Paleckis] The situation in Russia is menacing. The threat to the Baltic countries would be really great in the event that dogmatic and chauvinistic communist forces come to power. On the other hand, I think that the comparison with 1940 is slightly incorrect. Lithuania and all East and Central European countries were between two big dictators—Hitler and Stalin—53 years ago. In the meantime, Western democracies were weak, and they were fighting only for their existence.

The present situation is completely different. Even if the developments in Russia are most unfavorable for democracy, the situation will be far from the totalitarian regime that could begin expanding. In the event of a civil war in Russia, repercussions of violence may reach the Baltic states. However, the best guarantee for preventing this is the unity of all Lithuanian democratic forces and the people, and our stability. Moreover, there is no Hitler in the West. Germany is a democratic country, while Poland is becoming one. There is also a powerful coalition of Western states. Even Russia's imperial forces cannot overlook this.

Economic Committee Head Criticizes Agrarian Reform

WS1205134293 Vilnius VALSTIECIU LAIKRASTIS in Lithuanian 17 Apr 93 No. 32 p 3

[Interview with Professor Kazimieras Antanavicius, chairman of the Seimas Economic Committee, by Juozas Kulakauskas: "Reform Must Not Be Suspended"]

[Text] The rural community is anxious about the government's decisions on agrarian issues adopted in March and the work on amendments to the law on agrarian reform. People in the countryside, however, need peace of mind and a clear sense of what is happening, because spring chores are close at hand. The newspaper correspondent discussed this with Prof. K. Antanavicius, chairman of the Seimas Economic Committee.

[Kulakauskas] **Work on amendments to the law on agrarian reform is nearing completion. What is your opinion on this?**

[Antanavicius] I would not call them amendments. There should be a definite plan about what to amend and how, which should also predict the outcome. Attempts are made to amend the law in fragments. That is why it seems that the intention is quite the reverse, and even worse. We should not live with illusions, as was the case with the hasty destruction of collective farms and the decision to restore land to those owners who live in towns. Those may not have been the best decisions, but now Lithuanian people have some grounds for regaining their land. Many are ready to work and set up farms. That is why the adoption of these amendments would create even greater unrest and hindrance of work than before.

Instead of suspending the restoration of land for three or five years, I propose to immediately legalize ownership and to let everyone, including those who have received from two to three hectares, dispose of their land freely. Let those who want to sell the land do this. Those who are senile or who have no heirs may sell it. They will each receive a few dozen thousand talonas, and certain social issues will be resolved.

The statement contained in the current amendments that people will get 70,000 talonas for one hectare in compensation is just one more illusion and deception of the rural population. Some Seimas deputies and government officials behave very irresponsibly when they say this, because the state does not have such funds. By selling their land, people would compensate a few individuals. Those who do not want to farm would get money, whereas those who wish to work the land, would be able to do this. The state should not interfere with this process. The state could extend credits to those who would like to enlarge their farms, and thus promote their normal creation.

[Kulakauskas] **Instead of debating and adopting the amendments to the law on agrarian reform in the Seimas**

on 4 March 1993, the government issued its resolutions Nos. 137 and 138 sanctioning these amendments. The Ministry of Agriculture instructed the regional agrarian commissions on the new rules in implementing reform. Is this lawful and necessary?

[Antanavicius] The adoption of these decisions is unlawful, because there has been no thorough discussion, and the Seimas has not endorsed a respective document. On the other hand, these decisions are useless for the countryside. They cause nothing but confusion in people's heads and the process of reform. The significance of the resolutions adopted by the government and the Ministry of Agriculture could be defined by the saying: "Putting the cart before the horse!"

[Kulakauskas] **On behalf of the opposition, Seimas deputy M. Treinys has several times proposed to review and adopt a draft resolution canceling the given government decision, because the latter violates the owners' rights and the law. However, the Seimas majority rejected his proposal. How would you assess this?**

[Antanavicius] I have also suggested to Agrarian Minister R. Karazija that he repeal these resolutions. I have told the Seimas that they must be annulled, because they contradict the law and are misleading. People do not know which laws to obey—the old or the new. During my visit to the Gargzdai constituency which elected me, I told its officials that under the current circumstances they could behave any way they liked, because they were not responsible for the legal mess. Those unlawful decisions should be appealed to the Constitutional Court.

[Kulakauskas] **What do you think of ownership and land restoration as a politician and a citizen?**

[Antanavicius] My views are clear and known to many people. I am not against property and its restoration. However, the situation in Lithuania does not permit assigning absolute truth for to saying that "property is sacred," which has been reiterated for three years. We should see what the actual situation is. If we want to seriously resolve the problem of property restoration, we should first make an inventory of all assets and see what can be compensated and how. Only then can we get down to work, because it is obvious that the current assets will not be enough for all who demand them.

[Kulakauskas] **What about restoring land to its lawful owners?**

[Antanavicius] Our previous decision was to restore land to all owners—to those who work it and who do not. Since this process has already begun, we should not suspend or reverse it.

The current amendments to the law on agrarian reform that give priority to land leasing are economically detrimental and will do no good. Our agriculture is inefficient. Having leased land, people will have to pay the rent and taxes, and they will again be short of money for the construction of facilities, and for buying machines and fertilizers. This will increase the costs of agricultural produce and food prices, and living standards will continue to fall.